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Abstract 
 
Sub-advising contracts have grown considerably during recent decades despite the 
agency issues identified by prior literature. In the first chapter, I find that the market 
provides several contractual arrangements such as co-branding, multi-advisory 
arrangements and performance fees that management companies can use to protect their 
more informed investors from poor management by these sub-advising firms. 
Additionally, I show that fund families that have outsourced some of their portfolios 
tend to have greater market share, especially when a new investment style is launched. 
The second chapter empirically analyzes the role of investment companies’ core 
competencies in explaining the growing importance of outsourcing within the mutual 
fund industry. We demonstrate that management companies allocate portfolios that are 
not within their core competencies to sub-advisors whose core competency coincides 
with the outsourced mutual fund. We investigate the efficiency of such decisions in 
terms of performance, and the findings suggest that selecting a sub-advisor according to 
core competency improves mutual fund performance. In the third chapter, I examine 
whether individual management leads to better performance than team approach when 
managers face greater coordination cost. SRI funds provide an ideal empirical setting 
for testing this, as these funds implement strict social criteria. We show that SRI funds 
are better managed under an individual management structure independently of the 
specific fund and family characteristics. This performance increases for SRI funds with 
highly levels of social screenings since individual management leads to sharpen 
information processing and decision-making.  
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Resumen 
 
Los acuerdos de sub-contratación para la gestión de fondos de inversión han crecido 
considerablemente durante las últimas décadas, a pesar de los problemas de agencia que 
sufren dichos contratos. En el primer capítulo, se muestra que el mercado ofrece varios 
acuerdos contractuales, tales como “co-branding”, “multi-gestión” y “compensación por 
desempeño” que las gestoras pueden utilizar  para proteger a sus inversores más 
sofisticados de la posible mala gestión de las empresas sub-contratadas. También se 
observa que las gestoras que han sub-contratado externamente algunas de sus carteras 
suelen tener una mayor cuota de mercado, sobre todo cuando lanzan  un nuevo estilo de 
inversión. El segundo capítulo se analiza la relación entre la especialización de las 
gestoras y las decisiones de sub-contratación. Se muestra que las gestoras de fondos 
tienden a sub-contratar carteras que no están dentro de sus competencias básicas y 
buscan empresas externas que si tengan dicha especialidad. Se investiga la eficacia de 
este tipo de decisiones en términos de rendimiento y los resultados sugieren que la 
selección de un gestora externa especialista en la categoría del fondo sub-contratado 
mejora el rendimiento de dicho fondo. En el tercer capítulo, se estudia cuando la gestión 
de carteras por un solo gestor es mejor que la gestión formada por un equipo de 
gestores. Se define el coste de coordinación entre individuos como el principal 
problema de la gestión en equipo. Los fondos de inversión socialmente responsables 
proporcionan un marco empírico ideal para este estudio, ya que estas carteras 
implementan estrictos criterios sociales que reducen el conjunto de oportunidades de 
inversión. Los resultados indican que fondos de inversión con responsabilidad social 
son mejor gestionados con una estructura de gestión individual. Este mejor rendimiento 
aumenta cuanto más restringido son las oportunidades de inversión que dicho fondo 
permite.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
US registered investment companies play a major role in the US economy and around 
the world financial markets. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI Fact 
Book, 2014), there are 30 trillions of dollars in mutual funds asset worldwide, with half 
of them ($15 trillions) in the US mutual fund market. Besides, the number of sub-
advised funds has grown considerably and at a significantly higher rate than mutual 
funds managed in-house. According to the ICI, approximately 40% of funds were 
delegated to a sub-advisor for portfolio management in 2009. The number of mutual 
funds with either affiliated or unaffiliated sub-advisors grew from 1,304 in 1999 to 
2,414 in April 2009, which represents an increase of 85%. Moreover, the value of 
outsourced funds is expected to increase by up to 2.2 trillion dollars by 2016 (Financial 
Research Corporation).  
In an industry that is becoming more and more competitive, with a growing universe of 
investments and greater complexity of assets, a team management structure seems to be 
more optimal for handling and proceeding larger volume of information related to the 
investment management decisions. Consistent with this phenomenon, there has been an 
outstanding growth of team management in the mutual fund industry over the past two 
decades. For example, by mid 90s, the proportion of team managed funds was barely 
30% while today this figure went up to nearly 70%. Despite the notable switch toward 
team-based portfolio management, the extant academic literature has not found clear 
performance benefits of teamwork in the fund industry.  
These figures suggest the emergence of new business models within the mutual fund 
industry that must be studied and properly understood. Recent literature on mutual 
funds has focused on the decisions made by firms that provide mutual funds and their 
consequences for investors, including decisions about fund family structure and strategy 
(Nanda et al., 2004 and Gaspar et al., 2006), whether to merge or liquidate funds 
(Khorana et al., 2007), and the role of fund boards and their impact on fund fees (Ding 
and Wermers, 2009). This thesis aims to explain the growth of sub-advising portfolio 
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management in the last decade and investigates how different organizational structures 
perform within the investment funds industry.  
Outsourcing asset management may create a set of agency problems ranging from a 
simple lack of effort on the part of the agent to the unfair treatment of different clients. 
In many cases, portfolios are managed by companies that also manage their own funds 
and, in such cases, if the costs and benefits of managing both types of funds are 
different, some conflicts of interest may arise and the agent (sub-advisor) could give a 
preferential treatment to one group of funds over the other. The fact that outsourced 
funds are unable to outperform in-house funds makes it even harder to understand the 
growth of outsourcing portfolio management, unless fund performance was not the 
main driver. Providing further explanations of why performance does not appear to 
concern these firms when initiating a sub-advisory agreement will help to understand 
what motivates management companies to outsource their portfolio management. 
The organizational structure of managmentent companies plays also a critical role on 
the fund investments efficiency. Team management can gain and profit from larger 
intrinsic knowledge and this should be accompanied with portfolios under team 
structures being outperforming those managed by an individual manager, however. 
most of the current research on fund management structure is unable to evidence it. This 
results together with the fact that there are about one third of portfolios that are still 
managed by individual managers, arise the interest of studying what are the advantage 
of individual portfolio management. We draw on the Steiner’s theory of process loss 
(1972) to claim that coordination costs in reaching an optimal decision under time 
constraints present in the portfolio management industry is one of the downside of using 
a team approach.  
The primary objective of this thesis is to study what motives management companies to 
outsource the investment decisions of some of their funds and analyze the role that 
coordination cost plays in the efficiency of portfolio management structures. The thesis 
is structured in three chapters. The first chapter examines the growth of sub-advising 
within the investment funds industry over the last decade and shows that outsourcing 
contracts allow management companies to gain market share. Contrary to previous 
literature, I document that outsourced funds underperform only when investors are 
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uninformed. For cases in which the investor demands good management, the market 
actually provides several contractual arrangements (co-branding, multi-advisory 
agreements or performance fees) for monitoring sub-advisors. Therefore, by offering 
each client what they demand, the fund families can benefit from outsourcing to 
improve their market share.  
The second chapter of this thesis analyzes the role of core competencies in outsourcing 
decisions. The results are in general consistent with previous research on industrial 
organization. We show that management companies are more likely to outsource funds 
outside his core competency while keeping in-house the funds that are within his core 
business Additionally, firms outsourcing the management of funds that exceeded their 
core competency improved the performance of the funds managed internally compared 
to investment companies that maintained in-house management of such funds. Lastly, in 
this chapter we demonstrate that the core competency remains an important factor in 
firm outsourcing decisions even when other factors are involved, such as pre-existing 
commercial relationships. Previous studies (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002) indicate the 
importance of previous interactions between companies in subsequent agreements or 
contracts.  
The third chapter addresses another interesting questions: what are the advantage of 
individual portfolio management as well as under which circumstances such 
organization structures are more suited than team management. We examine whether 
individual management leads to better performance, relative to team management 
approach, when portfolio managers face higher coordination costs. We show that SRI 
funds are better managed under an individual management structure independently of 
the specific fund and family characteristics. This performance increases for SRI funds 
with highly levels of social screenings since individual management leads to sharpen 
information processing and decision-making since high levels of screening criteria 
funds have a more constrained set of investment opportunity than conventional funds. 
This thesis contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to the general 
literature on principal-agent relationships (e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1986), 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Kawasaki and McMillan (1987), Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991)) by applying the principal-agent framework to describe outsourcing in 
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the specific case of the mutual fund industry. More specifically, we relate to the 
outsourcing literature (Cashman and Deli (2009), Kuhnen (2009), Duong (2010), Del 
Guercio et al. (2010, 2014), Chuprinin et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2013)) while 
providing empirical evidence of contracting design to mitigate some of the main issues 
in an outsourcing model. As far as we know, this is the first study in which outsourced 
mutual funds are not presented as underperforming portfolios. Second, it also 
contributes to the recent literature on mutual funds at the family level (e.g., Gaspar, et 
al. (2006) or Elton et al. (2007)), showing how families use outsourcing agreements to 
strategically attend to the potential types of investor to gain market share. Third, the 
research is related to industrial organization literature on core competency and firm 
performance (Quinn, 1992; Ellram and Billington, 2001), and outsourcing activity and 
internal efficiency (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Venkatesan, 1992 and Quinn and 
Hilmer, 1994). Forth, this thesis contributes to the general and broader organizational 
management literature when manager of corporations face different restrictions and 
firms suffer from coordination problems. And finally, we also contribute to the growing 
literature of social concerned investments, in which prior literature is still unsettled 
about its effectiveness in general performance terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Chapter 2: Management Sub-advising: The Mutual 
Fund Industry  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, the number of sub-advised funds has grown considerably and at a 
significantly higher rate than mutual funds managed in-house. According to the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI), approximately 40% of funds were delegated to a 
sub-advisor for portfolio management in 2009. The number of mutual funds with either 
affiliated or unaffiliated sub-advisors grew from 1,304 in 1999 to 2,414 in April 2009, 
which represents an increase of 85%. Moreover, the value of outsourced funds is 
expected to increase by up to 2.2 trillion dollars by 2016 (Financial Research 
Corporation). These figures suggest the emergence of a new business model within the 
mutual fund industry that must be studied and properly understood. 
Despite the growth of outsourced portfolio management in the mutual fund industry, 
relatively little research has been conducted on the reasons why management companies 
are sub-advising the portfolio management of their funds. Studies of this new business 
model for mutual funds have compared the performance of outsourced funds to that of 
funds managed in-house. In general, these studies (Duong (2010), Chuprinin et al. 
(2013) and Chen et al. (2013), among others) indicate that externally managed funds 
significantly underperform internally managed funds, and they provide explanations 
based on specific actions taken by portfolio managers to benefit in-house mutual funds 
(e.g., assigning preferential IPOs and the preferential use of information).  
This chapter aims to explain the growth of sub-advising within the investment funds 
industry in the last decade, showing that such agreements help managers to gain market 
share in an increasingly competitive industry. Because it is difficult to explain how 
market share is gained by offering only poorly managed sub-advised funds, we should 
first examine these contracts in more depth to determine if there are some cases that do 
not underperform. We find that, in fact, underperformance is more likely to exist only 
when the investor tolerates it (either because they have other interests or because they 
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are uninformed). For cases in which the investor demands good management, we show 
that the market actually provides the necessary mechanisms to monitor the sub-advisors. 
We demonstrate that including some contractual arrangements (such as cobranding, 
multi-advisory or performance fee arrangements) into the outsourcing contract can 
mitigate the agency issues of firms managing internal and external portfolios. Therefore, 
by offering each client what they really demand, the fund families can benefit from 
outsourcing to improve their market share.  
Contrary to previous literature, we show that outsourcing contracts can produce well 
performing funds under specific types of contractual arrangements that eliminate the 
underperformance caused by the conflict of interest discussed above. Our findings 
indicate that an incentive fee mechanism and different types of sub-advisory agreements 
– such as multi-manager contracts and co-branding business models – serve to control 
and monitor the conflict of interest.  
We first analyze the co-branding model as a contractual arrangement to reduce the 
negative effects of this conflict. In a co-branding arrangement, the principal advisor 
partners with a sub-advisor to capitalize on the reputation of the sub-advisor (or a 
specific portfolio manager employed by the sub-advisor). Previous literature on contract 
design (Hayek (1948) and Marshall (1949)) indicates that firm reputations and brand 
names are adequate mechanisms to assure contract performance. In this case, the 
conflict of interest in the management company is reduced because the sub-advisor 
could lose not only the sub-advisory contract but also its reputation or prestige (e.g., 
Klein and Leffler (1981) point out that reputation effects represent an implicit protection 
against adverse selection). We document an improvement of up to 119 basis points 
(bps) per year for funds operating under a co-branding model in which sub-advisory 
services are employed in cases of conflict of interest. 
The second mechanism is the multi-advising arrangement, which allows management 
firms to hire more than one sub-advisor to manage its funds. Such contracts are exempt 
from certain requirements of mutual funds mandated by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which allows them to terminate and appoint new 
unaffiliated sub-advisors without shareholder approval; this exemption makes it easier 
and less costly to terminate the sub-advisory relationship. Under this framework, sub-
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advisors are concerned with losing contracts; thus, they focus more on fund 
management, which leads to a more competitive environment. Given a potential conflict 
of interest, we find that multi-advisory outsourcing contracts improve fund performance 
by 106 bps per year. Some companies recognize the usefulness of such agreements and 
include them as an exception in contracts with advisory and sub-advisory firms being 
restricted from managing other funds.1  
Third, we analyze whether incentive fees might mitigate the underperformance of sub-
advised mutual funds. Incentive fees are a reward structure that makes management 
compensation a function of investment performance. Legally, a mutual fund can only 
use a type of fee known as a “fulcrum fee” as an incentive fee.2 We find that sub-
advised funds governed by performance fee contracts have significantly improved 
performance. We also observe that sub-advised funds subject to conflicts of interest 
enjoy a performance improvement of approximately 127 bps per year when they charge 
a performance fee to mitigate such conflict.  
After revising the role of these contractual arrangements (cobranding, multi-advisory or 
performance fee arrangements) and overcoming the underperformance concerns, we 
study how fund families are establishing specific outsourcing agreements in financial 
markets, justifying the extensive use of outsourcing in the mutual fund industry over the 
last decade. Recent studies of decisions in mutual fund families indicate that they face 
incentives to increase the menu of funds offered to customers, increasing both the 
number of funds and the investment objectives. Massa (2003) notes that fund 
proliferation is a tool used by fund families to increase market coverage and limit 
competition given the free-switching options offered to investors (that is, firms allow 
switching across funds belonging to the same family at no cost). Gallaher et al. (2006) 
                                                          
1
 For instance in our database, we observe that the principal advisor of John Hancock Funds II - 
International Growth Equity entered into an agreement with Turner Investments, L.P. (“The Sub-
advisor”) in which Turner agreed that for a five-year period, it will not act as an investment adviser for 
any fund with investment strategies and policies substantially similar to those of the sub-advisory fund. 
However, the sub-advisor is allowed to manage other funds in cases of multi-manager funds in which 
Turner is one of three or more managers of such fund. 
2
 According to the 1970 Amendment of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the incentive fee must be 
centered on an index, with increases in fees for performance above the index matched by decreases in 
fees for performance below the index. 
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observes that the more investment strategies a mutual fund family offers, the larger the 
flows of funds received.  
Additionally, Khorana and Servaes (2012) show that price competition and product 
differentiation are both effective strategies for increasing market share in the mutual 
fund industry. We hypothesize that management companies could be using outsourcing 
to increase their market share and therefore their profits, offering a wider range of 
products especially in those investment styles where they have no previous experience. 
Outsourcing allows them to focus and produce in-house in their areas of expertise while 
externalizing those activities with which they have less experience. We find that 
management engaged with outsourcing contracts are more likely to gain market share, 
especially if such arrangements allow them to offer funds with new investment 
objectives. 
Given the positive impact of contractual agreements on underperformance concerns, 
why some outsourcing agreements do not employ these mechanisms remains 
unresolved. We hypothesize that including such clauses in the outsourcing contract 
involves writing the contracts under higher fees (the agent may demand higher 
compensation because he could lose some privileges, for example, the subsidization 
evidenced by Chuprinin et al. (2013) could not be applied here) and it is even harder to 
find a counterpart willing to agree with these arrangements. This is also consistent with 
prior literature on contractual theory that claims that as the number of clauses in a 
contract goes up, more expensive it becomes to write the arrangement (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt (1986)).  
We argue that incorporating these arrangements may be costly and that greater effort 
should be dedicated to establishing the agreements. Therefore, the management 
companies incur these costs only if the potential investors are highly sensitive to 
performance. We find that outsourced mutual funds oriented toward sophisticated 
investors incorporate these contractual arrangements to avoid underperformance 
although the cost and effort to impose them could be higher, but funds oriented toward 
unsophisticated investors are not sensitive to poor performers and do not need to make 
that extra effort. Under this framework, outsourcing is an appropriate mechanism 
through which mutual fund families can increase their market share and therefore their 
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profits while discriminating between different types of investors according to their 
sophistication. 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
On the specific literature addressing outsourcing in the mutual fund industry, Cashman 
and Deli (2009) find that outsourced funds might perform better than internally 
managed funds when the underlying economics suggest that a fund should be sub-
advised. Kuhnen (2009) analyzes how the decision to outsource is influenced by 
connections between the board of directors and the advisor and finds that sub-advised 
contracts are more likely when these relationships are strong. Del Guercio et al. (2010, 
2014) analyze the different channels (direct and using a broker) for investing in mutual 
funds and their relationship with performance, finding that underperformance is limited 
to the broker-sold segment. Chen et al. (2013) show that funds managed externally 
significantly underperform those run internally and explain this by contractual 
externalities and firm boundaries that make it difficult to extract performance from an 
outsourcing relationship. Duong (2010) finds that outsourced funds underperform an in-
house managed peer when they are managed by the same company, suggesting 
managerial conflict of interest, and Chuprinin et al. (2013) suggest that in-house funds 
benefit from the subsidization of outsourced funds as part of the incentive compensation 
of the sub-advisory company. 
Mutual fund families (the principal) may benefit from using one or more sub-advisors 
(the agent), thereby capturing talent that is not available in-house. However, these sub-
advisors might be managing funds from other families and even managing their own 
funds. In this latter case, the agent could focus more effort on its internal funds and  
provide them with a preferential treatment. This scenario generates a conflict of interest 
framework is which externally managed funds underperform their internally managed 
peers. Previous literature has shown that management firms tend to favor their own 
funds to the detriment of sub-advised funds through preferential treatment in IPO 
allocations (Chen at al. (2013) or Duong (2010)), unobserved actions such as abnormal 
cross-trading activity between in-house and external funds or offering preferential 
information to in-house funds (Chuprinin et al. (2013)). 
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Despite these findings, it is not clear why the market does not prevent this agency issue 
or provide efficient mechanisms to monitor the interested actions of external sub-
advisors. We analyze in more detail some specific contractual agreements that are 
employed in the financial markets (such as cobranding, multiple advisors and 
performance fees) to study if they are being used to mitigate the negative effects of the 
agency issues that appear when external firms simultaneously manage their own and 
outsourced funds and to see if they could help us to partially understand the wide use of 
outsourcing over the last decade. 
We discuss co-branding as a sub-advisory arrangement in which the principal advisor 
partners with a sub-advisor to capitalize on the sub-advisor’s reputation (the fund 
includes the name of the sub-advisor in the fund's name to attract new investors).3 
Conflicts of interest will be mitigated as the sub-advisor will be concerned not only 
about the fees it receives but also about fund's performance linked to its reputation. The 
contract design literature has considered "firm reputations" and “brand names” to be a 
mechanism that provides incentives that assure contract performance (Hayek (1948) and 
Marshall (1949)). Klein and Leffler (1981) also claim that reputation effects constitute 
an implicit protection against adverse selection. This private-contract enforcement 
mechanism relies upon the value to the firm of repeat sales to satisfied customers as a 
means of preventing underperformance.  
We also examine multi-advisory agreements, that is, those arrangements made between 
the management company and more than one sub-advisor.4 Hill (1982) reviews the 
differences in performance of teams and individuals working with limited interaction 
and shows that group performance is generally superior to the performance of the 
average individual in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Prior studies on mutual 
funds have also shown that the strategic choice of management structure is associated 
with differences in performance depending on whether funds are managed by single 
                                                          
3 For instance, the Metropolitan Series Fund (Advisor) outsourced one of their funds to BlackRock, LLC 
(Sub-advisor) under the name of BlackRock Aggressive Growth Portfolio. More recently, Metropolitan 
Series Fund approved a change of sub-advisor to Frontier Capital Management Company, LLC, and the 
name of the portfolio also changed to Frontier Mid Cap Growth Portfolio. 
4
 For instance, JP Morgan Multi Manager Small Cap Growth Fund is externally co-managed by 
BlackRock Capital Management, Inc, ClariVest Asset Management LLC, UBS Global Asset 
Management and Oberweis Asset Management, Inc. 
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managers or by teams of managers (Bliss et al. (2008), Karagiannidis (2010), Bar et al. 
(2011), or Patel and Sarkissian (2013)).5 We expect multi-advisory agreements to be an 
optimal arrangement that address management conflicts of interest for two reasons. 
First, the SEC exempts multi-manager funds from having to obtain shareholder 
approval to terminate sub-advisory contracts.6 This exemption makes it easier and 
cheaper to terminate these contracts when there is a poor performance record and to 
generate greater competition among the sub-advisors that manage the fund. Previous 
studies as Chevalier and Ellision (1999) or Kempf et al. (2009) demonstrate that the risk 
of job loss is an important determinant of managerial behavior. In addition, Macaulay 
(1963) provides some evidence that firms prevent sub-optimal contracts by using 
effective non-legal sanctions consisting primarily of the loss of future business. This 
self-enforcement mechanism that assures performance by threatening termination of the 
relationship has also been examined in Macneil (1974), Goldberg (1976), Williamson 
(1979) and Klein and Leffler (1981). Second, multi-advising contracts involve 
compensation that is shared by all sub-advisors that form the contract. According to the 
literature on contractual theory, profit sharing will generate mutual monitoring and peer 
pressure that will positively affect firm productivity (Kandel and Lazear (1992), 
Freeman, Kruse and Blasi (2010)). 
Finally, there is an extensive literature analyzing performance-based contracts in the 
context of agency theory to solve problems of moral hazard or adverse selection (e.g., 
Holmstrom (1979) or Shavell (1979)), but in the specific case of the mutual fund 
industry, performance fee compensation has been proposed to eliminate the conflict of 
interest between the portfolio manager and mutual fund investors.7 Starks (1987) claims 
that symmetric contracts dominate “bonus” contracts when motivating the manager to 
                                                          
5
 General results are consistent with the idea that “two heads are better than one” based on empirical 
studies (Hastie (1986), Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) or Laughlin and Ellis (1986), among others). 
However, it must be highlighted that the multi-advisor structure is not the same as the team of managers 
previously analyzed by literature. In a multi-advisor case, each sub-advisor manages a fraction of the 
fund’s portfolio but they do not act as a team, having no cooperation or interaction among the managers.  
6 See SEC Release Ns. 33-8312, 34-48683, IC-26230, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml. 
7 Legally, if a mutual fund decides to charge an incentive fee, it must use a type of fee known as a 
“fulcrum fee”, which constitutes a symmetric contract because the manager compensation is established 
as a function of investment performance relative to some benchmark. Mutual funds generally have a fixed 
component of fees plus a variable component that must be symmetrical around a benchmark, and in 
practice, every mutual fund has an upper limit and a lower limit to the variable component.  
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achieve better portfolios.8 Ou-Yang (2003) analyzed the relationship between an 
investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous-time principal-agent 
framework and finds that optimal contracts are of a symmetric form. Elton et al. (2003) 
find evidence of superior performance among US mutual funds with explicit incentive 
fees, compared with similar funds without explicit incentive fees. More recently, Kyle 
et al. (2011), in a model that endogenizes information acquisition, conclude that linear 
contracts could induce the manager to apply more effort for information acquisition. We 
would expect these contracts to solve the moral hazard problem in the case of 
outsourcing business in mutual funds by aligning the management company’s and the 
sub-advisor’s incentives.  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Several contractual arrangements such as co-branding, multi-
advising and performance-based fees improve the performance of sub-advised 
funds by mitigating the potential conflict of interest in outsourcing contracts.   
After demonstrating that underperformance is not a universal issue in outsourcing 
agreements and that, in fact, some contractual agreements could be used to avoid it, we 
next study when these mechanisms are employed in the markets and how they could 
help us to understand the growing relevance of outsourcing over the last decade. To 
elucidate this topic, we begin with two strands of mutual fund literature: the literature 
about fund family decisions regarding fund creation, the variety of styles offered and 
market share (among others Khorana and Servaes (2012)) and the literature about 
investor sophistication and fund families’ discrimination regarding investors (for 
example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) or Del Gercio et al. (2010)).  
Recent studies show that fund families search to increase their market share and thereby 
maximize their profits, and price competition and product differentiation are both 
effective strategies to increase market share in the mutual fund industry. Khorana and 
Servaes (2012) point out that families that offer a wider range of products and 
differentiated funds relative to the competition are characterized by higher market 
shares. Additionally, Massa (2003) notes that fund proliferation is used as a tool by fund 
families to increase market coverage and limit competition given the free-switching 
                                                          
8
 Some other studies as Stoughton (1993), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) or more recently Li and Tiwai 
(2009) pointed out that symmetric compensation may not be the optimal structure in some cases.  
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options offered to investors (that is, firms allow switching across funds belonging to the 
same family at no cost). Gallaher et al. (2006) observe that the more investment 
strategies a mutual fund family offers, the larger the flow of funds received. In addition, 
from the industrial organization literature, Siggelkow (2003) demonstrates that U.S. 
mutual funds that belong to focused fund providers outperform similar funds offered by 
diversified providers. Focusing on a few investment objectives allows management 
companies to manage funds more effectively and improve fund performance. However, 
a negative effect arises from this focused strategy. Fund families will reduce cash 
inflows, thus affecting profitability, because they do not benefit from the demand 
externalities generated by a broad product offering. Therefore ideally, a fund family 
should benefit from offering a wide array of funds while focusing on the management 
of a few investment styles, and this organizational structure could be easily 
implemented using outsourcing arrangements.  
We hypothesize that management companies could be using outsourcing to increase 
their market share and therefore their profits, offering a wider range of products 
especially in investment styles where they lack experience. Outsourcing allows them to 
focus and produce in-house according to their expertise while externalizing those 
activities in which they lack experience. We find that management companies 
implementing an outsourcing policy, especially to offer investment fund styles that vary 
from those they manage in-house, will gain market share in terms of assets under 
management in the industry.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: Fund families using outsourcing increase their market share 
more than those families managing every fund in-house, especially those using 
outsourcing for new styles of investment funds.  
 
Additionally, we provide some insights into why contractual agreements that help avoid 
the underperformance of outsourcing contracts may not be universally adopted within 
every sub-advisory agreement, which we observe in the empirical data. We must 
understand that it is not always possible to establish such a mechanism (for example, in 
some cases it may not be possible to find a prestigious sub-advisor prepared to sign a 
co-branding agreement with a less prestigious fund or with a limited channel of 
distribution). In any case, establishing these mechanisms has a non-zero negotiation 
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cost. Prior research in contract theory has shown that i) as the number of clauses in the 
contract increases, it becomes more expensive to write the arrangement (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt (1986)); and ii) the more complex the contracts, the more expensive it 
becomes to manage the relationship with the outsourcing partner (Williamson (1991)). 
This effort can lead management companies to consider establishing the mechanism 
only in a case in which poor performance can lead to fund outflows. If investors in a 
certain fund are expected to be unsophisticated with no reaction to poor performance, 
the management company may not be interested in implementing costly mechanisms to 
avoid underperformance. Furthermore, Del Gercio et al. (2010) evidence that funds 
distributed through direct channels are aimed toward sophisticated investors; when they 
are outsourced, they must pay a higher fee to the sub-advisor because they require more 
active management and greater reliability. This reinforces the idea that costly 
contractual arrangements are only of interest if the investor is sophisticated enough to 
understand the potential conflicts in outsourcing contracts. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Mechanisms to avoid problems of conflict of interest are 
mainly used in the case of funds with shareholders who have high levels of 
sophistication and information. 
 
3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Data Sources   
We examine actively managed U.S. mutual funds during the period 1996-2011. The 
data come from two sources: filings for mutual funds (NSAR) required by the SEC and 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survival-Bias-Free U.S. mutual fund 
database. Data on advisors, sub-advisors, advisory arrangements and types of fees come 
from the NSAR filings. Fund returns, total net assets, turnover, expenses and other 
available fund characteristics come from CRSP. 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, every investment company must register 
with the SEC. All U.S. mutual funds and other regulated investment management 
companies are required to file NSAR Forms (along with other documents) on a semi-
annual basis. Form NSAR-A covers the first six months of the fiscal year for an 
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individual investment management company, and Form NSAR-B covers the full year. A 
mutual fund family, also known as a family complex, is composed of several mutual 
fund series, each of which (also known as a fund trust) may consist of several mutual 
funds. Each mutual fund series is legally formed as an investment company. Thus, each 
family complex may file several distinct NSAR forms for each of its fund trusts along 
with detailed information about each of its mutual funds. 
To create our database, we first downloaded and parsed all NSAR-B filings available 
from the SEC’s EDGAR database – a total of 55,315 files. Although certain funds 
voluntarily filed their reports prior to the mandatory disclosure period (there were 
filings available from 1993), the data began to appear consistently in 1996. To mitigate 
any selection bias, our sample begins with 1996. Our dataset is the entire population of 
the U.S. open-ended mutual fund market from 1996 to 2011.9 The NSAR filings allow 
us to extract a substantial amount of information that is unavailable in other databases, 
such as sub-advisor names, advisory fees and advisory contracts.  
The CRSP database has information about multiple fund classes issued by a particular 
fund. These classes, typically denoted A, B and C, have the same underlying portfolio. 
The main difference between them is the fee structure. Our observations are made at the 
class level. We group data by observation at the fund level, following the literature (e.g., 
Gaspar et al. (2006) and Nanda et al. (2004)). If the fund has multiple classes, the TNA 
of the fund is the sum of all TNA over all classes. We aggregate returns, weighting each 
class by total net assets (TNA). Turnover and expenses are aggregated at the fund level 
by weighting each class with its total net assets; for fund age, we select the oldest from 
among all classes. Finally, to merge the CRSP and NSAR data, we use a fuzzy match 
procedure that utilizes Weighted Jaccard Distances; it is discussed in the technical 
appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 From the initial 55,315 filings, we drop the corresponding filings for 1994 and 1995 and filings where 
no names for the trust appear, obtaining a sum of 43,537 filings. In addition, we do not consider index 
funds or those missing an advisor name.  
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3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table I reports by year the number of sub-advised funds managed by an unaffiliated 
company and the proportion of the different types of sub-advisory agreements in our 
sample. The affiliation data among investment management firms (in our case, between 
advisor and sub-advisor) come from the SEC website, where the firm name, the last 
filing date, issuer relationships, owner relationships, affiliate relationships, group 
members, and filing-agent relationships can be searched.10 The literature on outsourcing 
in mutual funds does not consider affiliated sub-advised funds to be outsourced funds, 
affiliated sub-advised funds are considered to be in-house funds. We follow this 
approach and hereinafter we will refer to sub-advised funds as unaffiliated funds.  
The figures show that the proportion of sub-advised funds has grown approximately 
50% over the past two decades, from 12.6% in 1996 to 18.8% in 2011. Other studies 
have found similar figures. For example, Cashman and Deli (2009) show that 13.6% of 
sub-advised funds in 2002 were unaffiliated, whereas Del Guercio et al. (2010) find that 
it is 18%. A report from the Independent Directors Council, “Board Oversight of Sub-
advisors” (2010), states, “as of April 2009, nearly 40% of mutual funds use at least one 
sub-advisor to manage the fund’s portfolio, compared to 25%, 10 years ago”. These 
figures are higher because outsourced funds include also the affiliated funds.11  
Columns 4 to 8 of Table I focus on sub-advised funds (column 3) and report, 
respectively, the percentage of sub-advised funds with a potential conflict of interest 
(when the sub-advisor (agent) is also the principal advisor of other funds in its family), 
the percentage of sub-advised funds using a co-branding model, those with multi-
manager arrangements, those funds using performance-based fees and finally funds 
using any of the sub-advisory agreements previously mentioned.12 It can be observed 
that funds with a potential conflict of interest represent approximately half of all sub-
                                                          
10 Firms’ affiliations have been accurately cross-checked using firm websites, financial news and 
company annual reports.  
11 Our data are also consistent with this statement. By the end of 2009, sub-advised funds (affiliated and 
unaffiliated) accounted for 41.9% of total funds in our sample, while in 1999, this number was 25.6%. 
12 Although these categories are not legally mutually exclusive, we observe that less than 1% of our 
sample combines two or more of these mechanisms. 
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advised funds and have increased from approximately 30% to 50% during the sample 
period.  
Co-branded funds represent almost 14% of all external funds. We can also observe that 
hiring more than one sub-advisor for the management of the funds is a common 
approach. This practice has been adopted by between 10% and 33% of the total sub-
advised funds over our sample period.13 Performance-based fees have been carefully 
applied in the industry, and they are used by approximately 3% to 6% of the outsourced 
funds. On average, approximately 35% of outsourced funds use at least one of these 
mechanisms.14 
 
Table I: Sub-advising Contracts over Time: Portfolio Level 
This table reports the number of sub-advised funds as well as the proportion of each type of sub-advisory 
agreement over the period 1996-2011 for all U.S. open-end funds. The Conflict of Interest column 
contains the percentage of sub-advised funds in which the sub-advisor is also the principal advisor for its 
own funds. Co-branding refers to funds that use the sub-advisor’s reputation by including the sub-
advisor’s name in the fund’s name. Multi-advising refers to funds sub-advised to more than one sub-
advisor. Performance fee applies when the sub-advised fund charges a floating fee that depends on prior 
fund performance. These three columns are shown as a percentage of the sub-advised funds. The last 
column (Mechanism) indicates the proportion of sub-advised funds that use any of the contractual 
agreements (co-branding, multi-advising and/or performance fee).  
    
Year 
All 
Funds 
Sub-advised 
Conflict of 
Interest 
Co-
branding 
Multi-advising 
Performance- 
fee 
Mechanism 
1996 2562 322 29.19% 9.01% 10.87% 3.11% 22.36% 
1997 2799 339 33.92% 12.68% 10.91% 3.54% 26.55% 
1998 2928 358 28.77% 13.41% 17.88% 2.79% 33.52% 
1999 2924 354 30.23% 16.38% 16.67% 2.54% 35.03% 
2000 3235 378 41.27% 16.14% 20.11% 3.17% 37.30% 
2001 2919 342 52.34% 11.40% 17.84% 4.09% 28.36% 
2002 3125 404 52.48% 10.40% 24.26% 4.21% 34.16% 
2003 3032 433 53.81% 15.01% 32.33% 4.85% 44.11% 
       (Continued) 
                                                          
13
 We consider mutual funds managed by more than one firm as having multi-manager sub-advisory 
arrangements (i.e., the principal advisor has hired more than one unaffiliated sub-advisor). We do not 
consider as multi-managed funds those that are partially managed by a principal advisor and jointly 
managed with one sub-advisor. 
14
 Because prior research has claimed that a significant portion of mutual fund investors are 
unsophisticated, the moderate use of these contracts is consistent with the fact that they are costly and 
hence used only to avoid outflows from sophisticated investors. 
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2004 2851 387 45.99% 17.31% 31.27% 5.68% 46.51% 
2005 2687 374 46.26% 14.97% 21.39% 4.01% 36.36% 
2006 2464 328 53.66% 14.63% 27.44% 4.88% 41.77% 
2007 2382 345 52.46% 13.04% 22.03% 3.48% 36.23% 
2008 2371 362 48.34% 15.19% 23.20% 6.35% 41.44% 
2009 2469 414 48.79% 15.46% 19.57% 4.35% 36.23% 
2010 2280 388 47.16% 13.40% 19.59% 3.61% 34.79% 
2011 2196 412 49.62% 12.37% 19.89% 3.76% 33.60% 
Average 2702 371 44.64% 13.80% 20.95% 4.03% 35.52% 
 
Table II reports the time-series averages of the monthly cross-section of fund 
characteristics in Panel A, principal advisor characteristics in Panel B and sub-advisor 
characteristics in Panel C. These characteristics belonging to funds or companies are 
computed across different groups and shown in the columns: all funds (or all 
companies), funds managed in-house (or companies with at least one fund managed in-
house), sub-advised funds (or companies with at least one sub-advised fund), sub-
advised funds with a potential conflict of interest, co-branding, multi-advising, or 
performance fees and funds (companies) using any of these mechanisms.15  
The variables analyzed in Panel A are as follows: Fund TNA measures total net assets 
under management in millions of dollars; Fund Size is the natural logarithm of TNA; 
Family Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the fund 
itself; Family Funds indicates the logarithm of the number of funds in the family, 
excluding the fund itself; Fund Age is the number of years since inception; Distribution 
Fee is the percentage of assets the fund charges for distribution and marketing under the 
12b-1 fee; Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees divided by the year-end 
TNA; Turnover is the minimum aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by 
average TNA over the calendar year; Flow is a percentage that represents new inflows 
into the fund over the previous year; and Gross Returns indicates the funds’ return from 
the previous year before the fee. We can observe that sub-advised funds are smaller, 
younger and more expensive than in-house managed funds. Moreover, they have higher 
turnover, lower flows and lower returns.  
                                                          
15
 All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Our results are consistent with Chen et al. (2013) regarding size, turnover, age flows 
and past returns and with Duong (2010), who shows that sub-advised funds are more 
expensive. Within these sub-advised funds, we can observe that funds with performance 
fees tend to be of small size and that, in general, funds with mechanisms are a bit larger 
than the average size of sub-advised funds. Co-branded funds have higher distribution 
fees and fund expenses along with turnover rates similar to those of in-house funds. 
Performance fee funds have higher yearly returns, but their flow levels are quite small. 
Panels B and C summarize the characteristics of management companies acting as 
advisors and sub-advisors, respectively. Firm Expenses measures the weighted average 
objective-adjusted expenses computed across all funds in the firm. Firm Return is 
defined as the objective-adjusted firm gross return. Top 5 Firms is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the management company has at least one fund that is performing in the 
top 5% of all funds with a particular investment objective. Funds Started indicates the 
number of funds started by the company in a given period. Firm Funds is the logarithm 
of the number of funds of the firm. Firm Turnover is defined as the average objective-
adjusted turnover computed across all funds in the company. Firm Experience is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years of existence for the management company. 
Firm Size is the logarithm of TNA for all firm funds.  
The figures indicate that firms with a sub-advising policy (management companies 
with at least one outsourced fund) are larger, have more experience, are better placed in 
the market in terms of top funds and are able to launch more funds than those without 
any sub-advised fund (3.23 compared with 0.317). While there is not much difference 
between firms that outsource their funds to sub-advisors with and without a potential 
conflict of interest, the sub-advisors that are actually managing these funds are larger, 
have more experience in the industry, have more top-performing funds and charge 
lower fees.  
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Table II: Mutual Funds and Management Company Characteristics 
 
Table III reports the time-series average of the monthly cross-sectional averages of fund characteristics (Panel A), principal advisor characteristics (Panel B) and sub-advisor 
characteristics (Panel C). These averages are computed across the different segments shown in the columns: all funds (companies in Panels B and C), funds managed in-house 
(companies with at least one fund managed in-house in Panels B and C), sub-advised, sub-advised with potential conflict of interest, co-branding, multi-advising, performance 
fee or with any of these arrangements. Fund TNA measures Total Net Assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of TNA 
under management in millions of dollars. Family Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. Family Funds indicates the logarithm of 
the number of funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. Fund Age is the number of years since inception. Distribution Fee is the percentage of assets that the fund 
charges for distribution and marketing under the 12b-1 fee. Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees divided by the year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of 
aggregate purchase and sale of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar year. Flow is a percentage that represents new inflows into the fund over the previous 
year. Gross Returns is the fund’s past year’s return before fee. Firm Expenses are weighted average objective-adjusted expenses computed across all funds in the firm. Firm 
Return is the objective-adjusted firm gross return. Top 5 Firms is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a management company has at least one fund that is performing in the 
top 5% of all funds with a particular investment objective. Funds Started is the number of funds started by the company in a given period. Firm Funds is the logarithm of 
the number of funds of the firm. Firm Turnover is the average objective-adjusted turnover computed across all funds in the company. Firm Experience is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years of existence for the management company. Firm Size indicates the logarithm of TNA for all funds of the firm. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
PANEL A: Mutual Fund Characteristics 
 All In-house Sub-advised Conflict Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee  Mechanism 
Fund TNA ($ millions) 726.668 818.234 320.760 306.780 368.279 359.333 262.703 361.796 
Fund Size (log TNA) 4.261 4.345 3.887 3.894 3.814 4.240 3.785 4.067 
Family Size (log family TNA) 8.679 8.779 8.233 8.334 8.422 8.315 8.538 8.386 
Family Funds (log # of funds) 3.386 3.412 3.273 3.386 3.400 3.173 3.595 3.274 
Fund Age (years) 9.447 9.787 7.963 7.887 7.070 8.313 7.709 7.854 
Distribution Fee (% per year) 0.210 0.207 0.225 0.212 0.241 0.197 0.104 0.201 
Expenses (% per year) 1.163 1.131 1.316 1.322 1.374 1.316 1.366 1.338 
Turnover (% per year) 101.45 98.49 114.76 110.84 98.56 106.89 107.99 103.03 
Flow (% per year) 51.21 52.01 47.55 46.91 40.03 49.28 14.21 44.33 
Gross Returns (% past year) 6.862 6.921 6.571 6.192 6.125 6.474 7.043 6.704 
(Continued) 
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Table II – Continued 
PANEL B: Management Company (Advisor) Characteristics 
 All In-house Sub-advised Conflicted Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee  Mechanism 
Firm Expenses (include loads,  
objective-adjusted) 
0.181 0.109 0.220 0.221 0.263 0.219 0.323 0.214 
Firm Return (% monthly  
objective-adjusted) 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 0.001 -0.015 0.003 -0.008 
Top 5 Firms (%) 77.96 63.70 85.48 88.82 94.90 91.29 97.02 90.63 
Funds Started (number of funds) 2.226 0.317 3.233 4.219 6.065 5.818 10.932 4.365 
Firm Funds (log number of funds) 1.505 1.076 2.395 2.683 2.932 2.722 3.112 2.697 
Firm Turnover (% 
objective-adjusted) 
18.20 21.16 16.62 16.01 12.18 12.60 5.86 16.84 
Firm Experience (log years) 1.723 1.581 1.796 1.849 1.944 1.946 2.173 1.861 
Firm Size (log TNA) 7.924 7.489 8.207 8.341 8.620 8.502 8.746 8.524 
         
PANEL C: Management Company (Sub-advisor) Characteristics 
 - - Sub-advised Conflicted Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee  Mechanism 
Firm Expenses (include loads,  
objective-adjusted) 
  0.173 0.129 0.154 0.107 0.009 0.136 
Firm Return (% monthly  
objective-adjusted) 
  -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 
Top 5 Firms (%)   67.43 86.28 91.27 87.62 94.56 84.34 
Funds Started (number of funds)   1.892 4.757 7.300 7.014 10.735 5.447 
Firm Funds (log number of funds)   3.127 4.423 5.105 4.897 5.982 4.428 
Firm Turnover (% 
objective-adjusted) 
  16.73 7.06 1.02 4.82 -4.44 7.88 
Firm Experience (log years)   1.510 1.892 1.997 1.995 2.187 1.899 
Firm Size (log TNA)   8.684 10.417 11.034 10.836 12.022 10.288 
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4. Contractual Arrangements for Outsourcing 
We start this section by comparing the performance of funds managed in-house and that 
of outsourced funds with a potential conflict of interest to draw some conclusions on the 
underperformance of these externally managed funds. Later, we examine whether this 
inferior performance can be mitigated using sub-advisory arrangements such as co-
branding, multi-manager systems or performance-based fees.  
Given that our variables of interest from CRSP have a monthly frequency, we convert 
all variables extracted from the NSAR-B filings from a yearly to a monthly basis. For 
each mutual fund, we compute risk-adjusted returns    ) before expenses using several 
different models: the Capital Asset Pricing Model (1F), the Fama-French 3-factor model 
(3F), Carhart's (1997) four-factor model (4F), and an international five-factor model 
(5F) that adds the MSCI World Index return factor to the four factor model. Apart from 
these, we use two additional performance measures including some income indexes to 
correctly evaluate the balanced and fixed income funds in our dataset; this creates a new 
model based on Carhart’s four-factor model (4F) and the MSCI World Index return 
factor (5F) but also including the U.S. Aggregate Bond Index returns in excess of the 
risk-free rate (6F). Also, we estimate alphas from a 9-Factor model (9F), which includes 
the four-factor model and five additional risk factors: Barclays US Treasury Bill 1-3 
Months, Barclays US Treasury 1-3 Years, Barclays US Government Long, U.S. 
Corporate High-Yield and U.S. Corporate AAA.16 
4.1. The Effect of Contractual Arrangements on Fund Performance 
In this first subsection, we test the overall effect of using any contractual arrangement 
(co-branding, multi-advising or performance fee) on outsourced funds with agency 
issues. To achieve this, we need to consider the three different mechanisms presented 
                                                          
16 The CRSP value-weighted stock index net of the one-month treasury rate (Rm) is used as the market 
factor. The SMB (size factor), HML (book-to-market factor) and WML (momentum factor) factors are 
obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The MSCI World and Bond Index data are from Bloomberg. 
For each month, we computed the fund's risk-adjusted return using data covering the previous 24 months 
because many of these sub-advised funds might be close in the short run because of a poor management, 
and requiring more observations could bias our results toward older and better managed funds. However, 
alphas were also computed using the previous 36 observations (with a minimum of 30) and the main 
conclusions did not change. 
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earlier as a single mechanism and run the following regressions using Fama-MacBeth, 
Pooled OLS and Pooled OLS with Sub-advisor Fixed Effects: 
              
                    
                                                
 
    
      
                                                                                                                                          
 
where               is the alpha of fund j in month t,    is the intercept,              
is a dummy variable indicating whether fund j was sub-advised by a firm that was also 
managing its own funds in month t.                is a dummy variable with value 1 if 
the sub-advised fund has arranged either a co-branding model, multi-advisors or a 
performance fee structure. As we observed in Table II, several characteristics can be 
correlated with outsourcing and might predict performance. For example, small funds 
with high turnover are more likely to be outsourced, therefore, we must control for 
them.       is a set of 1 period lagged control variables defined in Subsection 3.2 (Fund 
Size, Family Size, Family Funds, Fund Age, Distribution Fee, Expenses, Turnover, Flow and 
Past Returns). The subscript j corresponds to all U.S. open-end funds in our sample. We 
also adjust for serial correlation by applying Newey-West (1987) estimates of standard 
errors with lags of order three in Panel A, and we cluster the standard errors at the fund 
and family level in Panels B and C, respectively. We also include fund-investment-style 
dummies to avoid concerns about potential correlation between the fund style and 
performance and time dummies in Panel B and C.17 
The estimated parameters of equation [1] are displayed in three different panels in Table 
III.18 We can observe that independent of the estimation approach followed and 
consistent with prior literature, funds with potential conflicts underperform other funds 
                                                          
17 We employ the most detailed level of classification available provided by Lipper, but we aggregate 
multiple objectives into broader categories. We end up with the following fund categories: Asian equities, 
balanced, convertible bonds, corporate bonds, emerging market equity, equity income, European equity, 
global bonds, global equities, GNMA securities, government bonds, growth and income, growth, income, 
international bonds, international equities, large-cap equity, mid-cap equity, money market, multi-cap 
equity, municipal bonds, small-cap equity, commodities, consumer, environment, finance, healthcare, 
materials, natural resources, specialty precious metals, specialty real estate, technology, utilities and 
other. 
18
 To save space, we only show results using the performance measure from a 6-factor model (Carhart’s 
model augmented by an international index and a global bond index). The results are very similar to the 
other performance measures; they are available in the supplementary appendix section.  
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(the underperformance is between 30.6 and 63.6 bps per year). To test our first 
hypothesis, we must examine the coefficient of their interaction, as it determines the 
marginal effect of using a mechanism contract for funds with a potential conflict of 
interest. As we expected, the    coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The 
conflict of interest again has a negative impact on performance of between 43.9 bps (-
0.0366*12) and 79.6 bps (-0.0664*12) per year. However, the use of mechanisms leads 
to a marginal increase in fund performance of between 60.1 bps (0.0501*12) and 76.6 
bps (0.0638*12) per year compared to similar funds managed externally with a potential 
conflict of interest but not using this type of contractual arrangement.  
The employment of any mechanism in general is not statistically significant, as was 
expected, because they should provide an improvement only when there is an agency 
problem. Moreover, we must note that this parameter compares the performance of any 
outsourced fund using a mechanism (being in conflict or not) against the remaining 
mutual funds in the sample (including in-house or external funds without a mechanism). 
There is no theoretical reason driving us to think that an external fund with a 
mechanism should outperform either the in-house funds or the external funds without a 
conflict of interest and without a mechanism, so in general, that parameter should be 
insignificant.  
In general, the coefficients for the set of control variables are also consistent with prior 
studies. Fund size is negatively related to fund performance, in line with the idea that 
fund size is associated with liquidity and organizational diseconomies (Chen et al. 
(2004)). The weak significant might be associated with our inclusion of international 
stocks and bonds. Ferreira et al. (2013) find a positive relation between size and 
performance for the case of international funds. Family size and past returns are positive 
and statistically significant, which is also consistent with prior literature (Chen et al. 
(2004)). Age and Flows are positive and statistically significant, and Expenses is not 
significant; these are also both consistent with prior research, as we are considering fund 
returns gross of fees. After controlling for all these fund and family characteristics, 
outsourced funds with a potential conflict of interest are still underperforming those 
managed in-house. 
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Table III: Sub-advising Mutual Funds Using Mechanisms 
Table X presents results for monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates (Panel A), pooled OLS (Panel B) and 
panel sub-advisor fixed effect (Panel C) of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. The sample contains all 
U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross 
return). The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured using the alpha from Carhart’s model 
augmented by an international index and a global bond index (6F). Conflict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the fund is sub-advised by an unaffiliated firm that also manages its own funds and 0 otherwise. Mechanism is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is sub-advised using co-branding, multi-manager or performance-fee 
arrangements and 0 otherwise. The iteration term Conflict*Mechanism is also included to examine the effect 
that these mechanisms exert over conflicted funds. Control variables previously described in Table II are lagged 
1 period. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term has been 
omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund (Panel B) and sub-advisor (Panel C) level. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) in Panel A). * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
4.2. Co-branding, Multi-advising and Performance-fee Contracts on Sub-advised Funds 
In this sub-section, we examine the effect that each contractual arrangement has 
separately on fund performance.  
 Fund Performance 
 (Panel A) 
Fama Mac-Beth 
(Panel B) 
Pooled OLS 
(Panel C) 
Sub-advisor FE 
Conflict*Mechanism  0.0638**  0.0501**  0.0592** 
  (2.32)  (2.35)  (2.39) 
Conflict -0.0530*** -0.0664*** -0.0255** -0.0366*** -0.0450*** -0.0462*** 
 (-4.64) (-6.70) (-2.32) (-2.58) (-2.61) (-2.80) 
Mechanism  -0.0099*  -0.0202  -0.0114 
  (-1.83)  (-1.26)  (-0.65) 
Fund Size (log TNA) 0.0001 0.0027 0.0045 0.0045 0.0015 0.0016 
 (0.02) (1.01) (0.37) (0.34) (0.73) (0.79) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0112*** 0.0109*** 0.0090*** 0.0088*** 0.0011 0.0022 
 (4.32) (4.50) (2.79) (2.72) (0.25) (0.48) 
Family Funds -0.0150*** -0.0167*** -0.0101* -0.0097 -0.0065 -0.0081 
 (-2.90) (-3.95) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-0.69) (-0.87) 
Fund Age 0.0093 0.0082 0.0088 0.0088 -0.0011 -0.0008 
 (1.04) (1.23) (1.22) (1.21) (-0.15) (-0.10) 
Distribution Fee -0.0724** -0.0774*** -0.0877*** -0.0881*** -0.1248*** -0.1236*** 
 (-2.46) (-4.00) (-5.15) (-5.16) (-6.51) (-6.44) 
Expenses 0.0480 0.0633*** 0.0706*** 0.0708*** 0.0939*** 0.0926*** 
 (1.44) (2.98) (5.18) (5.19) (6.52) (6.44) 
Turnover 0.0051 0.0079 -0.0051** -0.0051** -0.0028 -0.0028 
 (1.39) (1.10) (-2.36) (-2.35) (-1.31) (-1.29) 
Flows 0.0135*** 0.0159*** 0.0128*** 0.0128*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 
 (3.02) (6.99) (7.36) (7.36) (7.05) (7.06) 
Past Returns 0.0161*** 0.0121*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 
 (4.88) (5.63) (7.52) (7.51) (4.05) (4.04) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
R2 0.086 0.146 0.060 0.067 0.170 0.172 
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4.2.1. Co-branding 
First, we test whether the underperformance of sub-advised funds is mitigated when the 
sub-advisor’s reputation is at stake. This could happen when the principal advisor 
associates with a sub-advisor to take advantage of the sub-advisor’s reputation and 
includes, for example, the sub-advisor’s name in the mutual fund's name to attract new 
investors. In these circumstances, the sub-advisor should manage the external portfolio 
better because its own industry reputation and image are at stake. To test whether this 
co-branding model can positively influence the management of sub-advised funds under 
conflict of interest, we run the following Fama-Macbeth regression: 
              
                    
                                                  
 
    
      
                                                                                                                                       
where                 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund uses a co-branding 
model of sub-advising and                               is an interaction term.
19 We 
also include investment style dummies. We expect that coefficient    will not be 
statistically significant, as it measures the effect of the co-branding mechanism in 
general (so it is measuring the effect of being a sub-advised fund and having a co-
branding mechanism against the remaining funds, including the in-house managed 
funds) but that    will be positive and statistically significant because it measures the 
marginal effect of using the co-branding mechanism when the outsourced fund is 
managed by a sub-advisor that is also managing its own mutual funds. 
Table IV (Panel A) reports the estimation results for the regression specification given 
in equation [2]. The coefficient for the variable          is negative and statistically 
significant, showing that the conflict of interest previously identified negatively impacts 
performance. In addition, we observe that funds managed externally no longer 
underperform funds managed in-house when they are under a co-branding arrangement 
(the coefficient for CoBranding is in general positive). However, to test our first 
                                                          
19 One might argue that even though an external fund is managed by a company that manages its own 
funds, these are not really subject to a conflict unless the funds have the same investment objective. As a 
robustness check, the sub-advised variable was refined to only consider those sub-advised funds that 
share the same investment objective for the in-house and external portfolios, and the results remained 
unchanged. We do not report those tables here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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hypothesis, we must examine the coefficient of their interaction, as it determines the 
marginal effect of using a co-branding model for funds with a potential conflict of 
interest. As we expected, the    coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The 
conflict of interest has a negative impact on performance of between 53.76 bps (-
0.0448*12) and 88.92 bps (-0.0741*12) per year. However, the use of a co-branding 
model leads to a marginal increase in fund performance of between 55.68 bps 
(0.0464*12) and 80.52 bps (0.0671*12) per year compared to similar funds managed 
externally that also have a potential conflict of interest but do not use this type of 
contractual arrangement. Thus, we confirm that when the sub-advisor has recognized 
status in the industry, the fund family can use a co-branding model to capitalize on the 
sub-advisor's reputation. In this case, although the sub-advisor faces a conflict of 
interest, it will try to perform well to maintain its reputation in the industry. This result 
is consistent with Hayek (1948) and Marshall (1949), who suggest that "firm 
reputation" and “brand names” are mechanisms that provide incentives to avoid 
underperformance.20  
4.2.2. Multi-advising 
To analyze whether outsourcing contracts with more than one sub-advisor can reduce or 
eliminate the observed underperformance, we estimate the following equation: 
              
                    
                                      
                    
 
                    
      
                                                                                                                                          
where                      is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund uses a multi-
manager model of sub-advising,                                   is the interaction 
                                                          
20
 We hypothesize that co-branding mitigates underperformance based on the idea that managing external 
funds and achieving poor performance can affect the reputation of the sub-advisor. If this is true, the 
effect should be stronger for those sub-advisors that have a higher reputation in the market. In an 
unreported table, we redefine the co-branding variable using only the most prestigious sub-advisors in 
terms of size and past performance (specifically, we considered only the largest sub-advisors (top 20% of 
management companies in terms of size (TNA)) and the highest performing sub-advisors (top 20% of 
management companies in terms of historical performance). The marginal improvement in performance 
for the largest sub-advisors and the top performing funds was much larger than the improvements for co-
branding funds in general. 
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term and            is an additional control variable that represents the number of sub-
advisors managing the fund.21 We expect that coefficient    will not be statistically 
significant, as it measures the effect of having several sub-advisors in general (so it is 
measuring the effect of being a multi-advising fund against the remaining funds, 
including the in-house managed funds); we have no hypothesis that leads us to assume 
that these multi-advising funds should achieve better performance than in-house funds. 
However,    should be positive and statistically significant because it measures the 
marginal effect of using the multi-advising mechanism when the outsourced fund is 
managed under a conflict of interest. 
Table IV (Panel B) shows the estimated regression coefficients from equation [3]. 
Again, we observe that being outsourced with agency issues leads to a drop in fund 
performance. In addition, as we expected, the performance of external funds with more 
than one sub-advisor does not differ from that of similar in-house funds, as the 
coefficient on the variable                is not statistically significant across all of the 
different specifications. The variable measuring the interaction between multi-managers 
and conflict is always positive and statistically significant; thus, in line with our second 
hypothesis, we confirm that entering into a sub-advisory contract with more than one 
sub-advisor helps to mitigate poor performance. While sub-advised funds underperform 
by between 23.76 bps and 59.64 bps per year, using multiple sub-advisors in the 
portfolio management of a fund with a potential conflict of interest improves 
performance by between 45.96 bps and 160.2 bps per year. 
This finding is consistent with the prior literature related to general firm theory. For 
example, Bone et al. (1999) and Cooper et al. (2005) support the idea that groups are 
more efficient, act more rationally and achieve better performance than individuals. In 
the case of mutual funds, we provide an additional reason why using multiple sub-
advisors may be beneficial that is based on the sub-advisors’ increased risk of 
replacement. Multi-manager funds are exempted from the SEC regulations that permit 
them to terminate and appoint new unaffiliated sub-advisors without shareholder 
approval provided certain conditions (such as notice to shareholders within a specified 
                                                          
21
 In our database the average and mediam number of sub-advisors in multi-advisors contracts is 5.2 
and 4.0, respectively. 
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period) are met.22 This exemptive relief substantially reduces the time and cost of 
obtaining shareholder approval for each change of sub-advisors, which makes it easier 
to replace management firms. Such power could enable funds to monitor and control 
poor performance through threats of replacement, which might mitigate problems in the 
outsourcing contract.  
4.2.3. Performance-based Fees 
Several previous studies have shown that funds with performance-based fee contracts 
have superior performance – because of the monitoring effect that this fee structure 
requires – over funds with fees based solely on assets under management (Elton et al. 
(2003)). We wish to examine the effect of performance-based fees on funds managed by 
external firms and in particular, on those managed under a conflict of interest 
framework to examine whether this incentive mechanism mitigates the management 
monitoring issue. In Table IV (Panel C), we present estimations of the following 
equation:  
              
                    
                                                            
 
    
      
                                                                                                                                                            
where                      is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the external fund is 
under a fulcrum fee compensation structure. We expect that coefficient    will not be 
statistically significant, as it measures the effect of being a sub-advised fund with a 
floating fee (so it is measuring the effect of being a sub-advised fund and having a 
performance fee mechanism against the remaining funds, including in-house managed 
funds) but that    will be positive and statistically significant because it measures the 
marginal effect of using the performance fee when the outsourced fund is managed by a 
sub-advisor that is also managing its own mutual funds. From Panel C of Table IV, we 
can assess that sub-advised funds, in general, generate poorer performance than funds 
managed in-house, as    is again negative and statistically significant. We observe that 
                                                          
22 See exemption from Shareholder Approval for Certain Sub-advisory Contracts, SEC Release Nos. 33-
8312, 34-48683, IC-26230. 
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   is not statistically significant, as we expected, and we observe that consistent with our 
third hypothesis, sub-advised funds under a conflict of interest and using a performance 
fee arrangement achieve an improvement of 32.4 to 100.2 bps compared to all other 
conflicted funds.  
 
Table IV: Sub-advising with Co-branding, Multi-advising and Performance-fee. 
 
Table IV presents results for monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before 
deducting fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance measured by the alpha 
from CAPM (1F), the Fama-French three factor model (3F), Carhart’s 4 factor model (4F), Carhart’s model 
augmented with an international index (5F) and a global bond index (6F) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 
government bond indexes and 2 corporate bond indexes (9F). Conflict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
fund is sub-advised by an unaffiliated firm that also manages its own funds and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, Co-
branding is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised under a co-branding arrangement and 0 
otherwise. In Panel B, Multi-advising is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised by more than 
one sub-advisor, and Number of Sub-advisors is the number of firms managing the fund. In Panel C, 
Performance-fee is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sub-advised fund is under a fulcrum fee compensation 
structure. The iteration terms are also included to examine the effect that these mechanisms exert over conflicted 
funds. Control variables previously described in Table II are lagged 1 period. Investment Style dummies are 
included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
(adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987)). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Fund Performance 
 ALPHA 1F ALPHA 3F ALPHA 4F ALPHA 5F ALPHA 6F ALPHA 9F 
Panel A: Co-branding       
       
Conflict*Co-branding 0.0671*** 0.0573** 0.0577** 0.0464* 0.0613*** 0.0584* 
 (2.82) (2.18) (2.13) (1.90) (2.69) (1.76) 
Conflict -0.0630*** -0.0448*** -0.0505*** -0.0684*** -0.0705*** -0.0741*** 
 (-5.22) (-5.70) (-5.89) (-7.19) (-7.11) (-5.98) 
Co-branding -0.0087 0.0060 0.0221* 0.0286** 0.0536*** 0.0480*** 
 (-0.55) (0.40) (1.68) (2.03) (3.64) (2.93) 
R2 0.181 0.182 0.180 0.173 0.145 0.156 
       
Panel B: Multi-advising       
       
Conflict*Multi-advising 0.1335*** 0.0557* 0.0538* 0.0383* 0.0567** 0.0714** 
 (3.06) (1.74) (1.84) (1.76) (2.01) (2.32) 
Conflict -0.0497*** -0.0257** -0.0198* -0.0354*** -0.0292*** -0.0465*** 
 (-3.52) (-2.55) (-1.75) (-3.03) (-2.65) (-3.79) 
Multi-advising -0.0143 -0.0206 -0.0204 -0.0213 -0.0367 -0.0473 
 (-0.48) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.83) (-1.39) (-1.28) 
Number of Sub-advisors -0.0157* -0.0117 -0.0114 -0.0108 -0.0057 -0.0037 
 (-1.73) (-1.42) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-0.77) (-0.38) 
R2 0.116 0.121 0.121 0.113 0.089 0.094 
       
Panel C: Performance-fee      
       
Conflict*Performance-fee 0.0498** 0.0238** 0.0312** 0.0835*** 0.0820*** 0.0270** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (2.46) (3.05) (3.07) (2.90) 
Conflict -0.0299*** -0.0077** -0.0009** -0.0180** -0.0134* -0.0246*** 
 (-3.92) (-2.02) (-2.11) (-2.15) (-1.78) (-3.07) 
Performance-fee -0.0817 -0.0081 -0.0041 0.0015 0.0370 -0.0186 
 (-1.41) (-0.42) (-0.24) (0.08) (1.28) (-0.72) 
R2 0.249 0.251 0.248 0.238 0.179 0.181 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
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4.3. Sub-advising Using Mechanisms: Pooled OLS and Sub-advisor Fixed Effects 
In Panel A of Table V, we present pooled OLS regressions for equations [2] to [4] and 
in Panel B, we report the results of panel regressions with sub-advisor fixed effects. 
Adding sub-advisor fixed effects allows us to compare specific differences in 
performance between in-house and outsourced funds that are managed by the same 
company (the sub-advisor).  
Overall, we observe the following: (1) external funds systematically underperform 
internally managed ones when both are managed by the same sub-advisor, (2) external 
funds with specific contractual arrangements do not systematically underperform in-
house managed ones and (3) the use of mechanisms for outsourced funds under a 
conflict framework has a positive and significant impact on fund performance (in every 
case, the coefficient measuring the marginal effect of the mechanism when there is a 
conflict is positive and statistically significant). Thus, the different model estimations 
allow us to confirm that sub-advisors facing a conflict of interest generally 
underperform unless they enter into a co-branding, multi-advisor or performance fee 
arrangement, in which case they will try their best to outperform to maintain their 
reputation in the industry, keep the contract or obtain higher fees.  
 
Table V: Sub-advising Mutual Funds with Co-branding, Multi-advising and 
Performance-fee Arrangements: Pooled OLS and Sub-adviser Fixed Effects 
 
Table V presents results for monthly pooled OLS (Panel A) and sub-advisor fixed effects (Panel B) 
regression estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. The sample contains all U.S. mutual 
funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). 
The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured using the alpha from Carhart’s model 
augmented by an international index and a global bond index (6F). Control variables previously described 
are lagged 1 period. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported, and the constant 
term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund (Panel A) and sub-advisor (Panel B) levels, 
and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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4.4. Testing for Reputation, Competitiveness and Incentives  
Having shown a significant positive impact on performance when outsourcing contracts 
include clauses such as co-branding, multi-management or performance-based fees, 
which mitigate the agency issues of firms that simultaneously manage internal and 
external funds, we draw on the organizational literature to explain this phenomenon. 
Under the theory of Klein and Leffler (1981), brand reputation constitutes an implicit 
protection against adverse selection. We therefore expect outsourcing contracts with co-
branding to effectively mitigate agency issues if the sub-advisor already constitutes a 
well-known brand in the industry. Additionally, these authors also provide evidence on 
self-enforcement mechanisms that assure performance by threatening termination of the 
relationship. The replacement risk faced by players in a multi-advising agreement will 
create a competitive environment in which only those sub-advisors that are able to 
deviate from the norm to outperform their peers will conserve the contract.  
Finally, Holmstrom (1979), among others, analyzes performance-based contracts in the 
context of agency theory to solve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. We 
 Fund Performance 
 Panel A: 
Pooled OLS 
Panel B: 
Sub-advisor Fixed Effects 
 Co-
branding 
Multi-
advising 
Performance-
fee 
Co-
branding 
Multi-
advising 
Performance-
fee 
Conflict -0.0386*** -0.0234* -0.0266** -0.0375*** -0.0311* -0.0305** 
 (-3.51) (-1.71) (-2.34) (-2.68) (-1.86) (-2.07) 
Conflict*Co-branding 0.0993***   0.0682*   
 (2.70)   (1.86)   
Conflict*Multi-advising  0.0733**   0.0636*  
  (2.30)   (1.96)  
Conflict*Performance-fee   0.0671*   0.1056** 
   (1.77)   (2.33) 
Co-branding 0.0152   0.0192   
 (0.53)   (0.67)   
Multi-advising  -0.0494**   -0.0365  
  (-2.51)   (-1.53)  
Number of Sub-advisors  -0.0079*   -0.0053  
  (-1.90)   (-1.07)  
Performance-fee   -0.0324   -0.0604** 
   (-1.47)   (-2.36) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.067 0.057 0.057 0.172 0.166 0.166 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
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hypothesize that while outsourcing contracts are generally under agency issues because 
the management company might be managing internal and external funds 
simultaneously, one way to align incentives is to have a floating compensation structure 
based on performance. Although this compensation contract could generally work for 
every type of agent, we expect that it works better in those cases in which the principal 
has higher uncertainty about the agent’s performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
this mechanism could be more effective within outsourcing contracts with 
inexperienced sub-advisors or sub-advisors with poor past performance. 
Table VI reports the estimates from the following logistic regression: 
             
         
           
 ,                                               [5] 
where                                       . The dependent variable (      is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the outsourced fund has a co-branding model in Panel 
A, a multi-advising contract in Panel B and a performance-based fee in Panel C.        
are the main explanatory variables and proxy for reputation, competitiveness and 
incentive alignment.        is a vector of fund and family variables lagged one period. 
We include style dummies (  ) and time dummies     . We cluster the standard errors at 
the fund level. 
In Panel A, we explain the use of co-branding contracts with Sub-advisor Performance, 
measured as the objective-adjusted sub-advisor abnormal return and Sub-advisor 
Experience, the natural logarithm of the number of years that the sub-advisor has been 
in business. Sub-advisor Performance is calculated as follows23: 
               
 
   
 
                                                      [6] 
where    is the weight of a fund in the sub-advisory company,    is the gross return of 
fund j from the J funds of the sub-advisor,    is the weight of the fund in its investment 
objective and    is the gross return of fund i from the I funds within the style. These two 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, with a marginal coefficient of 0.01 
                                                          
23
 This expression was used previously by Khorana and Servaes (2012) to measure performance in 
mutual fund families. 
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and 0.003, respectively. Considering the unconditional probability of being outsourced 
with these contractual agreements, a one standard deviation increase in sub-advisor 
performance (1.294) and sub-advisor experience (0.717) means that the funds are 61.6% 
(0.01*1.294/0.021) and 11.3% (0.003*0.717/0.019) more likely to have a co-branding 
arrangement than other funds, respectively. The greater the sub-advisors’ reputation 
when measured by skill and experience, the higher the probability of being involved in a 
co-branding agreement. 
In Panel B, we estimate the probability of an outsourced fund with a multi-advising 
contract using Idiosyncratic and Beta Deviation as explanatory variables. These 
variables are calculated as the differences (in absolute terms) between the actual value 
and the average of that period for all funds within the investment objective. The 
idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual when estimating 
the Alpha 6F model (Carhart’s model augmented by an international index and a global 
bond index), and the beta risk is the market beta from the same performance model. 
Both variables are proxies for competitiveness, and, as we expected, they are positively 
related to the use of multi-advising contracts24, indicating that Klein and Leffler’s 
(1981) assumption using about self-enforcement mechanisms to assure performance 
also holds in this case.   
In Panel C, we use the experience of the sub-advisor and Top 5 Sub-advisor, which is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a sub-advisor has at least one fund that is performing 
in the top 5% of all funds in a particular investment objective, to explain the use of a 
contract that compensates external firms with a floating fee based on performance. The 
last panel of Table VI reports these estimates and confirms that less experienced sub-
advisors without top funds are more likely to engage in these contracts as a way of 
preventing poor management. For example, sub-advisors unable to have at least a star 
fund, are 2/3 (0.006/0.009) more likely to be compensated according to their 
performance.  
 
                                                          
24
 Please note that because all of the variables are contemporaneous, we are not claiming that past higher 
deviations positively predict the use of multi-advising contracts but instead identify a simple positive 
relation, controlling for other variables, to evidence that under these contracts, portfolio managers tend to 
deviate more from others within the same style. 
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Table VI: Reputation, Competitiveness and Incentives 
 
This table reports the estimates of monthly logistic regressions addressing whether external funds are under different contractual arrangements based on different sub-advisor, 
fund and family characteristics. The dependent variables are Co-branding (Panel A), Multi-advising (Panel B) and Performance-fee (Panel C) as previously described. The 
main explanatory variables are as follows: Sub-advisor Performance is the objective-adjusted sub-advisor abnormal return, Sub-advisor Experience is the natural logarithm 
of the number of years the sub-advisor has been in existence, and Idiosyncratic and Beta Deviation are standard deviation of residuals and the market beta based on F6, 
respectively. Top 5 Sub-advisor is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a sub-advisor has at least one fund that is performing in the top 5% of all funds with a particular 
investment objective. The remaining variables are a set of controls previously described. The sample contains U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Time and investment-
style dummies are included but not reported; t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the constant term has been omitted. Average marginal effects and standard deviations 
are also shown, and the unconditional probability is described as the baseline predicted probability. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A 
Co-branding & Reputation 
Panel B 
Multi-advising & Competitiveness 
Panel C 
Performance-fee & Incentives 
 Skill Experience Idiosyncratic Deviation Beta Deviation Experience Top Funds 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
Sub-advisor Performance 0.021** 0.010**           
 (2.05) 1.294           
Sub-advisor Experience   0.445** 0.003**     -0.357*** -0.002***   
   (2.47) 0.717     (-2.61) 0.717   
Idiosyncratic Deviation     0.083*** 0.102***       
     (4.20) 0.015       
Beta Deviation       0.437*** 0.019***     
       (2.61) 0.283     
Top 5 Sub-advisor           -1.291*** -0.006*** 
           (-6.51) 0.480 
Fund Size (log TNA) 0.012 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.066* 0.002* 0.034 0.001 0.027 0.000 0.036 0.000 
 (0.28) 1.995 (0.61) 2.008 (1.77) 1.993 (0.86) 2.068 (0.35) 2.006 (0.48) 1.993 
Family Size (log family TNA) -0.105* -0.002* 0.060 0.000 0.176*** 0.005*** 0.166*** 0.007*** 0.028 0.000 0.016 0.000 
 (-1.77) 2.600 (0.90) 2.598 (3.98) 2.598 (3.36) 2.826 (0.26) 2.598 (0.18) 2.598 
Family Funds 0.220 0.004 0.041 0.000 -0.505*** -0.015*** -0.479*** -0.020*** 0.111 0.001 0.301* 0.001* 
 (1.55) 1.220 (0.31) 1.214 (-5.31) 1.219 (-4.47) 1.300 (0.56) 1.213 (1.76) 1.219 
Fund Age -0.618*** -0.010*** -0.836*** -0.005*** -0.382*** -0.011*** -0.273** -0.012** -0.419 -0.002 -0.445 -0.002 
 (-3.20) 0.530 (-3.75) 0.531 (-2.93) 0.530 (-1.97) 0.554 (-1.39) 0.529 (-1.52) 0.530 
Distribution Fee -0.712*** -0.012*** -0.931*** -0.006*** -0.648*** -0.019*** -0.434* -0.018* -3.637*** -0.019*** -3.631*** -0.017*** 
 (-2.92) 0.327 (-2.64) 0.327 (-3.06) 0.326 (-1.80) 0.324 (-4.33) 0.328 (-4.70) 0.327 
           (Continued) 
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 Table VI- Continued 
Expenses 0.731*** 0.012*** 0.922*** 0.006*** 0.481*** 0.014*** 0.231* 0.010* 0.916*** 0.005*** 0.913*** 0.004*** 
 (5.44) 0.542 (5.49) 0.530 (4.47) 0.537 (1.87) 0.538 (4.13) 0.538 (4.62) 0.539 
Turnover -0.028 -0.000 -0.060 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -0.001 -0.019 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-1.01) 1.818 (-1.10) 1.866 (0.02) 1.826 (-0.78) 1.790 (-0.53) 1.848 (-0.13) 1.821 
Flows 0.002 0.000 -0.022 -0.000 -0.018 -0.001 -0.041 -0.002 -0.007 -0.000 -0.008 -0.000 
 (0.15) 1.894 (-0.60) 1.778 (-0.84) 1.856 (-1.11) 1.868 (-0.16) 1.791 (-0.19) 1.852 
Past Returns 0.022** 0.000** 0.021 0.000 -0.031*** -0.001*** -0.024*** -0.001*** -0.026** -0.000** -0.025** -0.000** 
 (2.16) 5.190 (1.32) 4.845 (-4.60) 5.127 (-3.29) 6.096 (-2.18) 5.028 (-2.03) 5.099 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Style Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 346481  346481  346481  346481  346481  346481  
Pseudo R2 0.040  0.055  0.054  0.040  0.073  0.098  
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.021  0.019  0.038  0.051  0.009  0.009  
37                                                                                                Chapter 2: Management Sub-advising: 
The Mutual Fund Industry 
 
  
5. Outsourcing Policy, Market Share and Investor Sophistication 
5.1. Outsourcing Decisions and Market Share  
In this section, we examine whether management companies that engage in outsourcing 
contracts are able to increase their market share while offering a wider range of 
products, especially in those investment styles in which they have no previous 
experience. Previous studies of family decisions in mutual funds (Massa (2003) or 
Khorana and Servaes (2012), among others) find that families face incentives to 
increase the menu of funds offered to customers, in terms of both the number of funds 
and the range of investment objectives, to increase their market share. To proceed with 
our empirical tests, we need to aggregate funds to the family level, reducing our sample 
to family-month observations. We compute the market share at the family level as the 
sum of all assets under management by each management company divided by all assets 
under management in the industry during that period and regress it on the outsourcing 
decisions and fund family characteristics. We estimate the following regression model 
using different specifications: 
                    
                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
                          captures different decisions on outsourcing made by 
management company i in the previous month.                   is the market share 
of family “i” in period t-1. We also control for a set of family characteristics        
during period t-1.  
We use different variables to measure outsourcing decisions. Our data show that fewer 
than one third of management companies have at least one fund outsourced, hence, it 
appears that outsourcing decisions are taken at the family level. Thus, the variable used 
to measure these decisions is Outsourcing Policy, a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
management companies that are currently offering sub-advised funds and 0 otherwise. It 
is also important to differentiate between the type of funds that a firm is outsourcing, as 
we expect that outsourcing funds with investment objectives not yet offered by internal 
management would help to gain more market share.  
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We measure this outsourcing decision using the variable Outsource New Style; this 
variable takes the value 1 only if the management company is employing outsourcing to 
manage some of its funds, of which at least one belongs to a different investment style 
from those managed in-house. Therefore, this variable equals 1 if outsourcing is 
employed by the management company to offer new investment styles to its customers. 
Within those firms that decide to outsource some their funds, the number of funds 
externalized might vary across firms, so we will also measure this using Ratio 
Outsourced Funds, which is the proportion of sub-advised funds a management 
company currently holds over all of its funds.  
The set of family characteristics (  ) includes variables such as Firm Expenses, Firm 
Performance and Firm Turnover, which are weighted average objective-adjusted 
measures computed across all funds in the firm. These variables are weighted in the 
same fashion as in Khorana and Servaes (2012) based on equation [6] but replacing the 
fund returns with each variable of interest (funds expenses, 6 factor alphas and turnover, 
respectively). We also include some other control variables such as Funds Started, 
which measures the number of funds started by the company in a given period; Firm 
Funds, which is the logarithm of the number of funds of the firm; Firm Experience, 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of years a management company has 
been in existence; Top 5% Performance, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the family has at least one mutual fund that performs in the top 5% based on the fund’s 
style; and Herfindhal across Funds, which is simply measured as the sum of the squared 
fractions of each fund’s share in total management company assets. 
We estimate the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which is an augmented version of the 
difference GMM of the Arellano-Bond (1991) approach, to estimate equation [10].25 
Table VII reports the results of this regression in five different columns. Column 1 
shows a positive (0.2532) and statistically significant coefficient for our variable of 
                                                          
25
 Kievit (1995), among others, demonstrates that ordinary least squares estimates are inconsistent when 
the lagged dependent variable is included in the specification model. As we are including the lagged 
market share as an independent variable (following Khorana and Servaes (2012)), we must estimate our 
model using the system GMM. We estimate a system of equations in both differences and levels. We 
employ the lagged values of the differences as instruments in the levels and the lagged values of the 
levels as instruments in the difference equation.  
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interest Outsourcing Policy. This suggests that a change in the outsourcing policy of a 
management company (shifting from not using to using outsourcing) implies an 
increment in its market share of approximately 28.8% [e0.2532 -1]. So, for example, in a 
family with market share of 15% before implementing an outsourcing policy, the new 
policy of sub-advising will lead to a greater market share of 19.32% 
[0.15*(1+0.288)*100]. Moreover, we also find that firm experience and the number of 
funds in the family positively affect market share, consistent with the previous 
literature.  
Outsourcing decisions will have a positive impact on market share as long as the 
externalized funds have different investment objectives from those funds already 
managed in-house. Therefore, we would expect the coefficient of our variable 
Outsource New Style to be positive. Column 2 shows that effectively, this coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant (coefficient: 0.1555, p-value: 0.03). In column 3, 
we include both Outsourcing Policy and Outsource New Style, their coefficients 
(0.1008 and 0.1409 respectively) being positive and statistically significant. Thus, 
while the outsourcing decisions are shown to contribute positively to the gain in market 
share, the outsourcing of funds in a new investment style (different from those being 
managed in-house) will help even more to increase the management company’s market 
share. In economic terms, while having an outsourcing policy allows the management 
company to increase its market share from the 15% of our prior example to 16.59% 
[0.15*e (0.1008)*100], if the outsourcing involves offering a new investment style, the 
increment would reach up to 19.10% [0.15*e (0.1008+0.1409)*100].26  
In column 4, we consider the proportion of outsourced funds (Ratio Outsourced 
Funds), observing also a positive (0.757) and statistically significant coefficient. The 
economic interpretation of this number is that an increase of one standard deviation in 
the proportion of outsourced funds (0.266) will lead the advisor’s market share to 
increase 22.3% [e0.757*0.266 -1]. Using the prior example, a family with a market share of 
15% that changes the proportion of outsourced funds from the average (0.186) to one 
                                                          
26
 We checked whether there is second-order serial correlation of the error term and for the validity of the 
instruments using the Hansen test. The tests confirm that the error term is serially uncorrelated and that 
the instruments used in the GMM are exogenous, respectively.  
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standard deviation higher, 0.452 [0.186+0.266], will increase its market share by up to 
18.35% [0.15*(1+0.223)*100].  
We are assuming here that there is a linear relation between the proportion of 
outsourced funds and the market share. However, it appears unreasonable to believe 
that changes in the proportion of outsourced funds for a management company that 
already has a large number of funds externally managed will have the same impact on 
market share as an equivalent change for a management company that has a lower 
proportion of external funds. To test this non-linear relation, we split Ratio Outsourced 
Funds into three different variables to account for changes in the low, middle and high 
levels. We therefore estimate the following specification: 
                    
                                                       
                                   
 [8] 
 
where                considers changes in the proportion of outsourced funds with a 
structure of less than 20%, measured as the min(Ratio Outsourced Funds, 0.2); and 
                considers only changes for firms that had at least 80% of outsourced 
funds, measured with the max(0.8, Ratio Outsourced Funds). Finally, we also include 
              , which considers Ratio Outsourced Funds with a minimum of 0.2 and a 
maximum of 0.8. 
Column 5 of Table VII reports the estimates of equation [8] and confirms our 
hypothesis about the non-linear relation between the proportion of outsourced funds 
and market share. Low Ratio is positive and statistically significant with a coefficient 
of 1.8066 and a p-value of 0.04, while Mid Ratio and High Ratio are not statistically 
significant. To provide an economic interpretation of these results, we need to consider 
the standard deviation of Low Ratio (0.1025). An increase of one standard deviation 
from 0.1 to 0.2025 in the proportion of outsourced funds for a fund family with a 
market share of 15% will lead to a market share of 18.05% [0.15*e (0.1025*1.8066)*100], 
while an equivalent increase in the proportion of funds (0.1025) for a management 
company that already has more than 20% of funds outsourced would have no impact 
on the market share. 
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Table VII: Outsourcing and Market Share: Management Company Level 
This table presents results for the system GMM regressions of management company market share on the 
family outsourcing policy. The sample includes all U.S. management companies from 1996 to 2011. The 
dependent variable is log(market share), the natural logarithm of the sum of all assets under management 
by each management company divided by all assets under management in the industry in that period. 
Outsourcing Policy is a dummy variable that equals 1 for management companies that are currently 
offering at least one sub-advised fund and 0 otherwise. % Outsourced Funds is the proportion of sub-
advised funds a management company currently holds over all of its funds. Outsource New Style is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the management company is outsourcing funds styles different from 
those it manages in-house. Ratio Outsourced Funds is the proportion of outsourced funds over the total 
funds of the firm. Low Ratio is the min(Ratio Outsourced Funds, 0.2), High Ratio is the max(0.8, Ratio 
Outsourced Funds) and Mid Ratio is the Ratio Outsourced Funds with a minimum of 0.2 and a maximum 
of 0.8. Past Market Share is the natural logarithm of the prior year market share. Firm Expenses are 
weighted average objective-adjusted expenses computed across all funds in the firm. Firm Performance 
is the objective-adjusted firm gross return. Funds Started is the number of funds started by the company 
in a given period. Firm Funds is the logarithm of the number of funds of the firm. Firm Turnover is the 
average objective-adjusted turnover computed across all funds in the company. Firm Experience is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years a management company has been in existence. Top 5% 
Performance is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a family has at least one fund that is performing in 
the top 5% of all funds under its investment objective. Herfindhal across Funds is the sum of the 
squared fractions of each fund’s share in total management company assets. All variables are lagged one 
period. Time dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. P-values are 
reported in parentheses, using robust standard errors. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  Log (Market Share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outsourcing Policy 0.2532**  0.1008*   
 (0.02)  (0.07)   
Outsource New Style  0.1555** 0.1409**   
  (0.03) (0.04)   
Ratio Outsourced Funds    0.7570***  
    (0.00)  
Low Ratio      1.8066** 
     (0.04) 
Mid Ratio      0.0879 
     (0.82) 
High Ratio      0.5135 
     (0.85) 
Past Market Share 0.1253** 0.1263** 0.1227** 0.1261** 0.1256** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Firm Expenses -0.0221 -0.0225 -0.0223 -0.0226 -0.0224 
 (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Firm Performance 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Funds Started -0.0122 -0.0126 -0.0127 -0.0124 -0.0125 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
Firm Funds 0.1232* 0.1276* 0.1250* 0.1118 0.1156* 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) 
Firm Turnover 0.0583 0.0584 0.0584 0.0578 0.0578 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Firm Experience 2.899*** 2.922*** 2.909*** 2.848*** 2.865*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Top 5% Performance -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0028 
 (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
Herfindahl across Funds 0.0027 0.0025 0.0038 0.0015 0.0026 
 (0.97) (0.97) (0.96) (0.98) (0.97) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24623 24623 24623 24623 24623 
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5.2. Investor Sophistication and Outsourcing  
Given the positive impact of cobranding, multi-manager and performance fee 
arrangements, one might wonder why every sub-advising contract under a conflict of 
interest does not engage in them. To sign an outsourcing agreement with these types of 
mechanisms implies effort and costs as noted by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) 
for general contracts. It is necessary to find, for example, a family interested in 
managing your funds, but if it is large and prestigious enough and you are not, it may 
not agree to collaborate with you. Additionally, if you want to implement the multi-
manager mechanism, searching for different management companies takes time and 
costs beyond signing the subcontracting agreements. We hypothesize that one would 
be willing to incur such costs only if the investor is sensitive to changes in 
performance, in the sense that he or she is willing to leave funds if the performance is 
not as desired. 
In this sense, as prior literature has showed, not all fund shareholders are equally 
informed and sophisticated. For instance, Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that fund flows 
depend asymmetrically on past returns, chasing top funds while not running away from 
poorly performing funds. Similar results are found in Ferreira et al. (2012). 
Additionally, these authors show that sophisticated investors (those more frequently to 
be selling poor performing funds while buying past winners) are more likely to be 
placed in developed countries. At the same time, Del Guercio et al. (2010, 2014) 
evidence that portfolio managers are placed in different channels of distribution 
depending on the investors’ sophistication and the manager’s skills. In this regard, we 
claim that outsourced funds using mechanisms are going to be oriented toward more 
sophisticated investors, while the remaining outsourced funds with a conflict of interest 
are going to be written without any mechanism and will be distributed through brokers 
selling to less informed investors. 
To measure investors’ sophistication, we follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) by using a 
piecewise-linear specification to examine different flow-performance sensitivities at 
different levels of fund returns. In each month and for each investment objective, we 
rank the funds from 0 to 1 based on their past year gross return, 1 being the top 
performer and 0 being the worst. The variables on these piecewise decompositions 
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represent the marginal fund-flow response to performance. Following previous 
literature, we classify the fractional ranks into three unequal groups. The bottom group 
(LowRank) is the lowest quintile defined as Min(0.2, Rank). The middle three quintiles 
are combined into one group (MidRank) defined as Min(0.6, Rank-LowRank) and the 
highest quintile (HighRank) is defined as Rank-(LowRank+MidRank). We proceed with 
monthly-pooled OLS regressions to estimate the following piecewise linear 
regressions:27  
                       
                                 
                                              
                                                
                                                                                                   
                                                                    
                                                           
Table VIII provides the results from estimating different specifications of equation [9]. 
In general, we find flows in the middle and high ranks are more sensitive to 
performance, consistent with previous literature. The results from columns 2 to 5 
confirm that flows from sub-advised funds using mechanisms are more sensitive to poor 
performance (the coefficient in columns 2 through 5 being positive and statistically 
significant). This result is consistent with our hypothesis that mechanisms are only 
employed for mutual funds with sophisticated investors (those who sell poorly 
performing funds). Regarding the coefficients of the control variables, we find that 
larger and more expensive funds receive less flow, consistent with Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
Prior literature suggests that not chasing winners but selling losers is a “sophisticated” 
behavior, as it has been proved that performance persists for poor performers but not for 
top performers. Thus, consistent with our beliefs, sub-advised funds with mechanisms 
are targeted toward more sophisticated investors than those outsourced funds that are 
not using any mechanism to prevent the negative effects of potential conflicts of 
interest. 
 
 
                                                          
27
 These results are also robust using a Fama-MacBeth approach. 
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Table VIII: Flow-Performance Sensitivity: Sub-advised Funds 
This table presents results for the regressions of the growth rate of net new money on fund return ranks. 
The dependent variable is Fund Flows: the percentage of net new inflows into the fund over the previous 
year. The independent variables based on fund returns are estimated using a piecewise linear regression 
framework to define three linear segments in the flow-performance sensitivity. Each month, by fund 
investment objective, we rank the funds from 0 to 1 based on their past year gross return. Then, we 
construct the ranking variables as LowRank=min(0.2, rank), MidRank=min(0.6, rank-LowRank) and 
HighRank=rank-(LowRank+MidRank). Mechanism is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is sub-
advised using either co-branding, multi-manager or performance fee arrangements and 0 otherwise. Fund 
Size is the natural logarithm of TNA under management in millions of dollars. Family Size is the 
logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. Expenses are the total annual 
expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. StD Monthly Returns is the standard deviation of the prior 
year’s monthly returns. Control variables are lagged 1 period. Time and Investment Style dummies are 
included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and standard errors are clustered at fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The Wald Test is also 
performed: HighRank=LowRank (p-value:0.00), HighRank=MidRank (p-value:0.00), and 
MidRank=LowRank (p-value:0.00). 
 
 
 Fund Flows 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low Rank -0.2121 -0.2099 -0.2099 -0.2138 -0.2105 
 (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.30) (-1.28) 
Mid Rank 0.0687** 0.0684** 0.0684** 0.0689** 0.0686** 
 (2.21) (2.21) (2.21) (2.22) (2.21) 
High Rank 0.3098** 0.3066* 0.3061* 0.3089** 0.3078** 
 (1.97) (1.95) (1.95) (1.97) (1.96) 
Fund Size  -0.2280*** -0.2281*** -0.2280*** -0.2280*** -0.2281*** 
 (-16.38) (-16.38) (-16.38) (-16.38) (-16.38) 
Family Size  0.0283*** 0.0284*** 0.0283*** 0.0283*** 0.0284*** 
 (5.15) (5.15) (5.15) (5.15) (5.15) 
Expenses -0.3011*** -0.3005*** -0.3005*** -0.3007*** -0.3005*** 
 (-8.57) (-8.55) (-8.56) (-8.56) (-8.55) 
StD Monthly Returns 0.0190 0.0191 0.0190 0.0189 0.0191 
 (1.44) (1.44) (1.44) (1.43) (1.44) 
Mechanism  -0.0964 -0.0637 -0.0322 -0.0975** 
  (-1.57) (-1.28) (-0.65) (-2.00) 
Low Rank*Mechanism  1.0182**   1.3523* 
  (2.48)   (1.96) 
Mid Rank*Mechanism   0.3182**  -0.1790 
   (2.35)  (-0.77) 
High Rank*Mechanism    0.6831 -0.1635 
    (1.15) (-0.25) 
Style & Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.032 
 
To be more robust with prior results, we also examine whether outsourced funds with 
conflicts that do not use any mechanisms are going to be distributed through brokers 
looking for a less informed type of investor or through a direct channel instead (based 
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on DelGercio et al.’s (2010, 2013) findings about investor sophistication and channels 
of distribution). In Table IX, we estimate the following monthly logistic model: 
             
         
           
                                  [13] 
where                                                                       
                                     . The dependent variable (      is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the outsourced fund used Co-branding, Multi-advising, or 
Performance-fee arrangements.               is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
fund has been outsourced to a sub-advisor that is also managing and distributing its own 
funds.                       is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is charging 
any load fee, as a proxy for broker distribution and 0 otherwise (direct channel).28  
The estimated value of           is positive and statistically significant at 1% across the 
different models of Table IX. This suggests that these contractual arrangements are 
primarily applied to outsourced funds with a potential conflict of interest. However, we 
show that this positive probability is reduced when the funds are sold indirectly. The 
coefficient of the interaction    is negative and statistically significant (except for the 
performance fee), consistent with our third hypothesis that management companies use 
indirect channels of distribution as an alternative to using costly mechanisms to protect 
fund performance. The performance fee appears to be used for distribution through 
direct channels independent of whether or not the fund is managed externally by firms 
that also manage their own funds. To offer an economic interpretation of these results, 
we will focus on the general mechanism (Column 4), which has an unconditional 
probability of 6.7%. Funds under potential conflicts of interest that are sold indirectly 
through brokers are 26.9% (0.0180/0.067) less likely to be under a mechanism than 
other similar funds. 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Prior literature (e.g., Bergstresser et al. (2009)) has shown that investors generally do not pay front-end 
or back-end loads when purchasing mutual funds through a direct channel. Massa et al. (2010) also used 
load funds as a proxy for funds distributed through indirect channels.  
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Table IX: Distribution Channel and the Use of Mechanisms 
In this table, we use fund loads as a proxy for indirect channel distribution, assuming that those funds that charge loads are distributed by a broker and those without loads are 
distributed by direct channels. This table reports the results of monthly logistic regression estimates of whether a sub-advised mutual fund uses mechanisms depending on the 
type of distribution channel and other fund and family characteristics. The sample contains U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variables are dummies equal 
to 1 if the fund is outsourced and uses co-branding, multi-manager, and/or performance fee arrangements (Mechanism). Indirect Channel is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the fund charges any load fee as a proxy for indirect distribution. The iteration term Conflict*Indirect Channel is also included to examine the effect of using this 
distribution channel over sub-advised funds with potential conflicts of interest. The remaining variables are a set of controls previously described. Time and investment-style 
dummies are included but not reported; t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the constant term has been omitted. Average marginal effects and standard deviations are 
also shown, and the unconditional probability is described as the baseline predicted probability. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee Mechanism  
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
Conflict*Indirect Channel -0.5184* -0.0077* -0.4365* -0.0092* 0.3270 0.0014 -0.4641** -0.0180** 
 (-1.78) 0.1411 (-1.91) 0.1411 (0.69) 0.1411 (-2.44) 0.1411 
Conflict 2.0754*** 0.0309*** 2.8628*** 0.0605*** 2.1660*** 0.0090*** 2.8495*** 0.1107*** 
 (13.76) 0.2729 (25.01) 0.2729 (9.91) 0.2729 (28.75) 0.2729 
Indirect Channel 0.1968 0.0029 0.1354 0.0029 -1.3598*** -0.0057*** -0.0449 -0.0017 
 (1.09) 0.3975 (0.81) 0.3975 (-3.89) 0.3975 (-0.34) 0.3975 
Fund Size (log TNA) -0.0102 -0.0002 0.0595 0.0013 -0.0320 -0.0001 0.0257 0.0010 
 (-0.28) 2.0416 (1.64) 2.0416 (-0.49) 2.0416 (0.95) 2.0416 
Family Size (log family TNA) -0.1712*** -0.0025*** 0.1874*** 0.0040*** -0.1507* -0.0006* 0.1044*** 0.0041*** 
 (-3.09) 2.6454 (4.36) 2.6454 (-1.95) 2.6454 (2.97) 2.6454 
Family Funds 0.3006** 0.0045** -0.5357*** -0.0113*** 0.5738*** 0.0024*** -0.2902*** -0.0113*** 
 (2.21) 1.2380 (-5.84) 1.2380 (3.76) 1.2380 (-3.74) 1.2380 
Fund Age -0.3971*** -0.0059*** -0.1178 -0.0025 -0.5341** -0.0022** -0.2370*** -0.0092*** 
 (-2.92) 0.6096 (-1.15) 0.6096 (-2.31) 0.6096 (-2.82) 0.6096 
Distribution Fee -0.0184 -0.0003 -0.3389 -0.0072 -3.1089*** -0.0130*** -0.5337*** -0.0207*** 
 (-0.08) 0.3243 (-1.64) 0.3243 (-4.78) 0.3243 (-3.09) 0.3243 
Expenses 0.3030** 0.0045** 0.2690** 0.0057** 0.3079 0.0013 0.3280*** 0.0127*** 
 (2.53) 0.5560 (2.32) 0.5560 (1.38) 0.5560 (3.56) 0.5560 
Turnover -0.0330 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0000 -0.0126 -0.0005 
 (-1.17) 2.0294 (-0.05) 2.0294 (-0.06) 2.0294 (-0.77) 2.0294 
Flows 0.0026 0.0000 -0.0126 -0.0003 -0.0528 -0.0002 -0.0123 -0.0005 
 (0.37) 2.4956 (-0.86) 2.4956 (-0.74) 2.4956 (-1.25) 2.4956 
Past Returns 0.0045* 0.0001* -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0042* -0.0000* 0.0001 0.0000 
 (1.80) 18.6508 (-0.19) 18.6508 (-1.76) 18.6508 (0.07) 18.6508 
Style & Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.024  0.041  0.011  0.067  
Pseudo R2 0.121  0.215  0.170  0.211  
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6. Alternative Interpretations and Robustness Checks 
In the previous sections, we have shown the importance of choosing different contractual 
arrangements when writing outsourcing contracts and the positive impact from these 
clauses on fund performance. We have also shown the positive relation between these 
contracts and the market share of management companies. As with any empirical study, an 
important concern in the interpretation of our results is potential endogeneity issues. In the 
following sections, we will try to address this concern while considering different 
alternative interpretations. 
6.1 The Effect of Bargaining Power 
In prior sections, we have shown that contractual arrangements such as co-branding, multi-
advising and performance fees are associated with an increase in the performance of 
outsourced funds managed by external firms that also manage their own funds. We pointed 
out that this result is related to the incentive alignment created by implementing these 
arrangements. However, one might argue an alternative interpretation: top sub-advisors 
may agree to these contracts because they can perform very well with low effort and either 
achieve higher compensation through performance fees or advertise themselves through the 
co-branding contract.  
To address this concern and confirm that writing these contracts actually encourages extra 
effort from sub-advisors, we need to proceed with a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
approach. We need to find a variable that is highly correlated with the use of these 
contractual arrangements and estimate the probability of using them in a 1st Stage using a 
logistic model. Then, we include the residual from the logistic model into the 2nd Stage 
regression to examine the effect of these contracts on fund performance. We expect that the 
decision of whether to include a mechanism will depend on the bargaining power of the 
advisor. When the sub-advisor’s revenue is highly (less) dependent on a single firm, then 
the sub-advisor will have less (more) bargaining power, and thus it will be more (less) 
willing to accept the advisor’s contract clauses. Table X (Panel A) reports the estimates for 
the following logistic regression: 
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                                              [14] 
where                                                              
  , . The dependent variable (yi, t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is sub-advised 
using either co-branding, multi-manager or performance fee arrangements and 0 otherwise. 
                                   is the main explanatory variable proxying for 
the advisor’s bargaining power.        is a vector of fund and family variables lagged one 
period. We include style dummies (  ) and time dummies      and cluster the standard 
errors at the fund level. 
In Panel A, our bargaining power variable Sub-advisor revenues dependence measures the 
proportion of the sub-advisor’s income (TNA internal funds times expense ratio plus TNA 
external funds times advisory fee) that comes from the management companies affiliated 
with the sub-advised funds. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, with a 
marginal effect coefficient of 6.11%, suggesting that higher levels of advisor bargaining 
power leads to higher probabilities of contractual arrangements.  
In Panel B, we present the results for the second stage of the 2SRI estimation of the effect 
on fund performance from outsourcing under these mechanisms estimated using a Fama-
MacBeth approach.29 We replicate the estimation of equation [1] with the only difference 
being the inclusion of the residual from the logistic estimation of Panel A. The coefficient 
of the residual is statistically significant, confirming the concerns regarding endogeneity 
issues, and contrary to our expectation, the negative sign of the Residual 1st Stage suggests 
that top performing sub-advisors are more likely to avoid writing these contractual 
arrangements. A possible explanation might be that management companies trust sub-
advisors that deliver good performance and do not require them to write such clauses. 
Nevertheless, the main results remain unchanged, and we can confirm that outsourcing 
contracts that include a contractual agreement aligning the principal’s (advisor) and the 
agent’s (sub-advisor) incentives will have a positive impact on final fund performance.  
                                                          
29
 These results are also robust when using an OLS methodology.  They are available upon request. 
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Table X: The Use of Mechanisms 2SRI: The Effect of Bargaining Power on Sub-
advising Decisions with Mechanisms and the Effect of Sub-advising with Mechanisms 
on Fund Performance 
Panel A presents the monthly logistic regressions in the 1ST-stage regression of the 2SRI estimation of the effect 
of sub-advisory agreements with mechanisms on mutual fund performance. This specification measures the effect 
of advisor bargaining power on the use of mechanisms when arranging sub-advisory agreements. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is sub-advised using co-branding, multi-manager or 
performance fee arrangements and 0 otherwise. Sub-advisor Revenues Dependence measures the proportion of 
the sub-advisor’s income (TNA internal funds times expense ratio plus TNA external funds times advisory fee) 
that comes from the management companies affiliated with the sub-advised funds. Panel B shows the 2nd-stage 
estimation of the effect of sub-advising with mechanisms on fund performance under a Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
approach. The dependent variable is fund performance measured by Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index (5F) and a global bond index (6F) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond 
indexes and 2 corporate indexes (9F). Residual 1ST Stage is the residual from the 1st stage logistic regression of 
the 2SRI estimation. The remaining variables have been previously described. The sample includes all U.S. 
mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Time and Style dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term 
has been omitted. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
(1987)). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. The baseline predicted probability of Panel A is 0.048. 
 
 Panel A: 
(1st Stage) – The Use of Mechanism 
Panel B: 
(2nd Stage) – Fund Performance 
 Coef/t Mfx/Sd ALPHA 5F ALPHA 6F ALPHA 9F 
Sub-advisor Revenues Dependence 1.5733*** 0.0611***    
 (7.48) 0.2064    
Conflict*Mechanism   0.1066*** 0.1027*** 0.0951*** 
   (3.68) (3.55) (3.04) 
Conflict   -0.0948*** -0.0957*** -0.0921*** 
   (-5.33) (-5.83) (-5.14) 
Mechanism   0.7627*** 0.7173*** 0.9127*** 
   (3.68) (3.45) (3.91) 
Fund Size (log TNA) -0.0343 -0.0013 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0039 
 (-1.10) 1.9932 (0.38) (0.30) (-1.29) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0980** 0.0038** 0.0166*** 0.0120*** 0.0193*** 
 (2.26) 2.3329 (5.98) (3.87) (4.42) 
Family Funds -0.1902** -0.0074** -0.0100* -0.0096* -0.0031 
 (-2.29) 1.1381 (-1.94) (-1.85) (-0.51) 
Fund Age -0.5144*** -0.0200*** 0.0222*** 0.0336*** 0.0505*** 
 (-4.52) 0.5381 (3.10) (4.94) (5.42) 
Distribution Fee -0.6906*** -0.0268*** -0.1012*** -0.0996*** -0.1627*** 
 (-3.88) 0.3271 (-6.17) (-6.13) (-6.04) 
Expenses 0.5557*** 0.0216*** 0.0789*** 0.0908*** 0.1383*** 
 (5.96) 0.5322 (4.53) (5.42) (5.32) 
Turnover -0.0127 -0.0005 -0.0037 -0.0001 -0.0032 
 (-0.86) 1.9308 (-1.21) (-0.04) (-0.68) 
Flows -0.0066 -0.0003 0.0253*** 0.0320*** 0.0389*** 
 (-0.56) 1.9426 (4.59) (5.93) (5.29) 
Past Returns -0.0126* -0.0005* 0.0185*** 0.0136*** 0.0187*** 
 (-1.94) 5.0886 (8.95) (7.76) (8.42) 
Residual 1st Stage    -0.7464*** -0.6881*** -0.9011*** 
   (-3.59) (-3.26) (-3.81) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
Pseudo R2 0.052  0.197 0.109 0.111 
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6.2 Creating New Styles Using In-house Managed Funds 
The investment management industry is dynamic in nature; new investment categories 
arise, and there is considerable variation in investor preferences over time. If a management 
company wants to maximize its profits, it needs to maintain its current investors while 
continuing to attract new investors to gain market share in the industry. Therefore, a 
management company might offer a new fund that differs from its existing product line to 
capture new investors. This is in line with Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002), who claim that 
the investment characteristics of new funds should differ as much as possible from those of 
existing funds. 
We have previously shown that fund families that have an outsourcing policy can gain 
greater market share, especially when they launch funds with new investment objectives. 
Because these companies find their expertise regularly extended by investor demands for 
investment opportunities that are not within the fund family core competency, outsourcing 
provides a way for the management company to meet these demands. However, one might 
argue that investors respond more favorably towards families that offer a differentiated 
product independently of whether the funds are managed in-house or outsourced. 
To test this idea, in Table XI (Panel B), we estimate the following system GMM regression 
models: 
                    
                                                                                          
 
                    
                    
                                                           
                                                                                                                                   
 
where                equals 1 if in the previous month, management company i created a 
fund in a different investment category than its existing funds. If this new fund is managed 
internally,                       will be 1; however, if this fund is outsourced to an 
unaffiliated sub-advisor,                         will be 1 instead. We also control for 
51                                                                                                       Chapter 2: Management Sub-advising: 
The Mutual Fund Industry 
 
  
a set of family characteristics       , previously described, where we include 
                 , which is the market share of family “i” in period t-1. 
    of equation [15] is positive and statistically significant (coefficient: 0.1206, p-value: 
0.05). In economic terms, a family with 15% of market share that creates a new style fund 
would increase its market share to 16.9% [0.15*e (0.1206)*100].  Therefore, families that 
innovate more than the competition are able to attract a larger share of the market, and 
consistent with prior literature, differentiating the new product from existing ones is 
therefore an important consideration (see, e.g., Tirole (2004)). 
Next, we are interested in analyzing whether internal versus external management of new 
funds affects the market share of the firm. Estimates of equation [16] exhibit a positive 
coefficient for    and   , whereas only the estimate of                          is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, we could argue that creating a new fund style 
leads to greater market share when the new fund is externally managed by a firm that, we 
assume, has greater expertise in that investment category.  
Alternatively, if we control for management company expertise, we would expect that 
offering a new investment category fund will contribute to an increase in market share 
independently of whether the fund is managed in-house or outsourced. Therefore, we are 
concerned about a sample selection bias in which management companies decide to 
externalize all new funds unless they have a management structure that allows them to 
manage such new funds in-house. To test for this alternative interpretation, we employ 
Heckman's approach, which uses the inverse Mill's ratio (obtained from a probit model that 
estimates the probability of managing a new fund in-house) as an additional control in our 
market share model (see, e.g., Heckman, 1978).  
In Panel A of Table XI, we estimate the probability of internally managing a fund created 
in a new investment category using Herfindhal In-house Styles (the sum of the squared 
fractions of each investment objective’s share in the total management company assets of 
in-house managed funds) and the family control variables previously used. As we expect, 
the coefficient of Herfindhal In-house Styles is negative and statistically significant, 
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suggesting that families with a more concentrated internal management structure are less 
likely to manage a new fund category in-house. In a second stage, we replicate the 
estimation of equation [16] including the Inverse Mill’s Ratio. The coefficient estimate for 
the Mill’s ratio provides insight into the relation between the omitted variable and market 
share. A positive and statistically significant estimate of the coefficient of the Inverse Mill’s 
Ratio in the third column of Panel B indicates that management companies with greater 
market share are more likely to manage new funds in-house.  
The endogeneity-corrected estimates of equation [16] suggest that when considering the 
internal management structure of a fund family, both the internal and the external 
management of new investment categories has a positive effect on the management 
company’s market share (   and     are positive and statistically significant at 10%). The 
meaningful differences between the column 2 and 3 estimates of the coefficient of 
                      suggest that, consistent with our intuition, self-selection has an 
economically meaningful impact when interpreting the effect of product differentiation and 
outsourcing on market share. We can conclude that outsourcing allows fund families to 
gain much greater market share when externalizing funds in a new investment category, 
unless the family already has a well-diversified internal management structure. In this case, 
the increase in market share will come from the mere fact of creating a new style rather 
than the outsourcing decision, as in-house management will make a contribution similar to 
that of external management.   
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Table XI: New Styles and Market Share: Selection Bias Approach 
Table XI presents the monthly regressions with and without applying a selection bias approach to the effect of 
managing (either in-house or sub-advised) new investment styles on fund family market share. The sample 
includes all U.S. management companies from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable in Panel A is In-house 
New Style, a dummy variable that equals 1 for management companies that are currently offering a new 
investment style that is managed in-house. Herfindhal In-house Styles is the sum of the squared fractions of 
each investment objective’s share in total management company assets of in-house managed funds. In Panel 
B, we report the estimates of system GMM regressions where the dependent variable is log(market share), 
the natural logarithm of the sum of all assets under management by each management company divided by all 
assets under management in the industry in that period. New Style is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
management companies that are currently offering a new investment style that is managed either in-house or 
outsourced. Inverse Mill’s Ratio has been estimated from the Probit model of Panel A (Heckman Correction 
approach). The remaining variables have been previously described in Table VII. Time dummies are included 
but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. P-values are reported in parentheses using robust 
standard errors. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. The baseline predicted probability of Panel A is 0.593. 
 
 
 Panel A: 
 Prob (In-house New Style) 
Panel B:  
Log(Market Share) 
 Coef/p-value Mfx/Std Coef/p-value Coef/p-value Coef/p-value 
Herfindahl In-house Styles -0.127*** -0.047***    
 (0.00) 0.311    
New Style   0.1206** 0.0275 -0.0596 
   (0.05) (0.74) (0.33) 
In-house New Style    0.0490 0.1063* 
    (0.49) (0.06) 
Outsource New Style    0.1260** 0.1011* 
    (0.03) (0.07) 
Firm Expenses 0.054*** 0.020*** -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0070 
 (0.00) 0.549 (0.98) (0.98) (0.86) 
Firm Performance -0.006 -0.002 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0012 
 (0.19) 2.028 (0.42) (0.42) (0.22) 
Funds Started -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0097 
 (0.00) 2.077 (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) 
Firm Funds 0.675*** 0.251*** 0.1464* 0.1417* 0.3700** 
 (0.00) 1.342 (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) 
Firm Turnover -0.005 -0.002 0.0645* 0.0642* 0.0605 
 (0.40) 1.563 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
Firm Experience 0.021** 0.008** 2.9879*** 2.9648*** 2.8806*** 
 (0.05) 0.810 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Top 5% Performance 0.065*** 0.024*** -0.0039 -0.0038 0.0132 
 (0.00) 0.499 (0.30) (0.31) (0.11) 
Herfindahl across Funds -0.633*** -0.236*** -0.0003 0.0006 -0.1728 
 (0.00) 0.320 (1.00) (0.99) (0.20) 
Past Market Share   0.1853*** 0.1849*** 0.1192** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio      0.5190** 
     (0.05) 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24623  24623 24623 24623 
Pseudo  R2 0.364     
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7. Conclusions 
Our analysis of the growth of sub-advising within the investment funds industry over the 
last decade, shows that outsourcing contracts allow management companies to gain market 
share in an increasingly competitive industry. Contrary to findings elsewhere, we document 
that outsourced funds underperform only when investors are uninformed. When the 
investor demands good management, we show that the market actually provides several 
effective contractual arrangements for monitoring sub-advisors. Therefore, by offering each 
client what it demands, fund families can benefit from outsourcing to improve their market 
share.  
Our findings indicate that an incentive fee mechanism and different types of sub-advisory 
agreements – such as multi-manager contracts and co-branding business models – are 
responsible for a positive impact to fund performance that ranges from 0.60% to 0.76% per 
year (risk-adjusted return). There are a variety of theories that explain the positive results of 
these contractual arrangements.  
First, Klein and Leffler (1981) document that reputation effects constitute implicit 
protection against adverse selection, so co-branding an outsourcing contract can help to 
align incentives because the fund’s performance will be linked to the sub-advisor’s 
reputation. Second, Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that profit sharing can generate 
mutual monitoring and peer pressure while positively affecting firm productivity. A multi-
advising contract, which involves compensation shared by all firms in the contract, leads 
sub-advisors to monitor each other. Finally, Holmstrom (1979) finds that performance-
based contracts solve moral hazard or adverse selection problems; that is, when sub-
advisors are compensated under a fulcrum fee structure, the management company 
(principal) will be able to extract higher yield from the outsourcing contract. 
We document that management companies with an outsourcing policy gain greater market 
share than those that manage all their funds in-house. We see this particularly when the 
firm outsources funds with an investment style that differs from those managed in-house. 
We also show that the increase in market share for a management company with a well-
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diversified internal management structure stems from creating a new style, as the 
contribution of in-house management is similar to that of external management. 
Outsourcing is especially useful to firms offering new funds in areas where they lack 
expertise.     
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 
This appendix provides details on how we proceeded matching the different databases, 
results from testing several alternative interpretations, and robustness checks. 
1. Technical Appendix: Jaccard Similarity for a Fuzzy Match 
Also known as the Jaccard Index, the Jaccard similarity coefficient is a statistical measure 
of similarity between sample sets; for two sets, it is defined as the cardinality of their 
intersection divided by the cardinality of their union. For example, the sets {a, b, c} and {a, 
c, d} have a Jaccard similarity of 2/4=0.5 because the cardinality of their intersection is 2 
{a, c} and that of their union is 4 {a, b, c, d}. The maximum obtainable index is one, in 
which case the sets are identical; therefore, the higher the index is, the greater the similarity 
between the sets.  
A more sophisticated way to proceed with this algorithm is to use the Weighted Jaccard 
Index, which enables us to assign weights to each item in a set and define the weighted 
Jaccard similarity index as the total weight of the intersection divided by the total weight of 
the union. Imagine the previous example with the following weights: {(a, 25), (b, 35), (c, 
13)}, {(a, 25), (c, 13), (d, 27)}. The weighted Jaccard similarity is then (25+ 13)/(25 +35 + 
13 +27) = 38/100 = .38. 
Because Jaccard similarity is defined over sets, our fuzzy match algorithm must convert 
data records to sets before calculating the Jaccard similarity. We can convert the data into 
sets of words, using spaces to separate the sets (trust and fund name). For example, the 
record {“Pacific Select Fund”, “Fidelity Series”} will be structured into the set {“Pacific”, 
“Select”, “Fund”, “Fidelity”, “Series”}. Then, a weight is assigned to each word because 
not all the words are of equal importance. Words are assigned high weights if they occur 
infrequently in a sample of records and low weights if they occur frequently. For example, 
frequent words, such as “Fund,” might be given a low weight, whereas less frequent words, 
such as “Vanguard,” might be given a high weight. We also include some words that were 
repeated in the sample but were considered to be of high importance and so were manually 
assigned high weights. 
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Finally, transforming the sample can greatly increase the power of the Jaccard Index. For 
example, if we allow for an abbreviation such as “U.S.” to represent “U.S.A.,” “EEUU” or 
“United States”, we obtain better results. This also occurs with misspelled words. For 
example, “Fidelity” is not a different word from “Pidelity” but a typographic error made by 
the register. Therefore, Weighted Jaccard Index similarity under transformation is the 
maximum weighted Jaccard similarity across all pairs of transformed sets. Thus, fuzzy 
match and Jaccard similarity are used together to find the pair of inputs with the highest 
Jaccard Index. We proceeded with a fuzzy match as follows:  
1) The name of the fund in CRSP is written as “trust name: fund name, class”. Once we 
aggregate the class level information to the fund level, we eliminate the class; thus, we 
have, for each observation, the trust name and the fund name. We collect identical 
information for each observation in the NSAR database (trust and fund name).  
2) When we have trust and fund names in both databases, we conduct a fuzzy match by 
names using weighted Jaccard similarity (the details of this process are provided 
above). 
3) For each pair of trust and fund names in both databases, we have an index from 0 to 1, 
which indicates the degree of similarity between the two. We first drop all outputs with 
index values below 0.5 and directly accept as valid outputs with index values of 1. 
4) For outputs between 0.5 to 0.85, we double-check them manually, assigning 0 to those 
belonging to different funds and 1 to those identified as identical. We again drop those 
with values of 0 and accept those with values of 1. 
5) If the output is between 0.85 to 1, we undertake another filtering process. We extract 
“key words” pertaining to investment style such as “equity”, “bond”, “small”, “cap”, 
etc., and all possible combinations among them. Both outputs must exactly coincide 
with these words. Thus, at this point, the fund names have a Jaccard similarity above 
0.85 and, additionally, are characterized by the same investment style. Those that differ 
in investment style are dropped from the sample.  
To ensure the accuracy of the process, we then manually double-check a random set of 
matches representing 5% of the final dataset.  
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2. Summary Statistic: Management Companies 
Table IA.1 provides by year the same information as Table I but now considering the 
management companies (MCs) in our sample instead of the funds. The number of firms has 
grown from 315 in 1996 to more than 500 in the last few years. The second column (sub-
advised MC) reports the number of these companies that have entered into sub-advisory 
agreements. Thus, families with an outsourcing policy (with at least one sub-advised fund) 
have increased considerably, from 88 to 161. Among these families, we observe that a high 
proportion tend to outsource their portfolios to sub-advisors that also have their own funds. 
For example, by 2011, more than 2/3 of these firms had at least one fund under a conflict of 
interest. From this table, we can conclude that outsourcing may be a relevant decision at the 
family level because we observe that not every family employs outsourcing in its fund 
management; approximately 50% of the families in our sample never employed it.  
Table IA.1: Sub-advising Contracts over Time: Management Company (MC) Level 
This table reports the number of all management companies and those that have at least one sub-advised fund 
for the period 1996-2011. For each year, we also report the proportion of these MCs that have entered into 
one of the different sub-advisory agreements. The Conflict MC column contains the percentage of MCs with 
at least one sub-advised fund in which the sub-advisor is also the principal advisor for its own funds. Co-
branding refers to MCs that hold at least one fund that uses the sub-advisor’s reputation by including the sub-
advisor’s name in the fund’s name. Multi-advising refers to MCs that currently have at least one fund sub-
advised by more than one sub-advisor. Performance Fee MC applies when the firm has at least one sub-
advised fund that charges a floating fee that depends on prior fund performance. The last column, Mechanism 
MC, indicates the proportion of MCs that contain at least one sub-advised fund that use any of the prior 
contracts (co-branding, multi-advising and/or performance fee).  
    
Year 
All 
MC 
Sub-advised 
MC 
Conflict 
MC 
Co-branding 
MC 
Multi-advising 
MC 
Performance  
fee MC 
Mechanism 
MC 
1996 315 88 40.91% 20.45% 13.64% 4.55% 35.23% 
1997 338 95 44.21% 16.84% 23.16% 6.32% 38.95% 
1998 372 113 39.82% 24.78% 20.35% 4.42% 44.25% 
1999 375 109 41.28% 23.85% 22.94% 6.42% 45.87% 
2000 570 163 48.47% 19.02% 19.02% 6.75% 40.49% 
2001 508 160 54.38% 21.88% 24.38% 5.63% 43.13% 
2002 497 161 62.11% 22.36% 32.30% 6.83% 50.31% 
2003 488 165 63.03% 17.58% 32.73% 6.06% 46.67% 
2004 475 179 61.45% 18.44% 30.73% 6.15% 45.25% 
       (Continued) 
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2005 434 158 60.13% 22.78% 34.81% 3.80% 51.27% 
2006 426 148 66.22% 25.68% 33.78% 6.76% 50.00% 
2007 414 141 59.57% 26.24% 36.17% 8.51% 54.61% 
2008 472 139 61.15% 28.06% 40.29% 7.91% 56.83% 
2009 511 163 62.58% 34.36% 40.49% 7.98% 61.96% 
2010 510 148 58.78% 36.49% 45.95% 6.76% 67.57% 
2011 508 161 67.75% 34.23% 38.74% 6.31% 59.46% 
Average 451 143 52.25% 24.54% 31.33% 6.38% 49.98% 
 
 
3. Robustness Checks 
3.1 Sub-advised Funds: Potential Conflict of Interest 
To test for sub-advised fund efficiency, we estimate differences in performance due to 
management status from the following monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of risk-
adjusted returns on fund characteristics:  
                                                    [1] 
where               is the alpha of fund j in month t,    is the intercept,              is a 
dummy variable indicating whether fund j was sub-advised to a firm that was also 
managing its own funds in month t, and       is a set of 1 period lagged control variables. 
The subscript j corresponds to all U.S. open-end funds in our sample. We also adjust for 
serial correlation by applying Newey-West (1987) estimates of standard errors with lags of 
order three.  
Table IA.2 reports the estimation results for equation [1]. We include fund-investment-style 
dummies to avoid concerns about potential correlation between the fund style and fund 
performance. We cluster standard errors at the fund level. The results show that these 
outsourced funds underperform funds managed in-house. The coefficient    is negative for 
all performance measures (-0.0616, -0.0549, -0.0500, -0.0566, -0.0530 and -0.0531 from 
columns 1 to 6, respectively), which indicates that underperformance ranges from 60 bps 
per year (using the alpha 4F model) to 73.9 bps per year (using the alpha 1F model). Our 
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results are consistent with Chen et al. (2013), who find – using a different dataset –that 
funds outsourced to sub-advisors who also manage their own funds underperform in-house 
funds by between 50.4 and 72 bps per year.  
 
Table IA.2: In-house Managed vs. Sub-advised Mutual Funds 
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of monthly risk-adjusted fund returns on fund characteristics. 
The sample contains all of the U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting 
fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance measured by the alpha from CAPM 
(1F), the Fama-French three factor model (3F), Carhart’s 4 factor model (4F), Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index (5F) and a global bond index (6F) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes 
and 2 corporate bond indexes (9F). Conflict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised by an 
unaffiliated firm that also manages its own funds and 0 otherwise. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of TNA under 
management in millions of dollars. Family Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the 
fund itself. Family Funds indicates the logarithm of the number of funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. 
Fund Age is the logarithm of the number of years since inception. Distribution Fee is the ratio of the total assets 
attributed to marketing and distribution costs. Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end 
TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the 
calendar year. Flow is a percentage that represents new inflows into the fund over the previous year. Past Returns is 
a fund’s past years’ gross risk-adjusted return. Control variables are lagged 1 month. Investment Style dummies are 
included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
(adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987)). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Fund Performance 
 ALPHA 
1F 
ALPHA 
3F 
ALPHA 
4F 
ALPHA 
5F 
ALPHA 
6F 
ALPHA 
9F 
Conflict -0.0616*** -0.0549*** -0.0500*** -0.0566*** -0.0530*** -0.0531*** 
 (-4.56) (-5.23) (-4.92) (-5.32) (-4.64) (-4.37) 
Fund Size (log TNA) -0.0046 -0.0056 -0.0066 -0.0084 0.0001 0.0003 
 (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.23) (-1.57) (0.02) (0.07) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0180*** 0.0105*** 0.0110*** 0.0088*** 0.0112*** 0.0179*** 
 (4.61) (3.14) (3.51) (3.02) (4.32) (4.39) 
Family Funds -0.0177** -0.0064 -0.0076 -0.0050 -0.0150*** -0.0143** 
 (-2.13) (-0.94) (-1.22) (-0.81) (-2.90) (-2.09) 
Fund Age 0.0238*** 0.0272** 0.0271** 0.0305*** 0.0093 0.0123 
 (3.31) (2.51) (2.42) (2.97) (1.04) (1.33) 
Distribution Fee -0.1006** -0.0157 -0.0222 -0.0104 -0.0724** -0.1206*** 
 (-2.60) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-0.29) (-2.46) (-3.50) 
Expenses 0.0572 -0.0257 -0.0312 -0.0447 0.0480 0.0989 
 (1.32) (-0.60) (-0.71) (-1.04) (1.44) (1.57) 
Turnover 0.0047 0.0036 0.0041 0.0022 0.0051 0.0134 
 (1.19) (0.79) (1.19) (0.68) (1.39) (1.63) 
Flows 0.0229*** 0.0149*** 0.0148*** 0.0153*** 0.0135*** 0.0158*** 
 (4.93) (3.90) (3.90) (3.89) (3.02) (2.96) 
Past Returns 0.0239*** 0.0240*** 0.0212*** 0.0202*** 0.0161*** 0.0186*** 
 (7.45) (6.48) (6.11) (6.00) (4.88) (5.54) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
R2 0.111 0.117 0.117 0.109 0.086 0.091 
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3.2 Outsourcing and Market Share: Instrumental Variable Approach 
In this section, we employ an instrumental variable approach to document the causal effect 
of outsourcing decisions on market share. If a fund family is internally managing a group 
of funds more concentrated around an investment objective, this company will have a 
more specific internal management structure, and therefore, it will be more likely to make 
outsourcing decisions. Meanwhile, management companies that are managing a wider 
variety of investment style funds in-house will have less need to hire an external firm to 
manage new funds. We propose an instrument to determine whether the management 
company has an outsourcing policy based on how concentrated their internal management 
structure is. The instrument is the Herfindhal index across styles of funds managed 
internally, calculated as the sum of the squared fractions of each investment objective’s 
share in the total management company assets of in-house managed funds.  
Table IA.3 presents the results of a 2SRI estimation (previously described) of the effect of 
the firm sub-advisory policy on the fund family market share. Panel A reports the monthly 
logistic regressions of the 1st-Stage regression. This first specification measures the effect 
of the internal concentration of firm managed assets across investment objectives on the 
outsourcing agreements decisions. Consistent with the conditions of being a good 
instrument, the variable Herfindahl In-house Styles is highly correlated with Outsourcing 
Policy. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, with a marginal effect of 
0.386, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase of internal management 
concentration (0.311) makes the firm 12% more likely to become involved in outsourcing 
contracts. Considering that the unconditional probability of having an outsourcing policy 
is 37.8%, we can conclude that fund families with one higher standard deviation in 
Herfindahl In-house Styles are 31.7% more likely to be an outsourcing firm that other 
families.  
To have a valid instrument, we must assume that the level of concentration in the internal 
management of a firm is uncorrelated with the firm’s market share. We cannot think of 
any economic reason why both variables would be related. Different scenarios might lead 
to different results. For example, a family with a concentrated internal management 
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structure can gain market share if it outsources the portfolio management for funds 
targeting other investment styles, while they will have a lower market share if they decide 
to focus only on the specific style of internal funds. Similarly, a firm with a less 
concentrated internal management structure can gain market share because it is covering 
the entire market or can lose market share simply because it is not an internal specialist in  
a few styles.  
Panel B of Table IA.3 shows the 2nd-Stage of the 2SRI estimation of the effect of the sub-
advising policy on firm market share. We replicate the estimation of the first model of 
Table VII while also including the residuals obtained from the first stage. The statistical 
significance of this coefficient confirms our concern about endogeneity issues. The 
negative sign suggests that firms with lower market share were more likely to self-select to 
have an outsourcing policy. This finding appears reasonable because small and new 
companies usually have lower market share and might be more interested in becoming 
involved in outsourcing arrangements. After controlling for this, we confirm the causal 
and positive effect of an outsourcing policy on market share.  
 
Table IA.3: Outsourcing and Market Share: Endogeneity Issues – 2SRI 
 
Panel A presents the monthly logistic regressions in the 1ST stage regression of the 2SRI estimation of the 
effect of firm sub-advisory policy on fund family market share. This first specification measures the effect of 
internal firm concentration in assets managed across investment objectives on the policy of arranging sub-
advisory agreements. Panel B shows the 2nd stage of the 2SRI estimation of the effect of the sub-advising 
policy on firm market share under a Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. The sample includes all U.S. 
management companies from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable in Panel A is Outsourcing Policy, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for management companies that are currently offering at least one sub-advised 
fund. Herfindhal In-house Styles is the sum of the squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in 
total management company assets of in-house managed funds. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
log(market share), the natural logarithm of the sum of all assets under management by each management 
company divided by all assets under management in the industry in that period. Residual 1ST Stage is the 
residual from the 1st stage logistic regression of the 2SRI estimation. The remaining variables are a set of 
controls previously described. Time dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term has been 
omitted. P-values are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The baseline 
predicted probability of Panel A is 0.378. 
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3.3 Investor Sophistication and Outsourcing 
Table IA.4 provides the results from estimating different specifications of equation [9]. 
More specifically, we replicate Column 5 from Table VIII for each of the mechanisms 
separately. We can observe that while in general, investors are more sensitive to 
performance in the middle and high ranks, specific investors from funds with co-branding, 
multi-advising (weak evidence) and performance fee arrangements are more sensitive to 
performance in the low rank. These results are also consistent with our hypothesis and 
provide more robustness to our claims that mechanisms are only employed for mutual 
funds with sophisticated investors (those selling the poorest performing funds). 
 
 
 Panel A: 
 (1st Stage) - Outsourcing Policy 
Panel B:  
(2nd Stage) - Log (Market Share) 
 Coef/p-value Mfx/Std Coef/p-value 
Herfindahl In-house Styles 1.738*** 0.386***  
 (0.00) 0.311  
Outsourcing Policy   0.3153** 
   (0.04) 
Firm Expenses 0.412*** 0.092*** -0.0307 
 (0.00) 0.549 (0.41) 
Firm Performance -0.014* -0.003* 0.0008 
 (0.09) 2.028 (0.27) 
Funds Started -0.003 -0.001 -0.0067 
 (0.72) 2.077 (0.38) 
Firm Funds 0.794*** 0.177*** 0.1411 
 (0.00) 1.342 (0.15) 
Firm Turnover 0.015 0.003 0.0616* 
 (0.36) 1.563 (0.10) 
Firm Experience -0.098*** -0.022*** 2.9971*** 
 (0.00) 0.810 (0.00) 
Top 5% Performance 0.017 0.004 -0.0048 
 (0.71) 0.499 (0.21) 
Herfindahl across funds -2.340*** -0.520*** 0.0491 
 (0.00) 0.320 (0.51) 
Past Market Share   0.1168** 
   (0.05) 
Residual 1st Stage    -0.1097** 
   (0.02) 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes 
Observations 24623  24623 
Pseudo R2 0.223   
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Table IA.4: Flow-Performance Sensitivity: Sub-advised Funds (II) 
This table presents results for the regressions of the growth rate of net new money on fund return ranks. The 
dependent variable is Fund Flows, the percentage of net new inflows into the fund over the previous year. The 
independent variables based on fund returns are estimated using a piecewise linear regression framework to 
define three linear segments in the flow-performance sensitivity. Each month, by fund investment objective, 
we rank the funds from 0 to 1 based on their past year gross return. Then, we construct the ranking variables , 
forming LowRank=min(0.2, rank), MidRank=min(0.6, rank-LowRank) and HighRank=rank-
(LowRank+MidRank). Co-branding is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised under a co-
branding arrangement, Multi-advising is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised by more 
than one sub-advisor and Performance-fee is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sub-advised fund is under 
a fulcrum fee compensation structure. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of TNA under management in 
millions of dollars. Family Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. 
Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. StD Monthly Returns is the 
standard deviation of the prior year’s monthly returns. Control variables are lagged 1 period. Time and 
Investment Style dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The Wald Test is 
also performed: HighRank=LowRank (p-value:0.00), HighRank=MidRank (p-value:0.00), and 
MidRank=LowRank (p-value:0.00). 
 
 Net Flows 
 Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee 
Low Rank -0.2563 -0.2271 -0.2390 
 (-1.54) (-1.35) (-1.42) 
Mid Rank 0.0662** 0.0703** 0.0674** 
 (2.11) (2.19) (2.12) 
High Rank 0.3524** 0.3228** 0.3546** 
 (2.21) (2.02) (2.21) 
Size (log TNA) -0.2277*** -0.2279*** -0.2279*** 
 (-16.37) (-16.38) (-16.38) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0283*** 0.0283*** 0.0287*** 
 (5.14) (5.14) (5.17) 
Expenses -0.3030*** -0.3010*** -0.3018*** 
 (-8.62) (-8.57) (-8.59) 
SD Monthly Returns 0.0190 0.0189 0.0190 
 (1.44) (1.44) (1.44) 
Co-branding -0.2331**   
 (-2.13)   
Low Rank* Co-branding 2.1862**   
 (2.23)   
Mid Rank* Co-branding 0.0726   
 (0.29)   
High Rank* Co-branding -1.9708   
 (-1.53)   
Multi-Sub-advising  -0.1066  
  (-1.52)  
Low Rank* Multi-Sub-advising  0.3855  
  (0.85)  
Mid Rank* Multi-Sub-advising  -0.0331  
  (-0.28)  
High Rank* Multi-Sub-advising  -0.4043  
  (-0.67)  
   (Continued) 
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 Table IA.4 – Continued   
Performance-fee   -0.1827** 
   (-2.37) 
Low Rank* Performance-fee   0.8176** 
   (2.04) 
Mid Rank* Performance-fee   0.0466 
   (0.38) 
High Rank Performance-fee   -1.3260** 
   (-2.22) 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.030 0.032 
 
 
3.4 Propensity Score Matching 
Our first endogeneity concern arises from the idea that funds under these contractual 
arrangements (co-branding, multi-advising and performance fees) might perform better 
than other outsourced funds due to a selection criterion from the management companies, 
which agree to include these mechanisms only for their best funds. Thus, funds managed 
under these contracts outperform all other funds not because of the effect from aligning 
incentives per se, but from the effect of the company’s portfolio allocation. Therefore, we 
employ a propensity score matching procedure using Nearest Neighbor from Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) and Kernel Matching from Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) to identify a 
control sample of funds without any of the contractual arrangements previously defined and 
that exhibit no observable differences in characteristics relative to the funds that have the 
mechanisms. Thus, each pair of matched funds is almost identical to one another except for 
the main variable of interest: the contractual arrangement. Then, we compare the fund 
performance between the two groups. As the control funds are restricted to a set of peers 
that is almost identical in terms of observable characteristics, the funds with contractual 
arrangements are expected to have the same performance as the funds managed without 
such contracts.  
To implement this methodology, we first calculate the probability (e.g., the propensity 
score) that a fund with given characteristics is under a contractual arrangement. The 
propensity score is calculated using the fund and family characteristics that we included in 
the specification model [1]. More specifically, this probability is estimated as a function of 
Fund Size, Family Size, Family Funds, Fund Age, Distribution Fee, Expenses, Turnover, Flows 
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and Past Returns. To ensure that the funds in the control sample (Non-Mechanism) are 
sufficiently similar to the funds with a mechanism, we require that the maximum difference 
between the propensity score of the mechanism funds and that of their matching peers does 
not exceed 0.1% in absolute value.  
Table IA.5 compares the fund performance between the two groups and reports the value of 
the difference (Mechanism vs. Non-Mechanism) and the t-statistic using bootstrapped 
standard errors associated with that difference. Fund performance is measured by the alpha 
from CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model (3F), Carhart’s 4 factor model (4F), 
Carhart’s model augmented by an international index (5F) and a global bond index (6F) and 
Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes and 2 corporate bond indexes 
(9F). The sample contains all of the U.S. mutual funds that have been sub-advised with a 
potential managerial conflict of interest between 1996 and 2011. Panels A and B show that 
the difference between the two groups is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that outsourced funds with mechanisms outperform those without mechanism by between 
22.8 and 80.4 bps per year. These results confirm that even when holding observable 
characteristics virtually identical between sub-advising funds under contractual 
arrangements and those without them, the former appear to be much better managed.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 These results are also robust using the radius and stratification matching methods. 
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Table IA.5: Sub-advising Mutual Funds Using Mechanisms: Propensity Score Matching 
 
In this table, we compare the fund performance between two groups (with mechanism and without mechanism) of outsourced mutual funds managed by a sub-
advisor with a conflict of interest. To identify a control sample, we employ two different propensity score matching procedures: Nearest Neighbor from 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and the Kernel Matching of Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). The difference between the propensity score of the funds managed with 
mechanisms and their matching peers (funds without mechanism) are required to not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. The propensity score is estimated using all 
fund and family characteristics previously described (Fund Size, Family Size, Family Funds, Fund Age, Distribution Fee, Expenses, Turnover, Flows and 
Past Returns). Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return), and fund performance is measured by the alpha from CAPM, the 
Fama-French three factor model (3F), Carhart’s 4 factor model (4F), Carhart’s model augmented by an international index (5F) and a global bond index (6F) and 
Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes and 2 corporate bond indexes (9F). The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds that have been sub-
advised with a potential managerial conflict of interest during 1996 and 2011. Figures in this table represent the difference in performance between the two 
groups (Mechanism vs. Non-mechanism) and the significance level using bootstrapped standard errors associated with that difference. * denotes significance at 
the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Panel A: 
Nearest Neighbor 
Panel B: 
Kernel Matching 
 ALPHA 
1F 
ALPHA 
3F 
ALPHA 
4F 
ALPHA 
5F 
ALPHA 
6F 
ALPHA 
9F 
ALPHA 
1F 
ALPHA 
3F 
ALPHA 
4F 
ALPHA 
5F 
ALPHA 
6F 
ALPHA 
9F 
 Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t Coef/t 
Mechanism 
vs 
Non-
mechanism 
0.029*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 
Observations 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 38251 
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3.5 Fund Performance around Mechanism Contracting 
To test whether management companies benefit from including a contractual arrangement 
such as co-branding, multi-advising or performance fees in their outsourcing contracts, we 
conduct an event study that analyzes fund performance before and after the portfolio adopted a 
mechanism in their outsourcing arrangement. The analysis is conducted for the entire sample 
(1996 to 2011) of funds that were sub-advised to an unaffiliated management company that 
was also managing its own funds, but we focus only on funds that were initially outsourced 
without a mechanism but at some later time period, added a mechanism to the outsourcing 
agreement. In Panel A, we show the results only 5 months before and after the date on which 
the mechanism is incorporated into the outsourcing agreement, but in Panel B, the results take 
into account the entire range of sample data. 
Table IA.6 shows that, in general, writing contractual arrangements over a specific outsourced 
fund leads to an improvement in fund performance, not only at the time the contract is written 
but also during the subsequent months. For example, the average risk-adjusted return (using 
the alpha from Carhart’s model augmented by an international index and a global bond index) 
for one month before the writing of a co-branding arrangement is -0.149%; after the contract is 
written, the average of those funds changes to -0.045%, which represents a improvement of 
approximately 70%. Similar results are found for the other types of contracts. The last four 
rows of each panel contain the overall fund performance before and after contracting using 
any of those mechanisms, the difference and the associated t-statistics for their difference in 
means. Independent of the contractual arrangement taken, we can confirm that the average 
performance of the funds with mechanisms is greater than prior to implementing the 
mechanism. This difference can reach up to 48 bps per year for co-branding contracts or even 
57.6 bps per year in the case of multi-advising funds, for example. These improvements are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table IA.6: Event Study - Fund Performance Around Mechanism Contracting 
This table presents average fund performance (using the alpha from Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index and a global bond index (6F)) before and after a mutual fund incorporates a mechanism into 
the outsourcing agreement. In Panel A, we present the average fund performance during the five months before 
and after the portfolio contracted a mechanism for its outsourcing arrangement. In Panel B, we present the 
average performance of funds before incorporating the mechanism (from the beginning of the sample or the date 
the fund was created) and after adding the mechanism (from the next month to the end of our sample or the date 
the fund closes). Co-branding refers to funds that use the sub-advisor’s reputation by including the sub-advisor’s 
name in the fund’s name. Multi-advising refers to funds sub-advised by more than one sub-advisor. Performance 
fee applies when the sub-advised fund charges a floating fee that depends on prior fund performance. In the last 
column, Mechanism considers the average fund performance of mutual funds using any of the previous 
mechanisms (co-branding, multi-advising and/or performance fee). The analysis is conducted for the entire 
sample from 1996 to 2011 for funds that were sub-advised to an unaffiliated management company that was also 
managing its own funds. The last four rows of each panel contain the overall fund performance before contracting 
any of those mechanisms and after, the difference and the associated t-statistics for their difference in means.  
 
Portfolios with Potential Conflict of Interest that Adopt any Mechanism  
Panel A: Average Fund Performance from 5 Months Previous to 5 Months after Using a Mechanism  
Months  
Before / After Event 
Co-branding Multi-advising Performance-fee Mechanism  
-5 -0.115 -0.057 0.026 -0.109  
-4 -0.121 -0.058 0.060 -0.111  
-3 -0.133 -0.052 0.078 -0.115  
-2 -0.130 -0.051 0.096 -0.117  
-1 -0.149 -0.049 0.002 -0.106  
0 -0.045 0.004 0.118 -0.057  
+1 -0.061 0.003 0.107 -0.058  
+2 -0.059 0.006 0.080 -0.039  
+3 -0.047 0.010 0.095 -0.029  
+4 -0.063 0.012 0.152 -0.053  
+5 -0.055 0.008 0.149 -0.047  
Panel B: Average Fund Performance from 1996 to 2011   
Performance Before -0.039 -0.032 -0.029 -0.023  
Performance After 0.001 0.016 -0.004 -0.007  
Difference 0.040 0.048 0.024 0.017  
t-stat 8.76 8.68 4.84 3.58  
 
 
4. Alternative Interpretations 
4.1 The Consequences for Investors 
In this paper, we demonstrate that using any mechanism in outsourcing agreements when there 
is a conflict of interest eliminates the underperformance evidenced by the previous literature. 
Further, we show that this result is explained by the alignment of interests between the agent 
and the principal. If the improvement in performance does not come from this alignment of 
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interests but from a selection of better portfolio managers for mutual funds using mechanisms, 
then the shareholders could not profit from it. It might be possible that investors do not benefit 
from this improvement if better managers, who will be charging higher fees, are allocated to 
these funds, and this higher cost is eventually passed on to the final investors. One way of 
ruling out this alternative interpretation is to examine the consequences of these organizational 
decisions for the final investor and to examine whether the firms are charging higher fees for 
managing these funds. 
To test this, we will follow the same approach used in section 4.1 and replicate the estimation 
of equation Panel A - Table III, but now our dependent variable is fund performance using 
fund returns after deducting fees and expenses (net return). Table IA.7 presents the results for 
the monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of this model. We find that not only the 
outsourced funds that include a contractual arrangement improve their performance by 
between 105.5 bps and 201.7 bps per year but also the average fund using any of these 
contracts outperforms all other funds (including in-house managed ones) by up to 118.6 bps 
per year. Comparing these results with those from Table III, we observe that the improvement 
from using a mechanism in outsourced funds with a conflict of interest is even higher in terms 
of net returns. These results suggest that management companies are aware of the type of 
investors they are facing, and they not only protect the more informed investors against 
agency issues from outsourcing contracts but also charge them lower fees. Thus, externally 
managed funds with a contractual arrangement (that is oriented to sophisticated investors) are 
not showing better risk-adjusted returns only because better portfolio managers (with higher 
fees) are allocated to those funds but also because incentives are aligned and investors are 
charged lower fees.  
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Table IA.7 
Sub-advising Mutual Funds Using Mechanisms: Net Performance (after-fee) 
Table IA.7 presents results for monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. 
The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated after deducting fees and 
expenses (net returns). The dependent variable is fund performance measured by the alpha from CAPM (1F), the Fama-
French three factor model (3F), Carhart’s 4 factor model (4F), Carhart’s model augmented by an international index (5F) 
and a global bond index (6F) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes and 2 corporate indexes 
(9F). Conflict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is sub-advised by an unaffiliated firm that also manages its 
own funds and 0 otherwise. Mechanism is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is sub-advised using either Co-
branding, Multi-manager or Performance fee arrangements and 0 otherwise. The iteration term Conflict*Mechanism is 
also included to examine the effect that these mechanisms exert over conflicted funds. Fund Size is the natural 
logarithm of TNA under management in millions of dollars. Family Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the 
family, excluding the fund itself. Family Funds indicates the logarithm of the number of funds in the family, excluding 
the fund itself. Fund Age is the logarithm of the number of years since inception. Distribution Fee is the percentage of 
assets the fund charges for distribution and marketing under the 12b-1 fee. Expenses are the total annual expenses and 
fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by 
average TNA over the calendar year. Flow is a percentage that represents new inflows into the fund over the previous 
year. Past Returns is the fund’s past years’ gross risk-adjusted return. Control variables are lagged 1 period. Investment 
Style dummies are included but not reported, and the constant term has been omitted. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987)). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Net Fund Performance (after-fee) 
 ALPHA 
1F 
ALPHA 
3F 
ALPHA 
4F 
ALPHA 
5F 
ALPHA 
6F 
ALPHA 
9F 
Conflict*Mechanism 0.1032*** 0.1343*** 0.1570*** 0.1681*** 0.1459*** 0.0879** 
 (4.15) (5.48) (5.61) (6.03) (5.67) (2.22) 
Conflict -0.0326** -0.0390** -0.0445*** -0.0482*** -0.0328* -0.0414** 
 (-2.33) (-2.43) (-2.74) (-2.87) (-1.81) (-2.08) 
Mechanism 0.0365** 0.0663*** 0.0654*** 0.0984*** 0.0988*** 0.0089*** 
 (2.38) (6.23) (6.26) (5.61) (5.11) (3.73) 
Fund Size (log TNA) -0.0151*** -0.0146*** -0.0154*** -0.0175*** -0.0187*** -0.0077** 
 (-4.90) (-4.97) (-5.01) (-5.30) (-5.47) (-2.21) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0256*** 0.0413*** 0.0451*** 0.0578*** 0.0565*** 0.0271*** 
 (3.55) (7.42) (7.22) (10.56) (11.48) (3.41) 
Family Funds -0.0460*** -0.0747*** -0.0819*** -0.0995*** -0.0954*** -0.0521*** 
 (-4.28) (-8.11) (-7.80) (-9.98) (-11.53) (-4.51) 
Fund Age 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0017 0.0019* 0.0008 
 (1.18) (0.97) (0.92) (1.57) (1.87) (0.95) 
Distribution Fee -0.2262*** -0.3516*** -0.3818*** -0.5143*** -0.4669*** -0.1058 
 (-3.51) (-7.34) (-7.20) (-10.51) (-9.19) (-1.63) 
Expenses 0.1830** 0.3285*** 0.3698*** 0.5230*** 0.4750*** 0.0793 
 (2.51) (6.34) (6.24) (9.36) (8.51) (1.07) 
Turnover 0.0105 0.0159** 0.0180** 0.0233*** 0.0193*** 0.0099 
 (1.60) (2.27) (2.47) (3.18) (2.68) (1.15) 
Flows -0.0043 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0022 
 (-1.27) (-0.15) (0.20) (-0.25) (-0.39) (0.64) 
Past Returns 0.0449*** 0.0370*** 0.0377*** 0.0420*** 0.0410*** 0.0250*** 
 (9.60) (14.63) (14.39) (8.96) (9.23) (7.12) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
R2 0.289 0.261 0.264 0.283 0.265 0.221 
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4.2 Fund Closure, Sub-advisor Replacement and Board Compensation  
Chen et al. (2003) have shown that outsourced funds are more likely to be closed down than 
in-house managed funds, especially after being poorly managed and displaying high levels of 
risk taking. Additionally, managerial replacement might also be an important determinant of 
management behavior (Chevalier and Ellision (1999) or Kempf et al. (2009)). Some 
outsourced funds might be performing worse than others because they benefit from softer 
monitoring. Thus, the boards of directors of these funds might also play a role in shaping 
managerial incentives.  
We would expect that after controlling for fund family, the tendency to close funds, the 
tendency to replace sub-advisors and compensation to the board of directors, we will still find 
that the use of mechanisms exerts a positive impact on the fund performance of sub-advised 
funds that face managerial conflicts of interest. 
We measure Fund Closures with the number of funds that the fund family has closed in that 
period relative to the total number of funds the firm is managing. This will be a proxy for the 
entrenchment of these funds within the fund family rather than a disciplinary policy, as unlike 
the contractual arrangements we have been analyzing, the decision to close a fund is taken 
after the performance has been realized. We also consider the event of firing a sub-advisor 
with the variable Sub-advisor Replacement, which contains the number of sub-advisors that 
have been replaced within a family relative to all funds that family is offering. We would not 
expect to have better performing funds in families that generally fire their sub-advisors more 
often as the consequence of this replacement might be poor management. However, we expect 
this policy to have a disciplinary effect on those funds that are managed under a managerial 
conflict of interest, as by including this variable, we will control for different board policies 
about sub-advisor replacement. Finally, we will also examine how different board 
compensation affects management behavior and the effect of the contractual arrangement on 
the final fund performance. We measure Board Compensation using the proportion of the fee 
that the family collects from each fund that goes to the board of directors of that fund. 
73                                                                                                            Chapter 2: Management Sub-advising: 
The Mutual Fund Industry 
 
  
Table IA.8 shows the results for the monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of risk-adjusted 
returns using the alpha from Carhart’s model augmented by an international index and a global 
bond index (Alpha 6F) on the different governance policies, the outsourcing decisions and 
other fund and family characteristics. We can observe that the tendency to close funds and 
board compensation has no effect on the outsourced funds with conflicts, however, better 
governance in terms of replacing sub-advisors will positively affect the performance of these 
portfolios. We finally show that even when we control for different governance features of 
funds and families, our main results remain unchanged. Outsourced funds with a potential 
conflict of interest underperform their in-house managed peers between 80.9 and 87.1 bps per 
year, while those that are under a mechanism obtain an improvement of 74.4 to 79.2 bps per 
year. 
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Table IA.8 Fund Closures, Sub-advisor Replacement and Board Compensation 
Table IA.8 presents results for monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains all the U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated 
after deducting fees and expenses (net return). The dependent variable is fund performance measured by the  
alpha from the Carhart’s model augmented by an international index and a global bond index (6F). Fund 
Closures measures the number of funds the fund family has closed in that period relative to the total number of 
funds the firm is managing. Sub-advisor Replacement contains the number of sub-advisors that have been 
replaced within a family, relatively to all the funds that family is offering. Board Compensation measures the 
proportion of fee the family collects from a fund that goes to the board of directors of that fund. Control variables 
are lagged 1 period. Investment Style dummies are included but not reported; and the constant term has been 
omitted. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987)). * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 
1%level.
 Fund Performance 
 Fund Closures Sub-advisor Replacement Board Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conflict -0.0724*** -0.0674*** -0.0725*** -0.0726*** -0.0725*** -0.0723** 
 (-6.43) (-6.07) (-6.42) (-6.56) (-6.70) (-2.55) 
Mechanism -0.0074 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0075 -0.0075 
 (-0.67) (-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.74) (-0.74) 
Conflict*Mechanism 0.0660** 0.0620** 0.0659** 0.0646** 0.0632** 0.0635** 
 (2.50) (2.39) (2.49) (2.45) (2.41) (2.51) 
Fund Closures -0.2474* -0.2832**     
 (-1.85) (-2.06)     
Sub-advisor Replacement   0.3846 0.4227   
   (1.08) (0.22)   
Board Compensation     -0.2477 -0.3477* 
     (-1.27) (-1.82) 
Conflict*Fund Closures  0.0356     
  (0.12)     
Conflict*Sub-advisor Replacement    0.2990**   
    (2.20)   
Conflict*Board Compensation      -4.2324 
      (-0.40) 
Fund Size (log TNA) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0099 0.0098 0.0096 0.0100 
 (0.51) (0.53) (1.44) (0.42) (1.43) (0.51) 
Family Size (log family TNA) 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0085*** 0.0078*** 
 (4.17) (4.16) (4.17) (4.19) (4.14) (3.73) 
Family Funds -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.0188*** -0.0177*** 
 (-4.76) (-4.76) (-4.79) (-4.81) (-4.68) (-4.25) 
Fund Age -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.0085 -0.0075 -0.0092 
 (-1.39) (-1.40) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.28) (-1.48) 
Distribution Fee -0.0907*** -0.0912*** -0.0911*** -0.0910*** -0.0974*** -0.1005*** 
 (-4.53) (-4.57) (-4.56) (-4.55) (-4.92) (-5.10) 
Expenses 0.0759*** 0.0759*** 0.0759*** 0.0758*** 0.0787*** 0.0793*** 
 (3.78) (3.78) (3.78) (3.77) (3.86) (3.88) 
Turnover 0.0051* 0.0051* 0.0051* 0.0051* 0.0054* 0.0050* 
 (1.92) (1.89) (1.91) (1.89) (1.97) (1.86) 
Flows 0.0171*** 0.0171*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0169*** 0.0166*** 
 (5.68) (5.69) (5.75) (5.77) (5.62) (5.43) 
Past Returns 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0010* 0.0010* 
 (1.87) (1.88) (1.87) (1.87) (1.76) (1.73) 
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 346481 
R2 0.131 0.132 0.130 0.130 0.133 0.133 
  
  
 
Chapter 3: The Relevance of Portfolio Management Core 
Competencies in Outsourcing Decisions  
1. Introduction 
Despite the growth of outsourcing portfolio management in the mutual fund industry, 
relatively little research has been conducted on how outsourcing decisions are made. Studies 
of this new business model for mutual funds have compared the performance of outsourced 
funds to that of funds managed in-house. Issues such as which funds should be transferred to 
external companies or how to choose the best sub-advisor have not yet been explained. The 
aim of this chapter is to analyze the relevance of core competencies in outsourcing decision-
making within the mutual fund industry. Once we clarify the factors upon which these 
outsourcing decisions are made, it is likely that we will be able to explain the high growth rate 
of outsourcing in mutual funds over the last decade.  
Previous research on industrial organization indicates that companies should focus on the 
tasks or products that perform best, that is, their core competency, and outsource other 
activities to companies whose core competencies are aligned with those activities. This 
specialization generates the following efficiency gains: i) the company can focus on its core 
competency (which provides a competitive advantage) and thus improve performance (Quinn 
(1992); Ellram and Billington (2001)), and ii) the activities outsourced to other companies, 
which specialize in that activity, will also be completed more efficiently than if they were 
performed internally (Hamel and Prahalad (1990); Venkatesan (1992) and Quinn and Hilmer 
(1994)). Therefore, the core competency of a company is an important strategic component of 
outsourcing decisions (as Quinn and Hilmer (1994) noted). For many years, companies have 
been motivated to identify and focus on core competencies - the skills, knowledge and 
technologies a company must possess to be competitive (Hamel and Prahalad (1990)). 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) define a core competency as “a harmonized combination of 
multiple resources and skills that distinguish a firm in the marketplace.” Core competencies 
must provide potential access to a wide variety of markets, make a significant contribution to 
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the perceived customer benefits of the final product and be difficult to imitate by competitors. 
For investment companies, the core competency is clearly portfolio management, which is 
more important than any other activity performed by the company (such as accounting and 
marketing). However, many investment companies manage different types of mutual funds (in 
some cases, this can be explained by the desire of a firm to provide a superior menu of options 
for its customers to retain them (Massa (2003))), but the investment company specializes in 
only one of these types (which includes most of its funds and/or where it employs the largest 
number of managers). In this chapter, the core competency of a fund family is defined as the 
most common investment style among all the assets under their management.31 We 
hypothesize that by outsourcing the funds that are not within their core investment style, fund 
families can focus their efforts and skills on managing funds in which they have a competitive 
advantage to maximize performance while benefiting from the cost savings of outsourcing 
agreements.  
We analyze the role of core competencies in outsourcing decisions in the mutual fund 
industry and consider whether these explain the growth of outsourcing in this industry over the 
last decade. First, we examine whether the advisor’s core competency affects the selection 
decision of which funds are managed externally and whether the sub-advisors are chosen 
based on their core competencies. The results indicate that core competencies affect both 
decisions. Specifically, our results are consistent with previous research on industrial 
organization, i.e., an advisor is more likely to outsource the management of funds outside his 
core competency and keep funds that are within his core competency in-house. The core 
competency of the sub-advisor selected to manage an outsourced fund is likely to be consistent 
with that fund.  
Second, we examine whether the performance of the mutual fund industry has improved 
due to the outsourcing of portfolio management to explain the high growth rate of this practice 
over the last decade. We indeed observe that funds managed by external companies 
                                                          
31
 For example, our dataset indicates that in 2011, AMERICAN BEACON ADVISORS, INC. managed a total of 
$14.038 million, of which $11.077 million was in equity funds, $666,000 in debt funds, $959,000 in balance 
funds and $1.335 million in international funds. In this case, the core competency is the management of equity 
funds, in which the company is more experienced. 
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specializing in that investment style achieve better performance. Additionally, advisors who 
outsourced the management of funds that exceeded their core competency improved the 
performance of the funds managed internally compared to investment companies that 
maintained in-house management of such funds. This improvement in the performance of in-
house funds is consistent with the body of literature on industrial organization and explains the 
growth in outsourcing of funds that seems complicated (irrational) if we solely consider 
previous research that suggests that externally managed funds underperform internally 
managed funds.  
In the final part of this study, we demonstrate that the core competency remains an 
important factor in firm outsourcing decisions even when other factors are involved, such as 
pre-existing commercial relationships. Previous studies (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002) 
indicate the importance of previous interactions between companies in subsequent agreements 
or contracts. In addition, in the fund industry, Kuhnen (2009) observes that a firm is more 
likely to subcontract to companies when connections between the boards of directors exist. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
 Recent studies of family decisions in mutual funds indicate that families face incentives 
to increase the menu of funds offered to customers, increasing both the number of funds and 
the investment objectives. Massa (2003) noted that fund proliferation is a tool used by fund 
families to increase market coverage and limit competition given the free-switching options 
offered to investors (that is, firms allow switching across funds belonging to the same family 
at no cost). Gallaher et al. (2006) observes that the more investment strategies a mutual fund 
family offers, the larger the flows of funds received. Additionally, Khorana and Servaes 
(2012) find that families that offer a wider range of products and differentiated funds relative 
to the competition are characterized by higher market shares. They observe that price 
competition and product differentiation are both effective strategies to increase market share in 
the mutual fund industry. 
Prior research in management has noted that outsourcing decisions play a key role in the 
overall performance of an organization by improving resource allocation. Thus, activities that 
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are not within the core competencies of a firm should be outsourced (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 
(1990); Venkatesan (1992); Quinn and Hilmer (1994); Baden-Fuller and Hunt (2000); Díaz et 
al. (2000) and Wu et al. (2003))32 to allow the firm to focus on a limited set of strategically 
important tasks. This, in turn, leads to the continuous development of core competencies 
(Quinn (1992); Kotable (1990) and Venkatraman (1989)). Prior research demonstrates that by 
specializing on a limited activity structure, companies that outsource are able to improve the 
performance of their in-house activities (Quinn (1992) and Ellram and Billington (2001)).  
Siggelkow (2003) demonstrates that U.S. mutual funds that belong to focused fund 
providers outperform similar funds offered by diversified providers. Focusing on a few 
investment objectives allows management companies to manage funds more effectively and 
improve fund performance. However, a negative effect of this focused strategy arises. Fund 
families will reduce cash inflows, thus affecting profitability, because they do not benefit from 
the demand externalities generated by a broad product offering. Fund families benefit from 
offering a wide array of funds, as noted in the body of literature discussed above (Massa 
(2003); Gallaher et al. (2006) and Khorana and Servaes (2012)). Siggelkow (2003) described 
the organizational solution to this duality in the mutual fund industry as follows: fund 
providers could outsource the investment management of funds that are not consistent with the 
investment culture of the fund family to improve the performance of funds managed in-house 
without reducing the growth opportunities provided by new funds and investment styles.  
We analyze whether the rapid growth of outsourcing in the mutual fund industry over the 
last decade is consistent with this explanation. Outsourcing the activities beyond the core 
competency of the family improves the performance of funds managed internally without 
preventing the growth and diversification families require. Our hypotheses are as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Management companies are more likely to outsource the management 
of funds outside their core competency.  
                                                          
32
 Some other surveys of this literature on outsourcing, from a variety of perspectives, include Joskow (1988) or 
Shelanski and Klein (1995) and more recent Grossman and Helpman (2002). 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Outsourced mutual funds are more likely to be allocated to subadvisors 
with a high level of experience in the mutual fund’s investment objective or class of 
investment.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The closer the core competency of a subadvisor to the investment style 
of the outsourced fund (i.e., the higher the subadvisor expertise), the better the 
performance of the outsourced mutual fund.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Families outsourcing the management of funds outside of their core 
competency show better in-house fund performance than families that do not outsource.  
 
The industrial organization literature has noted that the performance (or efficiency) of 
outsourced activities (outside a firm’s core competency) will improve when performed by an 
external specialist. However, in the case of the outsourcing of mutual funds, previous research 
(e.g., Chuprinin et al. (2012); Moreno et al. (2012)) has demonstrated that externally managed 
mutual funds underperform regarding in-house funds, which seems to contradict the postulates 
of the organization literature. This research has demonstrated that management firms tend to 
favor their own funds to the detriment of subadvised funds through preferential treatment of 
IPO allocations (Chen at al. (2013) or Duong (2010)) and other unobserved actions (Chuprinin 
et al. (2012)). This includes abnormal cross-trading activity between in-house and external 
funds, especially when the in-house fund must sell some assets quickly, or offering 
preferential information to the in-house funds. Chen et al. (2013) argue that funds managed 
externally significantly underperform those managed internally due to contractual externalities 
and firm boundaries that make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourcing 
relationship. Considering only funds managed by advisors that have both in-house and 
subadvised funds, Duong (2010) finds that the latter underperform in-house managed funds, 
which suggests possible conflicts of interest for management firms. For instance, Moreno et al. 
(2012) argue that management companies favor their own funds by transferring relatively 
poorly performing portfolio managers to outsourced funds, which explains the 
underperformance of external funds. Alternatively, Chuprinin et al. (2012) suggest that in-
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house funds benefit from the subsidization of outsourced funds as part of the incentive 
compensation of the subadvisory company.  
To analyze the influence of core competencies (expertise) on the performance of mutual 
funds more deeply, we next consider the extreme case in which the principal advisor has null 
experience (which is defined as core competency assigned a value lower than 0.05). We 
expect that when the outsourced fund is very far from the core competency of the advisor, 
outsourcing could help improve the mutual fund’s performance. This distance represents a 
special case in which fund families face incentives to outsource and provides another 
explanation of the increased outsourcing of mutual funds over the last decade. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: When the advisor’s core competency is very far from the mutual fund 
style of investment, outsourcing portfolio management will positively affect performance.  
 
Our final hypothesis is related to the hiring of sub-advisors based not only on their core 
competency and compatibility with the fund style but also on previous business relationships 
between the fund family and sub-advisor.33 A previous business relationship between the 
advisor and sub-advisor reduces the cost of establishing the agreement and decreases 
uncertainty about the sub-advisor’s behavior in an outsourcing contract. Kuhnen (2009) 
analyzes how outsourcing decisions are influenced by connections between the boards of 
directors and finds that sub-advising contracts are more likely when such relationships are 
strong. To the best of our knowledge, no previous research addresses the influence of 
commercial relationships in outsourcing decisions in the mutual fund industry. We 
hypothesize that commercial relationships are relevant but that the sub-advisor’s core 
competency is also a critical factor in deciding which external firm is hired to manage funds. 
Selecting a sub-advisor with experience in a specific investment style and firms with an 
existing commercial relationship will positively affect performance. In these cases, the advisor 
possesses information about the sub-advisor from previous contracts that can be used to 
improve the performance of the outsourced funds and to select an advisor with a compatible 
                                                          
33 In a different industry, Poppo and Zenger (2002) highlighted the importance of previous business relationships 
in contract arrangements.  
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core competency. Consequently, a combination of these two factors produces the optimal 
arrangement. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: A strong commercial relationship between a fund family and a 
subadvisor will be relevant in selecting a subadvisor for portfolio management. However, 
selecting a subadvisor based on both core competency and previous commercial 
relationships should improve performance more than basing the decision on only one of 
these factors.  
3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
3.1.Data Sources  
We examine actively managed U.S. mutual funds during the period 1996-2011. The data 
were obtained from two main sources: Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual funds database. Data on sub-advisors, 
advisory arrangements, fund investment styles and fees were obtained from the Form NSAR 
filings. Fund returns, total net assets, turnover, expenses and other available fund 
characteristics were obtained from CRSP. 
Under the Investment Act of 1940, every investment company must register with the SEC. 
All U.S. mutual funds and other regulated investment management companies are required to 
file Form NSAR (along with other documents) on a semi-annual basis. Form NSAR-A covers 
the first six months of the fiscal year for an individual investment management company, 
while Form NSAR-B covers the full year. A mutual fund family, also known as a family 
complex, is composed of several mutual fund series, each of which (also known as a fund 
trust) may consist of several mutual funds. Each mutual fund series is legally formed as an 
investment company. Thus, each family complex may file several NSAR forms for each fund 
trust along with detailed information about each mutual fund. 
To create our database, we first downloaded and parsed all NSAR-B filings available from 
the SEC’s EDGAR database, comprising a total of 55,315 files. Although certain funds 
voluntarily filed their reports prior to the mandatory disclosure period (some were filings 
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available by 1993), the data were consistently reported beginning in 1996. To mitigate 
selection bias among early filers, our sample begins with 1996 data. The initial dataset 
includes the population of U.S. open-ended mutual funds from 1996 to 2011.34 
Mutual fund returns and characteristics are obtained from the CRSP Survivorship-Bias-
Free U.S. mutual fund database for the same period (1996-2011). The CRSP database contains 
information about multiple fund classes issued by a particular fund. These classes, typically 
denoted A, B and C, have the same underlying portfolio. The main difference among them is 
the fee structure. Our observations are made at the class level. We group data by observations 
at the fund level, consistent with the literature (e.g., Gaspar et al. (2006) or Nanda et al. 
(2004)). We aggregate returns, weighting each class by total net assets (TNA). We compute 
the TNA of the fund as the sum of all TNA over all classes. Turnover and expenses are 
aggregated at the fund level by weighting each class by its total net assets; to determine fund 
age, we select the oldest class. To merge the CRSP and NSAR data, we utilize a fuzzy match 
procedure with Weighted Jaccard Distances (for details about this procedure, see Moreno et al. 
(2012)). 
 
3.2.Summary statistics and preliminary results 
Table 1 reports the number of funds collected in our sample after accounting for the share 
classes described in the previous section. Table 1 is divided into two different panels based on 
whether funds are categorized by asset class (Panel A) or investment objective (Panel B).35 
Panel A groups the funds into four asset classes by whether the fund primarily invest in equity, 
fixed income, a mix of equity and fixed income (balance) or international assets. Before 2000, 
the sample was dominated by debt funds but subsequently by equity funds. The bottom row of 
Table 1 presents the average annual percentages representing each asset class or objective. 
                                                          
34 Of the initial 55,315 filings, we exclude filings for 1994 and 1995 and filings in which no names for the trust 
appear, resulting in 43,537 filings. In addition, we exclude index funds and funds missing an advisor name.  
35
 More detailed information about the methodology used to create this dataset can be found in Moreno et al. 
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138998. 
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Equity funds, at 43.6%, are the largest group, followed closely by debt funds at 39%. Balance 
and international funds represent only 4.9% and 12.5% of our sample, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 1 classifies the main groups of funds, equity and debt, according to the 
investment objective indicated on their NSAR forms. Equity mutual funds include seven 
groups: aggressive capital appreciation, capital appreciation, growth, growth and income, 
income and total return assets. We preserve the growth and total return categories from the 
filings, but due to the small number of observations and the similarity between aggressive 
capital appreciation and capital appreciation and between growth and income and income 
objectives, we combine them into capital appreciation and income, respectively. Debt funds 
include government long-term, government short-term and corporate debt. Capital 
appreciation dominates the sample of equity funds, with a time series average of 47.5%, while 
government long-term dominates debt funds, representing 55.9%. 
The Table 2 reports some summary statistics for advisor and sub-advisor expertise for all 
funds in our sample. Panel A examines the advisor expertise for two different groups of funds: 
in-house managed funds and outsourced funds. Panel B examines sub-advisor expertise for 
outsourced funds. Advisor (sub-advisor) expertise is defined as the percentage of their TNA 
for that particular asset class or investment objective over the total TNA managed by the 
advisor (sub-advisor). Table 2 also presents the proportion of funds managed by fully 
experienced (FullExp) and non-experienced (NonExp) companies. The figures indicate that, 
for all asset classes and investment objectives, advisor expertise in funds managed in-house is 
greater than their expertise in outsourced funds. This fact yields a first insight: management 
companies manage in-house funds from styles in which they have more experience and 
outsource those in which they have less expertise.  The proportion of advisors without 
experience managing a particular style or asset class is a key figure. For example, for all 
balance funds that were outsourced, 70% of advisors had no experience in this asset class. For 
outsourced international funds, 61% of advisors had no experience. It seems reasonable that 
experience managing a particular asset class of is one of the main drivers of outsourcing 
decisions. 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF FUNDS PER YEAR, ASSET CLASS AND INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE 
Table 1 reports the number of funds in our sample after accounting for the different classes. Panel A classifies funds by asset class selected on the NSAR form, 
equity, debt, balance and international funds, that is, whether the fund primarily invests in equity, debt, both equity and debt or foreign assets, respectively. Panel 
B groups these funds by the investment objective for equity and debt asset class funds (balance and international funds are excluded). Among the equity classes, 
there are four objectives: capital appreciation (aggressive capital appreciation and capital appreciation are indicated on the NSAR form), growth, income (growth 
& income and income as classified on the NSAR form) and total returns. Investment objectives among debt funds are government short-term maturity, 
government long-term maturity and corporate debt according to the NSAR form. The bottom row presents the average annual percentage for each asset class or 
objective. 
Number 
 of Funds 
Panel A: Asset Class 
 
Panel B: Investment Objective  
 
Equity Asset Class Funds Debt Asset Class Funds 
Year Equity Debt Balance International 
Capital  
Appreciation 
Growth Income Total Return Gov ST Gov LT Corporate 
1996 822 1275 105 310 336 208 214 64 420 739 116 
1997 944 1359 135 350 391 253 215 85 443 789 127 
1998 1240 1402 171 452 550 319 255 116 478 760 164 
1999 1234 1387 171 449 568 324 240 102 434 777 176 
2000 1884 1805 232 609 893 479 315 197 481 1102 222 
2001 2026 1624 208 561 1004 543 302 177 382 1012 230 
2002 2235 1920 214 582 1137 616 299 183 679 1015 226 
2003 2218 2081 224 532 1098 671 282 167 720 1112 249 
2004 2211 2036 230 515 1079 643 284 205 713 1091 232 
2005 2125 1941 243 514 1056 603 261 205 647 1087 207 
2006 2071 1834 238 498 1040 562 254 215 639 998 197 
2007 2136 1825 239 513 1059 550 255 272 613 1009 203 
2008 2715 1848 274 646 1314 687 356 358 623 999 226 
2009 3471 1998 365 968 1649 879 498 445 652 1034 312 
2010 3215 1874 331 939 1507 797 458 453 578 969 327 
2011 1992 1220 186 616 976 483 258 275 238 744 238 
Average  
Percentage 
43.6% 39% 4.9% 12.5% 47.5% 26.5% 15.7% 10.3% 31.5% 55.9% 12.6% 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS – EXPERTISE PER YEAR, ASSET CLASS AND INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for advisor and subadvisor expertise. Panel A examines advisor expertise for two groups of funds: funds managed in-house and 
funds that have been outsourced to other companies. Panel B examines subadvisor expertise for funds subadvised by an affiliated company. The advisor 
(subadvisor) expertise is defined as the percentage of their TNA in that particular asset class or investment objective over the total TNA managed by the advisor 
(subadvisor). The table also presents the proportion of funds managed by fully experienced (FullExp) and non-experienced (NonExp) companies. 
 
 
 
 
Statistic 
Fund Asset Class 
Investment Objective  (Balance and International funds excluded) 
Equity Asset Class Debt Asset Class 
Equity Debt Balance Internat. Capital Growth Income Return Gov ST Gov LT Corporate 
Panel A: Advisor Expertise 
In
ho
us
e 
F
un
ds
 
Mean 60.88 64.68 21.88 38.20 46.28 41.26 30.24 36.32 59.11 35.02 20.11 
Median 62.83 71.65 7.67 19.44 32.32 32.64 15.09 17.50 66.32 21.84 7.11 
Std Dev 33.15 31.02 29.47 38.12 37.26 34.59 33.60 38.11 34.16 32.60 27.68 
 NonExp  0.00 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.04 
O
ut
so
ur
ce
d 
F
un
ds
 
Mean 46.53 41.34 4.23 7.06 16.28 22.33 9.51 12.60 12.72 23.58 3.35 
Median 37.81 30.19 0.00 0.00 2.40 4.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Dev 38.97 41.31 13.56 19.69 27.69 32.64 20.50 27.60 27.57 36.97 10.77 
NonExp 15.25 36.06 70.53 61.94 39.18 35.42 58.51 59.85 74.25 54.99 75.75 
Panel B: Subadvisor Expertise 
O
ut
so
ur
ce
d 
F
un
ds
 Mean 78.03 75.25 39.00 67.83 63.73 61.16 46.34 60.95 62.81 56.01 49.47 
Median 99.70 92.56 20.62 100.00 78.79 72.69 34.74 82.79 80.59 61.19 41.41 
Std Dev 30.31 32.53 39.07 40.20 38.70 38.73 40.54 42.04 37.94 39.44 40.34 
FullExp 48.47 40.78 22.52 52.47 41.44 36.69 27.44 44.50 31.46 30.59 29.03 
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4. Fund Family Decisions: Fund Outsourcing and Subadvisor Selection.  
4.1 Principal Advisor Expertise and Fund Outsourcing  
We test whether management companies outsource funds in which they are less 
experienced while maintaining in-house management of funds within the core competency. 
We estimate the cross-sectional logistic model on a yearly basis for all U.S. mutual funds 
included in the dataset:36  
               
         
           
        for                           [1]  
where                                 . The dependent variable        takes the value 
1 if fund i is selected for outsourcing to an unaffiliated company in year t and 0 otherwise.37 
These regressions are estimated separately for each style s.    represents the constant term, 
and      represents the main variable of interest, defined as advisor expertise on fund i’s style 
in year t.38 This variable is measured as follows: 
 
      
                                                                               
                                                                                
    [2]      
Thus, for a given fund i, the total net assets managed by the management company within 
its style includes funds from the family the advisor manages and the funds the advisor 
manages as the sub-advisor to other families (if any) minus all the funds the advisor has 
outsourced to external firms (if any).39       is a set of one period lagged control variables, 
                                                          
36
 This specification will contain only the subsample of funds that are classified within a given style s. 
37 Note that our dependent variable is selection and not sub-advising because we will consider only funds from 
families that also have in-house managed funds as sub-advised funds. 
38
 We measure expertise using TNA instead of past performance because we are interested in capturing not only 
management skills but also how investors react to this performance (flows). TNA captures both features.  
39 We measure the expertise in relative terms (e.g., Equity TNA=principal advisor equity TNA/total principal 
advisor TNA), where principal advisor equity TNA is the total asset of funds that primarily invest in equity that 
the advisor is managing, and total principal advisor TNA is the sum of all funds’ TNA that advisor is managing. 
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such as fund size, advisor size, advisor funds, fund age, fund turnover, fund expenses, fund 
flows and past performance. Fund size is the natural logarithm of the TNA under management 
in millions of dollars. Advisor size is the logarithm of all funds’ TNA of the advisor, excluding 
the fund itself. Advisor funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds of that advisor, 
excluding the fund itself. Fund age is the number of years since fund inception. Fund turnover 
is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA 
over the calendar year. Fund expenses are the total annual expenses and fees dividend by the 
year-end TNA. Fund flows represents the new inflows over the previous year. Past return is 
the past years’ fund return. We also include time dummies for each year     . Standard errors 
(SE) are clustered at the fund level.40 We also report standard deviations and average marginal 
effects.  
Although the principal advisor or management company decides whether to outsource a 
fund, a fund family complex with more than one advisor (or affiliated sub-advisor) might 
allocate their funds to other advisors without hiring an external company. For instance, if an 
advisor is not an expert in a given style, but another advisor (or affiliated sub-advisor) in the 
same family is, then this fund would be allocated to an affiliated firm but not be considered 
management outsourcing per se. This could be easily the case because, in our sample, 34% of 
families have more than one principal advisor. Therefore, we also measure the core 
competency by fund family expertise rather than principal advisor expertise.41 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the logistic model [2] for each fund in our sample 
belonging to one of four asset classes. Each column reports coefficients, t-statistics, marginal 
effects and standard deviations of the variables. According our first hypothesis, the expected 
sign of Class Adv Expertise, our expertise variable for the advisor in each asset class, should 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
We also measured expertise in absolute terms (advisor TNA managed on the given style), and main results are 
unchanged. 
40 We apply the Petersen (2009) approach to estimate the standard errors of our regression efficiently. The SEs 
clustered by fund are dramatically larger than the white SEs, while the SEs clustered by year are only slightly 
larger than the white SE. Clustering by fund and year produces similar results to clustering only by fund. 
Therefore, the importance of time (after including dummies) is small, and, in the presence of a fund effect, White 
and Fama-MacBeth SEs are significantly biased. 
41
 The main results remain unchanged. These tables are available upon request. 
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be negative to indicate that higher advisor expertise decreases the probability of the fund being 
outsourced. Our results confirm this negative relationship in all cases. For instance, for the 
equity funds group, the marginal effect is -0.213, which suggests that an increase of one 
standard deviation (STD) in the expertise of the equity funds advisor (0.344) decreases the 
likelihood of equity funds being outsourced by 7.3% (0.213*0.344). The baseline predicted 
probability (the unconditional probability) that an equity fund is outsourced is 14.5%, 
suggesting that equity funds managed by advisors with one STD less of equity expertise (-
0.344*-0.213/0.145) are approximately 50.5% more likely to be outsourced than other funds.42 
Similarly, debt, balance and international funds with principal advisors less experienced (one 
STD lower) in each asset class are 30.4%, 83.4% and 83.5% more likely to be outsourced than 
other funds in their asset class, respectively. Our results indicate that the control variables size 
and expense ratio are positively related to outsourcing, while the number of funds of the 
principal advisor and the number of years the fund has been offered are negatively related to 
outsourcing.  
Table 4 shows advisor expertise is negatively related to outsourced funds and statistically 
significant at the 1% level across the seven equity and debt investment styles. Greater advisor 
expertise in some styles or asset classes reduces the likelihood that a fund of that 
objective/class is outsourced to an unaffiliated company. Specifically, for equity funds 
(objectives (1) to (4) in Table 4), a one STD increase in expertise decreases the likelihood of 
being outsourced by 7.8% to 11.8%, depending on the objective. Additionally, with an 
increase of one STD in advisor expertise, the fund is approximately 60.8% to 79.6% less likely 
to be outsourced than other funds with the same investment objective. Additionally, an 
increase of one STD in advisor expertise decreases the likelihood of being outsourced by 
2.1%, 2.9% and 7% for government short-term, government long-term and corporate funds, 
respectively, whereas when we consider the baseline probability that a fund of a specific style 
is outsourced, this increased expertise makes funds 36%, 40% and 54%, respectively, less 
likely to be outsourced than other funds. 
                                                          
42
 Our results are consistent with Cashman and Deli (2010), who find that although equity funds are more likely 
to be outsourced, when the advisor concentrates on managing equity funds, the likelihood of sub-advising 
decreases. 
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TABLE 3: ASSET CLASS ADVISOR EXPERTISE  
 
Table 3 presents the results of a cross-sectional time series logistic regression model [2] of the probability of a fund being selected for outsourcing to an unaffiliated 
company. The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011 classified by their asset class. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether the fund 
has been outsourced. Class Adv Expertise measures the expertise of the advisor in each asset class computed as the ratio of Advisor TNA on a fund’s asset class over all 
Advisor TNA. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of the total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Advisor Size is the logarithm of all the advisor’s 
fund TNA, excluding the fund itself. Advisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that advisor, excluding the fund itself. Fund Age is the number of 
years since the fund’s inception. Fund Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar year. Fund 
Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees dividend by the year-end TNA. Fund Flows represents the new inflows of the fund over the previous year. Past Return is the 
cumulative past year’s fund return. Control variables are lagged by one year. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
Equity Funds 
(2) 
Debt Funds 
(3) 
Balance Funds 
(4) 
International Funds 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  
Class Adv Expertise -2.723*** -0.213***  -2.168
*** -0.076***  -10.930** -0.338**  -7.512*** -0.431***  
 (-18.476) 0.344  (-9.063) 0.324  (-2.376) 0.284  (-9.944) 0.374  
Fund Size 0.110*** 0.009***  0.155
*** 0.005***  0.452
*** 0.014***  0.185
*** 0.011***  
 (4.057) 2.182  (3.136) 1.928  (3.315) 2.198  (2.972) 2.167  
Advisor Size 0.004 0.000  0.096
* 0.003*  -0.169 -0.005  -0.171
** -0.010**  
 (0.152) 3.463  (1.837) 2.646  (-1.199) 3.001  (-1.970) 3.429  
Advisor Funds -0.883*** -0.069***  -1.182
*** -0.042***  -0.887
*** -0.027***  -1.231
*** -0.071***  
 (-11.902) 1.485  (-10.005) 1.212  (-3.256) 1.333  (-6.669) 1.494  
Fund Age -0.031*** -0.002***  -0.046
*** -0.002***  -0.005 -0.000  -0.029
* -0.002*  
 (-3.522) 10.203  (-3.276) 7.091  (-0.411) 11.729  (-1.707) 6.232  
Fund Turnover -0.007 -0.001  0.106
*** 0.004***  0.184
* 0.006*  0.078
* 0.004*  
 (-0.419) 2.248  (2.767) 1.872  (1.753) 0.871  (1.945) 1.826    
Fund Expenses 0.355*** 0.028***  0.287
* 0.010*  0.911
*** 0.028***  0.252 0.014  
 (4.129) 0.549  (1.688) 0.422  (3.424) 0.556  (1.358) 0.582  
Fund Flows 0.004 0.000  0.009 0.000  -0.005 -0.000  -0.010 -0.001  
 (0.528) 2.621  (0.474) 2.043  (-0.119) 1.606  (-0.348) 2.062  
Past Return -0.284 -0.022  -0.398 -0.014  3.100
** 0.096**  0.384 0.022  
 (-1.313) 0.199  (-0.456) 0.051  (2.134) 0.108  (1.144) 0.233  
Observations 16947   12229   1995   4818   
Pseudo R2 0.236   0.278   0.341   0.535   
Baseline predicted probability 0.145   0.081   0.115   0.193   
Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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TABLE 4: INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE ADVISOR EXPERTISE 
  
Table 4 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression model [2] of the probability of a fund being outsourced to an unaffiliated company. The sample 
contains U.S. equity and debt mutual funds from 1996 to 2011 classified by their investment objectives. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the fund 
has been outsourced. Objective Adv Expertise measures advisor expertise in terms of investment objective computed as the ratio of Advisor TNA on the fund’s objective 
over all Advisor TNA. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of the total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Advisor Size is the logarithm of all the 
advisor’s fund TNA, excluding the fund itself. Advisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that advisor, excluding the fund itself. Fund Age is the 
number of years since the fund’s inception. Fund Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar 
year. Fund Expenses is the total annual expenses and fees dividend by the year-end TNA. Fund Flows represents the new inflows of the fund over the previous year. Past 
Return is the cumulative past year’s fund return. Control variables are lagged by one year. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund 
level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
Capital Funds 
(2) 
Growth Funds 
(3) 
Income Funds 
(4) 
Return Funds 
(5) 
Gov ST Funds 
(6) 
Gov LT Funds 
(7) 
Corporate Funds 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
Objective Adv Expertise -5.022*** -0.324*** -4.385*** -0.256*** -7.363*** -0.242*** -6.436*** -0.277*** -4.850*** -0.060*** -3.058*** -0.088*** -15.925*** -0.268*** 
 (-16.54) 0.364 (-10.58) 0.342 (-3.991) 0.322 (-7.364) 0.380 (-4.960) 0.356 (-5.495) 0.325 (-3.867) 0.262 
Fund Size 0.213*** 0.014*** 0.138*** 0.008*** 0.396*** 0.013*** 0.203** 0.009** 0.446*** 0.006*** 0.254*** 0.007*** 0.394*** 0.007*** 
 (4.893) 2.094 (2.605) 2.190 (3.524) 2.299 (2.303) 2.227 (2.597) 2.044 (3.914) 1.890 (2.839) 1.950 
Advisor Size -0.081 -0.005 -0.137** -0.008** -0.284** -0.009** -0.478*** -0.021*** -0.080 -0.001 -0.057 -0.002 -0.240 -0.004 
 (-1.572) 3.489 (-2.068) 3.324 (-2.545) 3.351 (-3.287) 3.776 (-0.450) 2.653 (-0.753) 2.565 (-1.247) 2.968 
Advisor Funds -0.951*** -0.061*** -0.888*** -0.052*** -0.618*** -0.020*** -0.626** -0.027** -1.219*** -0.015*** -1.045*** -0.030*** -1.361*** -0.023*** 
 (-8.169) 1.512 (-5.813) 1.433 (-3.006) 1.417 (-2.271) 1.570 (-3.078) 1.191 (-7.376) 1.185 (-4.189) 1.281 
Fund Age -0.033** -0.002** -0.050*** -0.003*** -0.015 -0.000 0.007 0.000 -0.046 -0.001 -0.035** -0.001** -0.063* -0.001* 
 (-2.186) 7.943 (-3.409) 10.990 (-0.905) 15.326 (0.268) 7.520 (-1.368) 6.277 (-2.039) 6.557 (-1.955) 9.360 
Fund Turnover 0.022 0.001 -0.067 -0.004 -0.029 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.112 0.001 0.137** 0.004** 0.271*** 0.005*** 
 (1.038) 2.729 (-1.426) 1.425 (-0.384) 1.034 (0.428) 2.553 (1.091) 1.810 (2.466) 1.859 (4.055) 1.947 
Fund Expenses 0.217 0.014 0.471** 0.027** 0.492* 0.016* 0.274 0.012 0.969 0.012 0.551** 0.016** 0.016 0.000 
 (1.446) 0.542 (2.520) 0.526 (1.934) 0.505 (1.033) 0.595 (1.252) 0.382 (2.468) 0.416 (0.053) 0.425 
Fund Flows 0.023 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.079* -0.003* 0.017 0.001 -0.320 -0.004 0.025 0.001 0.060*** 0.001*** 
 (1.098) 1.976 (-0.169) 2.124 (-1.713) 4.302 (1.423) 3.331 (-0.987) 2.430 (1.606) 1.709 (3.180) 3.112 
Past Return -0.253 -0.016 -0.282 -0.016 -0.699 -0.023 1.139 0.049 -1.351 -0.017 -0.565 -0.016 -0.265 -0.004 
 (-0.815) 0.214 (-0.578) 0.201 (-0.643) 0.156 (1.337) 0.169 (-0.421) 0.068 (-0.479) 0.044 (-0.161) 0.069 
Observations 8288  4542  2410  1707  693  9472  1986  
Pseudo R2 0.359  0.337  0.343  0.487  0.391  0.290  0.502  
Baseline Predicted  
Probability 
0.158  0.144  0.098  0.152  0.059  0.073  0.130  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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As a robustness check of the relationship between core competency and outsourcing, 
we conduct several additional tests. In particular, to assess the overall effect of expertise on 
outsourcing, we estimate equation [1] for the entire sample instead of using different 
regressions for each fund class and objective subsample. The results presented in Table 5 
exhibit the same overall pattern, that is, funds within the core competency of their principal 
advisors are less likely to be outsourced. Because portfolio management outsourcing 
decisions are made at the family level, they might be driven by unobservable 
characteristics of families. Models (3) and (4) in Table 5 repeat the prior analysis, adding 
fund family fixed effects that allows us to compare differences in the effect of expertise on 
outsourcing decisions within the same firm. Again, advisor expertise is negatively related 
to portfolio management outsourcing.  
Next, we consider whether advisor expertise affects outsourcing decisions in a linear 
manner. In particular, we compute two dummy variables, high and low, that equal 1 if the 
advisor expertise is at the 5th or 1st quintile, respectively. While the highest quintile of 
expertise makes funds 62.5% (for asset class) and 70% (for investment objective) less 
likely to be outsourced, the lowest quintile makes these funds 82% (for asset class) and 
90% (for investment objective) more likely to be outsourced. We also observe that the 
probability of a fund being outsourced when the advisor possesses a low level of expertise 
is higher than the probability of in-house management when advisor is experience is high. 
This pattern may occur because other factors affect outsourcing a portfolio besides the core 
competency, such as past commercial relationships. Overall, these results suggest that the 
core competency of the principal advisors matters and that this effect is robust to different 
approaches. In particular, management companies base their outsourcing decisions on 
advisor expertise, outsourcing those funds in which they are less experienced. These results 
are consistent with Sigglekow (2003), who finds that fund families often lack the expertise 
to hire and evaluate managers beyond their core styles. 
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TABLE 5: CORE COMPETENCY AND ADVISOR EXPERTISE 
 
Table 5 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund being selected for outsourcing to an unaffiliated company. The 
sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the fund has been selected to be subadvised. 
Explanatory variables are Class Adv Expertise and Objective Adv Expertise, which measure advisor expertise in terms of asset class (ratio of Advisor TNA on fund’s asset 
class over all Advisor TNA) and investment objective (ratio of Advisor TNA on fund’s investment objective over all Advisor TNA), respectively. The control variables are 
defined in previous tables. Control variables are lagged by one year. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 (1) 
All Funds-Asset Class 
(2) 
All Funds-Investment Objective 
(3) 
All Funds-Asset Class 
(4) 
All Funds-Investment Objective 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  
Class Adv Expertise -2.933*** -0.174***     -2.722*** -0.088***     
 (-25.036) 0.359     (-7.362) 0.353     
Objective Adv Expertise    -4.630*** -0.207***     -3.742*** -0.096***  
    (-20.621) 0.346     (-4.096) 0.335  
Fund Size 0.117*** 0.007***  0.227*** 0.010***  0.059 0.002  0.080* 0.002*  
 (5.714) 2.099  (8.563) 2.081  (1.524) 2.092  (1.780) 2.077  
Advisor Size -0.100 -0.003  -0.119*** -0.005***  0.192** 0.006**  0.136 0.004  
 (-0.015) 3.209  (-3.667) 3.183  (2.407) 3.124  (1.252) 3.075  
Advisor Funds -0.970*** -0.058***  -0.938*** -0.042***  -1.849*** -0.060***  -1.823*** -0.047***  
 (-17.799) 1.407  (-13.686) 1.394  (-9.923) 1.405  (-8.569) 1.381  
Fund Age -0.029*** -0.002***  -0.035*** -0.002***  -0.014 -0.000  -0.015 -0.000  
 (-4.697) 8.912  (-4.498) 9.039  (-1.353) 8.619  (-1.165) 8.665  
Fund Turnover 0.054*** 0.003***  0.054*** 0.002***  0.022 0.001  0.032 0.001  
 (5.000) 2.015  (3.549) 2.099  (0.757) 2.225  (0.949) 2.351  
Fund Expenses 0.289*** 0.017***  0.419*** 0.019***  0.670*** 0.022***  0.853*** 0.022***  
 (4.701) 0.560  (5.295) 0.535  (3.479) 0.537  (3.414) 0.508  
Fund Flows 0.004 0.000  0.005 0.000  0.017 0.001  0.028** 0.001**  
 (0.547) 2.316  (0.822) 2.396  (1.444) 2.018  (2.027) 2.052  
Past Return -0.035 -0.002  0.038 0.002  0.218 0.007  0.309 0.008  
 (-0.249) 0.166  (0.202) 0.155  (0.666) 0.163  (0.815) 0.152  
Observations 36025   29204   21039   16147   
Pseudo R2 0.282   0.341   0.563   0.590   
Baseline predicted probability 0.128   0.118   0.184   0.179   
Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Family F.E. No   No   Yes   Yes   
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TABLE 6: CORE COMPETENCY AND ADVISING  
 
Table 6 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund 
being selected for outsourcing to an unaffiliated company. The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 
to 2011. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the fund has been selected to be subadvised. 
The main explanatory variables are High Class Adv Expertise, Low Class Adv Expertise, High Objective Adv 
Expertise and Low Objective Adv Expertise, which are indicator variables that equal 1 if the advisor expertise is 
in the fifth (high) or first (low) quintile in terms of asset class (ratio of Advisor TNA on fund’s asset class over all 
Advisor TNA) and investment objective (ratio of Advisor TNA on fund’s investment objective over all Advisor 
TNA), respectively. The control variables have ben previously defined. Control variables are lagged by one year. 
The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
All Funds-Asset Class 
(2) 
All Funds-Investment Objective 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  
High Class Adv Expertise -1.322*** -0.080***     
 (-10.998) 0.382     
Low Class Adv Expertise 1.731*** 0.105***     
 (24.860) 0.406     
High Objective Adv Expertise    -1.894*** -0.083***  
    (-10.928) 0.371  
Low Objective Adv Expertise    2.414*** 0.106***  
    (28.289) 0.399  
Fund Size 0.108*** 0.007***  0.227
*** 0.010***  
 (5.397) 2.099  (8.659) 2.081  
Advisor Size -0.014 -0.001  -0.099
*** -0.004***  
 (-0.643) 3.209  (-3.283) 3.183  
Advisor Funds -0.926*** -0.056***  -0.832
*** -0.036***  
 (-16.361) 1.407  (-12.686) 1.394  
Fund Age -0.029*** -0.002***  -0.034
*** -0.001***  
 (-4.720) 8.912  (-4.431) 9.039  
Fund Turnover 0.052*** 0.003***  0.053
*** 0.002***  
 (4.680) 2.015  (4.360) 2.099  
Fund Expenses 0.251*** 0.015***  0.385
*** 0.017***  
 (4.069) 0.560  (4.996) 0.535  
Fund Flows 0.004 0.000  0.005 0.000  
 (0.532) 2.316  (0.686) 2.396  
Past Return -0.064 -0.004  0.097 0.004  
 (-0.455) 0.166  (0.501) 0.155  
Observations 36025   29204   
Pseudo R2 0.283   0.360   
Baseline predicted probability 0.128   0.118   
Time dummies Yes   Yes   
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4.2 Sub-advisor Expertise and Selection 
In this section, we test whether outsourced funds are more likely to be managed by 
experienced subadvisors. Sub-advisor expertise is measured as the concentration of assets 
managed in a fund style.43 We estimate the following cross-sectional logistic regression 
specification for all sub-advised U.S. mutual funds in our dataset across the period 1996-2011 
on a yearly basis:  
             
         
           
        for                                 [4] 
where                                  . The dependent variable        is a dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the sub-advised fund i belongs to style s in year t and 0 otherwise.    
represents the constant term, and      is the main variable of interest, defined as subadvisor 
expertise in a specific style. Thus,    will capture how subadvisor expertise for a given style 
affects the probability that this subadvisor manages an external fund in that style. For example, 
a positive    for equity expertise means that a subadvisor with higher experience is more 
likely to manage an equity fund than a fund of any other asset class. Further control variables 
at the sub-advisor level include sub-advisor size, measured as the logarithm of all funds’ TNA 
of the sub-advisor excluding the fund itself, and sub-advisor funds, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of funds in that sub-advisor excluding the fund itself. 
Note that by estimating [4], we do not consider causality between subadvisor expertise and 
fund style but simple correlation controlling for other factors. Consequently, this approach 
allows us to examine whether subadvisor expertise in a given style is related to the style of the 
fund selected for outsourcing and whether that management company will allocate outsourced 
funds to highly experienced subadvisors. 
Sub-advisor expertise measured at the asset class level seems relevant to the sub-advisor 
choice, as illustrated in model (1) of Table 7. A one STD increase in sub-advisor expertise for 
                                                          
43 Note that, as in principal advisor expertise, to properly assess sub-advisor expertise, we consider assets from 
their own internal funds and discount any assets from funds the sub-advisor has outsourced to a different 
company. 
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equity funds increases the likelihood that the fund managed by that sub-advisor is equity by 
52%. These sub-advisors are twice as likely to be assigned to equity funds as other sub-
advisors. The results are similar across categories (models (2), (3) and (4)), indicating that 
sub-advisors with expertise one STD higher are 62.4%, 46% and 90% more likely to be 
assigned to debt, balance and international funds, respectively, than to other sub-advised 
funds. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 8 highlight the importance of sub-advisor expertise 
on a given investment objective when management companies hire an unaffiliated firm to 
manage their outsourced equity funds. For instance, model 1 indicates that a sub-advisor with 
one STD more capital expertise is approximately 107.4% more likely to be assigned a capital 
fund than other equity funds. Similarly, under an equivalent increase in expertise, the sub-
advisor is 63%, 20.7% or 40.9% more likely to manage a growth, income or total return fund, 
respectively. These findings remain unchanged when we examine debt funds, and the results 
are similar across the three models presented. An increase of one STD in sub-advisor expertise 
in Gov ST, Gov LT or Corporate makes the sub-advisor 3.4%, 38.5% and 30.2% more likely 
to manage Gov ST, Gov LT or Corporate debt funds, respectively, than other debt funds.  
By testing the second part of our first hypothesis, we realize that although the results are 
similar across all categories, the magnitude of the effect of expertise on the investment 
objective of the fund outsourced varies by specification. In particular, we observe that for both 
asset classes, sub-advisor expertise has a stronger effect on riskier investment objectives, that 
is, capital appreciation and growth for equity funds and government long-term and corporate 
for debt funds. One interpretation of this result is provided in the Descriptive Appendix. 
Capital appreciation funds that invest in high-risk securities or growth funds with a moderate 
degree of risk are more difficult to price than other less risky funds and, therefore, might 
require managers who are more experienced. Similarly, assets from long-term government and 
corporate funds are more difficult to price than short-term government securities, especially 
corporate debt assets that might carry default risk. 
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TABLE 7: ASSET CLASS EXPERTISE AND SUBADVISOR CHOICE 
 
Table 7 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund belonging to one of four asset class categories. For 
the 4 models, the sample contains all U.S. outsourced mutual funds from 1996 to 2011, or 5644 observations. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of 
whether the subadvised fund belongs to the equity, debt, balance or international class in each three-column panel. The explanatory variables are Class Sub 
Expertise, which measures subadvisor expertise (ratio of Subdvisor TNA on a particular asset class over all Subadvisor TNA) in a specific asset class. For 
example, column (1) measures subadvisor expertise in the equity asset class. Fund Size is the natural logarithm of the total net assets (TNA) under management in 
millions of dollars. Subadvisor size is the logarithm of all the subadvisor’s fund TNA, excluding the fund itself. Subadvisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the 
number of funds in that subadvisor, excluding the fund itself. Fund Age is the number of years since the fund inception. Fund Turnover is the minimum of 
aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar year. Fund Expenses are the total annual expenses and fees dividend by 
the year-end TNA. Fund Flows represents the new inflows of the fund over the previous year. Past Return is the cumulative past years’ fund return. Control 
variables are lagged one year. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Equity) 
(2) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Debt) 
(3) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Balance) 
(4) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (International) 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  Coef/t Mfx/Std  
Class Sub Expertise 4.940*** 1.229***  5.234
*** 0.389***  7.127*** 0.158***  7.043*** 0.503***  
 (30.876) 0.424  (23.189) 0.366  (14.763) 0.151  (27.470) 0.326  
Fund Size 0.098** 0.024**  -0.216
*** -0.016***  -0.150
** -0.003**  0.087
* 0.006*  
 (2.411) 1.948  (-4.158) 1.948  (-2.113) 1.948  (1.690) 1.948  
Subadvisor Size -0.041 -0.010  0.042 0.003  0.187
* 0.004*  0.165
*** 0.012***  
 (-0.713) 3.776  (0.579) 3.776  (1.859) 3.774  (2.745) 3.776  
Subadvisor Funds 0.217 0.054  -0.018 -0.001  -0.086 -0.002  0.158 0.011  
 (1.424) 1.344  (-0.094) 1.344  (-0.340) 1.344  (1.030) 1.344  
Fund Age -0.023* -0.006*  0.029
** 0.002**  0.045
*** 0.001***  -0.007 -0.001  
 (-1.657) 7.466  (1.978) 7.466  (3.473) 7.463  (-0.577) 7.466  
Fund Turnover -0.111*** -0.028***  -0.020 -0.001  -0.032 -0.001  0.040
** 0.003**  
 (-3.446) 2.093  (-0.851) 2.093  (-0.542) 2.094  (2.277) 2.093  
Fund Expenses 0.642*** 0.160***  -2.319
*** -0.172***  -0.365 -0.008  1.001
*** 0.071***  
 (4.496) 0.557  (-9.592) 0.557  (-1.118) 0.557  (4.249) 0.557  
Fund Flows -0.018 -0.005  0.039
*** 0.003***  -0.098 -0.002  -0.002 -0.000  
 (-1.473) 2.585  (3.080) 2.585  (-1.250) 2.586  (-0.132) 2.585  
Past Performance -0.719** -0.179**  -0.066 -0.005  -0.400 -0.009  1.580
*** 0.113***  
 (-2.361) 0.174  (-0.179) 0.174  (-0.839) 0.174  (3.919) 0.174  
Observations 5644   5644   5644   5644   
Pseudo R2 0.471   0.582   0.368   0.586   
Baseline predicted probability 0.518   0.228   0.052   0.182   
Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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TABLE 8: INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE EXPERTISE AND SUBADVISOR CHOICE 
 
Table 8 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund being one of seven equity and debt investment objective 
categories. The sample contains the equity and debt U.S. outsourced mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the equity 
subadvised fund belongs to capital, growth, income, return, government short term, government long term or corporate bond investment objective in each two-column panel. 
The explanatory variables include Objec Sub Expertise, which measures subadvisor expertise (ratio of Subdvisor TNA on a particular investment objective over all 
Subadvisor TNA) in a specific investment objective in each column (for example, for column (1), the variable measures subadvisor expertise in capital investment). The set of 
control variables is defined in previous tables. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Capital) 
(2) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Growth) 
(3) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Income) 
(4) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (Return) 
(5) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Gov ST) 
(6) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (Gov LT) 
(7) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (Corporate) 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
Objec Sub Expertise 5.292*** 0.816*** 5.534*** 0.370*** 6.810*** 0.102*** 7.586*** 0.105*** 6.172*** 0.009*** 5.980*** 0.257*** 6.581*** 0.116*** 
 (27.884) 0.354 (24.417) 0.287 (15.423) 0.164 (19.217) 0.191 (6.684) 0.153 (18.119) 0.286 (16.074) 0.177 
Fund Size 0.028 0.004 0.042 0.003 0.103 0.002 -0.035 -0.000 0.045 0.000 -0.241*** -0.010*** -0.133* -0.002* 
 (0.661) 1.948 (0.910) 1.948 (1.106) 1.948 (-0.442) 1.948 (0.384) 1.971 (-4.663) 1.948 (-1.653) 1.948 
Subadvisor Size 0.168*** 0.026*** -0.052 -0.003 -0.090 -0.001 0.018 0.000 -0.048 -0.000 0.034 0.001 0.125 0.002 
 (3.319) 3.776 (-0.780) 3.776 (-0.966) 3.774 (0.168) 3.774 (-0.331) 3.800 (0.526) 3.776 (1.241) 3.774 
Subadvisor Funds -0.080 -0.012 0.322* 0.022* 0.674*** 0.010*** 0.243 0.003 0.129 0.000 0.375** 0.016** -0.061 -0.001 
 (-0.600) 1.344 (1.779) 1.344 (2.740) 1.344 (0.839) 1.344 (0.264) 1.348 (2.192) 1.344 (-0.235) 1.344 
Fund Age -0.023 -0.004 -0.028* -0.002* 0.022 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.038** 0.000** 0.044*** 0.002*** -0.032 -0.001 
 (-1.460) 7.466 (-1.840) 7.466 (1.563) 7.463 (0.513) 7.463 (2.424) 7.434 (3.580) 7.466 (-1.575) 7.463 
Fund Turnover -0.038 -0.006 -0.082 -0.006 -0.614*** -0.009*** -0.397* -0.005* 0.070*** 0.000*** -0.033 -0.001 -0.073 -0.001 
 (-1.461) 2.093 (-1.509) 2.093 (-3.401) 2.094 (-1.943) 2.094 (2.711) 2.233 (-1.389) 2.093 (-1.372) 2.094 
Fund Expenses 0.414*** 0.064*** 0.408*** 0.027*** 0.037 0.001 0.046 0.001 -1.520** -0.002** -2.344*** -0.101*** -1.708*** -0.030*** 
 (2.668) 0.557 (2.821) 0.557 (0.145) 0.557 (0.108) 0.557 (-2.386) 0.557 (-8.975) 0.557 (-6.207) 0.557 
Fund Flows -0.032** -0.005** -0.006 -0.000 -0.090* -0.001* 0.035** 0.000** 0.059 0.000 -0.025 -0.001 0.043*** 0.001*** 
 (-2.124) 2.585 (-0.298) 2.585 (-1.759) 2.586 (2.007) 2.586 (1.222) 2.599 (-0.706) 2.585 (3.035) 2.586 
Past Return -0.621* -0.096* -0.649 -0.043 0.187 0.003 0.385 0.005 -4.569*** -0.007*** -0.223 -0.010 0.898** 0.016** 
 (-1.776) 0.174 (-1.331) 0.174 (0.303) 0.174 (0.547) 0.174 (-3.069) 0.171 (-0.580) 0.174 (2.237) 0.174 
Observations 5644  5644  5644  5644  5644  5644  5644  
Pseudo R2 0.422  0.451  0.412  0.573  0.492  0.561  0.423  
Baseline predicted  
probability 
0.269  0.167  0.081  0.049  0.040  0.191  0.068  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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As an additional check, we examine whether high and low levels of sub-advisor expertise 
and affect fund style allocation equivalently. We observe mixed evidence. While the positive 
impact of high expertise in equity funds is stronger than the negative impact of low expertise, 
for debt and international funds, low levels of expertise exert greater effects than high levels. 
When expertise is measured in terms of investment objectives, except for capital appreciation 
and government short-term debt funds (which appear to exhibit a linear relation), low levels of 
expertise have a stronger negative impact than the positive effect of high levels. Overall, these 
results suggest that while experience positively affects the allocation of a fund, a lack of 
expertise in a given style is more heavily penalized, which makes the allocation of those funds 
to a sub-advisor highly unlikely, providing more evidence of the importance of the core 
competency. 44 
 
5. Core competency and fund performance 
5.1.Subadvisor Expertise and Fund Performance 
Next, we investigate whether the level of sub-advisor specialization in the fund asset class 
or investment objective affects fund performance. Tables 9 and 10 report the pooled OLS 
estimates of the following equation: 
                                                   ,
              [5] 
 
where     is the alpha of fund i in month t adjusted by different risk factors.    is the intercept 
of the model.       is a dummy variable indicating whether fund i was sub-advised in month t. 
                 is defined as subadvisor expertise and measures the proportion of fund TNA 
the subadvisor has in fund i’s style with respect to the general TNA of that sub-advisor.        
is a set of control variables as previously defined.45    is a set of dummy variables for each 
                                                          
44
 To save space, we do not report these tables, but they are available upon request. 
45
 Note that, unlike prior measures of expertise and control variables, these variables are defined on a monthly 
rather than annual basis. 
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fund style s,    is the time fixed effect for each period t, and     is an error term that is 
uncorrelated with all other independent variables. By including these dummy variables, we 
allow the coefficient of the subadvised fund to measure the effect of external firm outsourcing 
on fund performance relative to other funds in the same period and within the same style. We 
also cluster the standard errors to allow correlation of the error term of each fund over time. 
To analyze performance, we utilize monthly fund returns from CRSP and convert all 
variables extracted from NSAR-B filings into monthly data. We conduct a regular analysis of 
all U.S. open-ended mutual funds from our sample (from 1996 to 2011). Following prior 
research, we use the four-factor model developed by Carhart (1997) to estimate the abnormal 
returns, where the fund's alpha,   , captures the fund's before-fee risk-adjusted performance.
46 
As a robustness check, we also consider the CAPM and Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
models. Because we also consider international, balance and fixed income funds, we use two 
additional performance models. The first is a four-factor model (Carhart 1997) augmented by 
the MSCI World Index and U.S. Aggregate Bond Index returns in excess of the risk-free rate. 
The second model is a 9-Factor model, which includes the four-factor model (Carhart 1997) 
and the following five additional risk factors: Barclays US Treasury Bill 1-3 Months, Barclays 
US Treasury 1-3 Years, Barclays US Government Long, U.S. Corporate High-Yield and U.S. 
Corporate AAA. For every month from 1996 to 2011, we regress fund gross excess returns 
(before expenses and subtracting the risk-free rate) on the risk factors over the previous 24 
months (which requires a minimum of 20 observations).47 
The estimates presented in Table 9 are similar across all models. Several conclusions can 
be drawn about the importance of sub-advisor core competency on the performance of 
outsourced funds. First, as illustrated in Table 9, the coefficient of Subadvised is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with prior research that 
indicates the underperformance of outsourced funds. In particular, a sub-advised fund 
underperforms by an average of 23 to 58 bps per year compared to their in-house managed 
                                                          
46
 The data for the Fama-French and momentum factors were obtained from the Kenneth French website. 
47
 The main results remain unchanged when using a wider window of 36 months instead of 24 to estimate fund 
performance. 
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peers, depending on the performance measure. We hypothesize that expertise positively 
affects performance, and thus, outsourced funds gain from being managed by highly 
experienced sub-advisors. An outsourced fund managed by a sub-advisor who manages only 
funds of a given asset class outperform those managed by inexperienced managers by 35 to 52 
bps per year. Overall, being managed by a fully experienced sub-advisor is insufficient for 
funds to outperform their in-house managed peers. However, this difference helps offset the 
underperformance of outsourced funds that prior research attributed as being due to firm 
boundaries (Chen et al. 2013) or conflicts of interest (Chuprinin et al. 2013, Moreno et al. 
2012). 
Table 10 presents the repeated performance analysis by investment objective rather than 
asset class expertise. As in Table 9, the sub-advised coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, while expertise in a particular investment objective positively affects performance. 
A sub-advised fund, on average, underperforms by 32 to 59 bps per year compared to their in-
house managed peers, but an outsourced fund managed by a sub-advisor that exclusively 
manages a given objective outperforms inexperienced managers by 34 to 100 bps per year.48 
 
5.2.The efficiency of portfolio management outsourcing 
In this section, we address the consequences for advisory companies and in-house funds of 
outsourcing the portfolio management of some funds. Prior research has demonstrated that 
outsourced funds underperform their in-house peers due to firm boundaries (Chen et al., 2013) 
or conflicts of interest within management companies that tend to favor their internal funds 
(Chuprinin et al., 2012, Duong 2010, and Moreno et al., 2012). However, some authors claim 
that the efficiency of these outsourcing agreements depends on the underlying economics need 
to externalize such tasks (Cashman and Deli, 2009) or when certain mechanisms are specified 
in the sub-advisory contract (Moreno et al., 2012). Moreover, the literature on organizational 
theory suggest that allowing outside specialist organizations to concentrate on certain tasks 
                                                          
48 The results reported so far do not vary because the core competency (or experience) is defined by asset classes 
or investment objectives. To save space, we will utilize only the definitions of asset classes. 
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increases firm performance by allowing them to focus on the tasks they perform best (Quinn 
(1992), Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Ellram and Billington, 2001). We hypothesize that internal 
funds should have a positive impact on performance after a company outsources a high 
proportion of the funds they were managing. 
 
TABLE 9: SUBADVISOR CLASS EXPERTISE AND FUND PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the monthly panel regressions of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. The 
sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and 
expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured by the alpha from 
CAPM, Fama-French three factors (FF3), Carhart’s 4 factors (FF4) model, te Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index and a global bond index (FF6) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes 
and 2 corporate indexes (FF9). Subadvised is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is subadvised to an 
unaffiliated firm. Class Sub Expertise measures the subadvisor expertise in terms of fund asset class (ratio of 
Subadvisor TNA on fund’s asset class over all Subadvisor TNA). Fund Size is the natural logarithm of the total 
net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Advisor size is the logarithm of all the advisor’s fund 
TNA, excluding the fund itself. Advisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that advisor, 
excluding the fund itself. Subadvisor size is the logarithm of all funds TNA of the Subadvisor, excluding the fund 
itself. Subadvisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that Subadvisor, excluding the fund 
itself. Fund Age is the number of years since the fund inception. Fund Turnover is the minimum of aggregate 
purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar year. Fund Expenses are the total 
annual expenses and fees dividend by the year-end TNA. Fund Flows represents the new inflows of the fund over 
the previous year. Past Return is the percentage of cumulative past years’ fund return. Control variables are 
lagged 12 months. Time and investment objective dummies are included but not reported; the constant term has 
also been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 (1) 
CAPM 
(2) 
FF3 
(3) 
FF4 
(4) 
FF6 
(5) 
FF9 
Subadvised -0.0381*** -0.0218** -0.0193* -0.0309*** -0.0483*** 
 (-2.82) (-1.99) (-1.78) (-2.70) (-3.51) 
Class Sub Expertise 0.0380*** 0.0416*** 0.0434*** 0.0295*** 0.0339*** 
 (3.51) (4.39) (4.54) (3.04) (3.07) 
Fund Size  -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0015 
 (-0.16) (0.40) (-0.05) (-0.36) (-0.49) 
Advisor Size  -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0020 0.0041 
 (-0.69) (-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.44) (0.79) 
Advisor Funds  0.0487** 0.0692*** 0.0801*** 0.0526** 0.0312 
 (2.02) (3.44) (4.07) (2.53) (1.37) 
Subadvisor Size  0.0174*** 0.0208*** 0.0200*** 0.0149*** 0.0153** 
 (2.87) (4.09) (3.96) (2.68) (2.39) 
Subadvisor Funds -0.0701*** -0.0871*** -0.0968*** -0.0684*** -0.0632*** 
 (-2.99) (-4.39) (-4.98) (-3.30) (-2.86) 
Fund Age  0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0000 
 (0.25) (-1.11) (-0.69) (-0.48) (-0.01) 
Fund Expenses  0.0435** 0.0295** 0.0252* 0.0434*** 0.0572*** 
 (2.40) (2.06) (1.73) (3.27) (3.98) 
     (Continued) 
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Fund Turnover 0.0021 0.0033 0.0052** -0.0020 -0.0049* 
 (0.94) (1.43) (2.07) (-0.75) (-1.81) 
Fund Flows  0.0048*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0046*** 0.0055*** 
 (3.74) (4.08) (4.18) (4.60) (4.22) 
Past Return 0.0117*** 0.0105*** 0.0100*** 0.0090*** 0.0074*** 
 (34.51) (35.39) (34.71) (29.24) (18.79) 
Observations 140155 140155 140155 140155 140155 
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.194 0.177 0.170 0.090 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment Objective dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10: SUBADVISOR OBJECTIVE EXPERTISE AND FUND PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the monthly panel regressions of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. The 
sample contains all U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and 
expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured by the alpha for CAPM, 
Fama-French three factors (FF3), Carhart’s 4 factors (FF4) model, Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index and a global bond index (FF6) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes 
and 2 corporate indexes (FF9). Subadvised is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is subadvised to an 
unaffiliated firm. Class Sub Expertise measures the subadvisor expertise in terms of fund asset class (ratio of 
Subadvisor TNA on fund’s asset class over all Subadvisor TNA). Fund Size is the natural logarithm of the total 
net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Advisor size is the logarithm of all the advisor’s fund 
TNA, excluding the fund itself. Advisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that advisor, 
excluding the fund itself. Subadvisor size is the logarithm of all funds TNA of the Subadvisor, excluding the fund 
itself. Subadvisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in that Subadvisor, excluding the fund 
itself. Fund Age is the number of years since fund inception. Fund Turnover is the minimum of aggregate 
purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar year. Fund Expenses are the total 
annual expenses and fees dividend by the year-end TNA. Fund Flows represents the new inflows of the fund over 
the previous year. Past Return is the percentage cumulative past year’s fund return. Control variables are lagged 
by 12 months. Time and investment objective dummies are included but not reported; the constant term has also 
been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
CAPM 
(2) 
FF3 
(3) 
FF4 
(4) 
FF6 
(5) 
FF9 
Subadvised -0.0273* -0.0306** -0.0288** -0.0493*** -0.0493*** 
 (-1.83) (-2.48) (-2.37) (-3.83) (-3.34) 
Objective  Sub Expertise -0.0182 0.0417*** 0.0465*** 0.0834*** 0.0284* 
 (-1.12) (3.19) (3.66) (6.11) (1.81) 
Fund Size  -0.0110*** -0.0092*** -0.0099*** -0.0057** -0.0044 
 (-3.19) (-3.26) (-3.57) (-1.99) (-1.40) 
Advisor Size  -0.0098* -0.0093** -0.0083* -0.0050 0.0021 
 (-1.72) (-2.02) (-1.84) (-1.05) (0.38) 
Advisor Funds  0.0526* 0.0815*** 0.0929*** 0.0707*** 0.0358 
 (1.93) (3.65) (4.30) (3.18) (1.49) 
Subadvisor Size  0.0209*** 0.0240*** 0.0230*** 0.0167*** 0.0185*** 
 (3.04) (4.23) (4.14) (2.89) (2.78) 
Subadvisor Funds -0.0594** -0.0831*** -0.0951*** -0.0786*** -0.0673*** 
 (-2.23) (-3.75) (-4.42) (-3.54) (-2.90) 
     (Continued) 
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Fund Age  0.0007 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (1.09) (0.78) (0.99) (-0.23) (-0.52) 
Fund Expenses  -0.0343** -0.0494*** -0.0509*** -0.0055 0.0327** 
 (-2.01) (-3.52) (-3.63) (-0.46) (2.46) 
Fund Turnover 0.0059** 0.0084*** 0.0100*** -0.0009 -0.0027 
 (2.38) (3.45) (3.79) (-0.33) (-1.02) 
Fund Flows  0.0046*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 
 (3.36) (3.59) (3.69) (4.29) (3.63) 
Past Return 1.2370*** 1.0878*** 1.0213*** 0.9044*** 0.7586*** 
 (30.22) (31.48) (31.33) (26.99) (17.55) 
Observations 135790 135790 135790 135790 135790 
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.175 0.162 0.155 0.088 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment Objective dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
5.2.1 T-test analysis 
To examine whether in-house funds benefit from the specialization of a management 
company that outsources many of its funds, we perform a t-test analysis to compare the overall 
performance of advisors who increase or decrease their proportion of outsourced funds. For an 
advisor, the proportion of outsourced funds is computed by dividing the number of outsourced 
funds and the number of total funds the advisor is currently offering. To consider different 
outsourcing policies, we adjust the ratio computing the percentage change with respect to the 
previous twelve months49. We select a twelve-month period because our sub-advisory contract 
data are provided on an annual basis. We can assume that there will be very few cases in 
which advisory contracts change more than once a year. 
In Panel A of Table 11, we present a t-test analysis to compare differences in advisor 
performance for positive and negative changes in the proportion of outsourced funds during 
the previous year (the first row). The second row tests differences in performance between 
companies in the top decile (the highest increase in the proportion of outsourced funds) and 
the bottom decile (the largest decrease). The third and fourth rows consider only those 
outsourced funds that are not within the advisor’s core competency, where the core 
competency of the advisor is defined by the maximum asset class expertise (simple majority) 
                                                          
49
 There might exist firms with non-outsourcing policies, others that have been outsourcing frequently, or even 
virtual families that only distribute funds and hire external firms to manage all their funds. To correct for these 
possibilities, we first exclude virtual families and then adjust the ratio by calculating the percentage change. 
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or at least 50% expertise (absolute majority). The advisor performance is measured as the 
TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level alpha from Carhart’s model 
augmented by 3 government bond indexes and 2 corporate indexes (FF9). We use the fund 
alpha of in-house funds (first two columns), in-house funds within the simple majority core 
(3rd and 4th columns), and in-house funds within the absolute majority core (5th and 6th 
columns).  
The results presented in the first two columns of Panel A indicate that the performance of 
in-house funds of advisory companies that increased the proportion of outsourced funds during 
the past twelve months (outsourcing firms hereafter) is approximately 23.7 bps higher per year 
than that of funds from advisory companies that increased the proportion of in-house funds 
(integrating firms hereafter). In the second row of Panel A, we examine the difference between 
the top and bottom deciles rather than simple positive and negative changes. The advisor 
performance of in-house funds that are within the core competency is approximately 80.5 bps 
per year higher for outsourcing firms than for integrating firms. We observe that such 
differences are systematically higher across the table. Thus, we argue that not only is the sign 
important but also the magnitude of such changes. When examining the difference between 
outsourcing and integrating firms of non-core funds, we find that the general advisor 
performance of the former is between 37 bps and 58 bps higher than that of integrating firms. 
To demonstrate the economic significance of these figures, we note that the average advisor 
performance is approximately 82.6 bps per year. Thus, by increasing the proportion of non-
core outsourced funds, these firms experience performance gains of 43% to 63% over an 
average firm. 
 
5.2.2 Propensity Score Matching 
In-house funds from outsourcing firms might perform better because fund sub-advising 
affects other advisor characteristics that lead to higher efficiency. In this section, we employ a 
propensity score matching procedure using a nearest neighbor algorithm developed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and stratified sampling described by Hunt and Tyrrell (2001) to 
identify a control sample of integrating firms that exhibit no observable differences in 
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characteristics relative to outsourcing firms. Thus, each pair of matched advisors is similar, 
except for the main variable of interest: changes in the proportion of outsourced funds. We 
then compare the advisory performance (the alpha from the 9-factor model previously defined) 
of the two groups for any in-house managed funds and for funds managed in-house within the 
advisor’s core competency. Because the control advisors are restricted to a set of peers who 
are similar in terms of observable characteristics, funds from outsourcing firms are expected to 
exhibit the same performance as funds from integrating firms. The same analysis with a 
similar intuition was conducted for a restricted group of funds that are managed by 
outsourcing firms that externalize the portfolio management of their non-core funds. 
To implement this methodology, we first calculate the probability (i.e., the propensity 
score) that an advisor with particular characteristics is an outsourcing firm. The propensity 
score is calculated using advisor characteristics. Specifically, this probability is estimated as a 
function of the number of funds per advisor and total advisor size as well as age, turnover and 
expenses defined as the TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level measures. To 
ensure that the characteristics in the control sample (integrating firms) are sufficiently similar 
to those of outsourcing firms, we require that the maximum difference between the propensity 
score of these firms and that of its matching peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value.  
Panel B of Table 11 compares the advisor performance of matched outsourcing and 
integrating firms and reports the value of the difference and significance level using 
bootstrapped standard errors. We observe that, independent of the type of funds managed and 
the approach used, the advisor performance of outsourcing firms is between 18 bps and 43 bps 
higher per year than that of integrating firms. When we restrict our analysis to only 
outsourcing firms that increased the proportion of non-core outsourced funds, the difference is 
as high as 66 bps per year. These results confirm that even when holding observable advisor 
characteristics of outsourcing and integrating firms constant, in-house funds of the former tend 
to be better managed than the latter.50 
 
                                                          
50
 These results are also robust to the use of radius and kernel matching methods. 
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TABLE 11. THE EFFICIENCY OF OUTSOURCING (I) 
Panel A of Table 11 presents a t-test analysis of the differences in advisor performance between positive and negative changes in the proportion of the outsourced 
funds of a given advisor during the prior year (the first row). The second row test differences in performance between companies in the top decile (the highest 
increase in the proportion of outsourced funds) and the bottom decile (the largest drop). The third and fourth rows consider only outsourced funds that are not 
within the advisor’s core competency, where the core competency of the advisor is defined by the maximum asset class expertise (simply majority) or at least 
50% of expertise (absolute majority). The advisor performance is the TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level alpha from Carhart’s model 
augmented by 3 government bond indexes and 2 corporate indexes (FF9). We use the fund alpha of in-house funds (first two columns), in-house funds within the 
simple majority core (3rd and 4th columns), and in-house funds within the absolute majority core (5th and 6th columns). In Panel B, we identify a treatment group 
of firms that increased the proportion of outsourced funds and a control sample of advisors employing two different propensity score matching procedures: a 
nearest neighbor algorithm by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and stratified sampling by Hunt and Tyrrell (2001). The propensity score is estimated using the 
number of funds per advisor and total advisor size as well as age, turnover and expenses of the advisor defined as the TNA-weighted averages of the 
corresponding fund-level measures. We require that the difference between the propensity score of advisors that increased the number of external funds and its 
matching peer not exceed 0.1 in absolute value. We then compare the performance between the two groups and report the difference. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. The sample period is 1996-2011. 
 
Panel A: T-Test Analysis 
  
All In house funds In house funds in the CORE Max In house funds in the CORE (50) 
 
  
Diff Adv 
Performance  
p-value 
Diff Adv 
Performance  
p-value 
Diff Adv 
Performance  
p-value 
Outsourced any funds   0.0198 0.02 0.0108 0.23 0.0194 0.04 
Top Decile- Bottom Decile   0.0668 0.00 0.0545 0.00 0.0671 0.00 
Outsourced NON CORE (MAX) funds   0.0483 0.00 0.0322 0.00 0.0310 0.01 
Outsourced NON CORE  (50%) funds   0.0479 0.00 0.0441 0.00 0.0448 0.00 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
  
All In house funds In house funds in the CORE (MAX) In house funds in the CORE (50) 
 
  
Nearest  
Neighbor 
Stratified  
Sampling 
Nearest 
 Neighbor 
Stratified  
Sampling 
Nearest  
Neighbor 
Stratified  
Sampling 
Outsourced  any funds   0.036*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
Outsourced NON CORE (MAX) funds   0.035** 0.038*** 0.025** 0.037*** 0.022** 0.029** 
Outsourced NON CORE (50%) funds   0.047*** 0.052*** 0.037** 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.053*** 
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5.2.3 Regression Analysis 
To test the hypothesis that in-house funds are better managed when their advisory firms 
increase the proportion of outsourced funds, we estimate the following regression model: 
                                                                      [6] 
where                is advisor performance measured by the TNA-weighted averages of 
the corresponding fund-level alpha using the 9-factor model previously described. 
                     is a dummy variable that equals 1 if fund i is internally managed by an 
advisor who increased the proportion of outsourced funds in month t-12. X is a vector of 
advisor-specific control variables, including Advisor Age, Advisor Expenses, Advisor 
Turnover, Advisor Flows and Advisor Past Returns. These variables are defined as the TNA-
weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level measures. Advisor Size is the logarithm of 
the TNA of all advisor funds excluding the fund itself, and Advisor Funds is the natural 
logarithm of the number of advisor funds. Control variables are lagged by 12 months. We 
estimate [6] using an advisor fixed effect (    ) regression model to determine how the main 
variable of interest affects performance within the same advisory firm over time. We clustered 
the standard errors at the advisory firm level. 
Table 12 displays the estimation of [6] for all U.S. advisory firms managing mutual funds 
from 1996 to 2011. The first row specifies the fund type used to calculate the dependent 
variable, advisory performance, and the second row classifies the main variable, outsourcing 
firm, based on the type of fund the firm has outsourced. We find that outsourcing any type of 
funds does not affect advisor performance, while outsourcing funds that are not within the 
core competency of the firm has a considerable effect. This positive impact on performance is 
more significant for in-house funds that those within the core competency of the firm. This 
finding is statistically significant across every specification. In economic terms, we can 
conclude that outsourcing firms that increased the proportion of outsourced funds that were 
not within their core competency experienced an increase in the performance of their core in-
house managed funds, outperforming those of integrating firms by 24.6 to 34.6 bps per year.  
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TABLE 12. THE EFFICIENCY OF OUTSOURCING (II) 
Table 12 presents the results for advisor fixed effect estimates of risk-adjusted returns on the proportion of outsourced funds and other advisor characteristics. The 
dependent variable is advisor performance measured by the TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level alpha using the 9-factor model previously 
described (FF9). Advisor performance is calculated using either all in-house funds or only in-house funds that are within the core competency of the advisor. 
Outsourcing firms is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the advisor increased the proportion of outsourced funds during the prior year and 0 otherwise. We also 
classified this measure using any outsourced funds or only outsourced funds that are not within the core competency of the advisor. The core competency of the 
advisor is defined as the maximum asset class expertise (Max) or at least 50% expertise. Advisor Age, Advisor Expenses, Advisor Turnover, Advisor Flows and 
Advisor Past Returns are defined as the TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level measures. Advisor Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in 
the advisor, excluding the fund itself, and Advisor Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in the advisor. Control variables are lagged by 12 
months. The sample contains observations for all U.S. advisory firms from 1996 to 2011. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at the 
advisor level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 All In house funds In house funds in the CORE (Max) In house funds in the CORE (50%) 
Advisor 
Performance 
Any  
Outsourced 
Outsourced  
Non-core (max) 
Outsourced  
Non-core (50) 
Any  
Outsourced 
Outsourced  
Non-core (max) 
Outsourced  
Non-core (50%) 
Any  
Outsourced 
Outsourced  
Non-core (max) 
Outsourced  
Non-core (50%) 
Outsourcing Firms 0.0048 0.0192** 0.0151* 0.0039 0.0253*** 0.0252** 0.0155* 0.0205** 0.0288*** 
 
(0.68) (2.50) (1.66) (0.48) (2.95) (2.56) (1.90) (2.29) (2.96) 
Advisor  Age 0.0077*** 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0075*** 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0062*** 0.0047*** 0.0046*** 
 
(7.13) (5.45) (4.73) (5.63) (4.20) (3.76) (4.31) (3.23) (2.85) 
Advisor  Expenses 0.0179 -0.0336 -0.0332 0.0554* -0.0130 0.0159 0.0827*** -0.0030 0.0070 
 
(0.77) (-1.28) (-1.07) (1.96) (-0.40) (0.46) (2.95) (-0.10) (0.22) 
Advisor  Turnover -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001 
 
(-4.91) (-3.32) (-3.14) (-4.80) (-3.28) (-2.17) (-4.23) (-2.20) (-1.62) 
Advisor  Flows 0.0081 -0.0005 -0.0037 0.0076* -0.0010 -0.0029 0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0043 
 
(1.61) (-0.07) (-0.51) (1.78) (-0.13) (-0.38) (0.95) (-0.53) (-0.57) 
Advisor  Past Returns 0.2520*** 0.3162*** 0.2158*** 0.3269*** 0.4098*** 0.2936*** 0.3154*** 0.4201*** 0.3074*** 
 
(4.96) (5.80) (3.23) (5.54) (6.41) (4.05) (4.91) (6.17) (4.06) 
Advisor Size -0.0414*** -0.0195*** -0.0292*** -0.0383*** -0.0110 -0.0086 -0.0350*** -0.0066 -0.0054 
 (-6.14) (-2.67) (-3.16) (-4.78) (-1.22) (-0.83) (-3.96) (-0.70) (-0.52) 
Advisor Funds 0.0005** -0.0001 0.0004 0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0012*** 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(2.05) (-0.49) (1.04) (3.07) (0.20) (0.09) (3.63) (0.41) (0.34) 
Observations 9485 7549 5854 8855 6979 5472 7951 6170 5154 
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.388 0.426 0.335 0.378 0.426 0.381 0.444 0.455 
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5.3.Sub-advisor Expertise and Fund Performance  
In this section, we investigate the apparent inconsistency between the investment fund 
industry and other industries regarding the improved results that are achieved if activities 
beyond the core competency are outsourced. As we noted in Section 2, the mutual fund 
literature on sub-advising demonstrates underperformance. However, these studies did not 
consider the importance of the firm’s core competency. To explore our fifth hypothesis, that 
an advisor’s core competence that differs from the fund style positively affects outsourcing, 
we re-estimate equation [5] limiting the sample to the following groups: 1) funds managed in-
house by a non-specialist advisor and 2) outsourced funds. 51  
As indicated in Table 13, Subadvised is not statistically significant (except in model 1), 
suggesting that there is no significant difference in fund performance between managing a 
fund in-house when the principal advisor is not an expert and outsourcing the fund to an 
external company. However, consistent with the previous hypothesis, as the selected sub-
advisor obtains more expertise in the fund asset class, the outsourced fund outperforms its in-
house managed peer. In particular, Model 5 suggests that a fund managed by a fully 
experienced sub-advisor (Sub-expertise class variable equal to 100%) in the fund’s asset class 
will outperform a fund managed internally by a non-specialist advisor by approximately 43.4 
bps per year.  
Therefore, when the principal advisor is not familiar with some aspects of the fund style, it 
is not suboptimal to outsource that fund to an external firm. Moreover, if that sub-advisor is 
highly experienced in that specific fund style, this outsourcing decision will improve 
performance. Overall, sub-advisor specialization seems to exert a significant and positive 
economic impact on mutual fund performance.  
 
 
                                                          
51
 A fund managed by a non-specialist advisor is managed by firms that mostly manage (at least 95%) funds of 
other types. An outsourced fund with a conflict of interest is a fund managed by an unaffiliated firm that also 
manages and distribute its own funds. 
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TABLE 13: PERFORMANCE OF OUTSOURCING WHEN THE ADVISOR HAS NO 
EXPERIENCE WITH THE GIVEN FUND TYPE 
 
This table presents the results of the monthly panel regressions of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. 
The sample contains U.S. mutual funds from 1996 to 2011 that are either subadvised to an unaffiliated firm or 
managed in-house by an advisor that is not experienced in the fund style (less than 5 on the ratio of Advisor TNA 
on fund’s asset class over all Advisor TNA). Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses 
(gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured by the alpha from the CAPM, 
Fama-French three factors (FF3), Carhart’s 4 factors (FF4) model, Carhart’s model augmented by an 
international index and a global bond index (FF6) and Carhart’s model augmented by 3 government bond indexes 
and 2 corporate indexes (FF9). Subadvised is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is subadvised to an 
unaffiliated firm and 0 if it is managed in-house by an advisor without expertise. Class Sub Expertise measures 
subadvisor expertise in terms of fund asset class (ratio of Subadvisor TNA on fund’s asset class over all 
Subadvisor TNA). The set of control variables has been previously defined. Time and investment objective 
dummies are included but not reported; the constant term has also been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at 
the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level 
and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
CAPM 
(2) 
FF3 
(3) 
FF4 
(4) 
FF6 
(5) 
FF9 
Subadvised -0.0463* -0.0279 -0.0255 0.0012 -0.0328 
 (-1.82) (-1.19) (-1.10) (0.06) (-1.37) 
Class Sub Expertise 0.0431*** 0.0600*** 0.0579*** 0.0421*** 0.0362*** 
 (2.76) (4.58) (4.42) (3.43) (2.61) 
Fund Size  -0.0113** -0.0104** -0.0104** -0.0127*** -0.0103** 
 (-2.17) (-2.41) (-2.45) (-2.90) (-2.17) 
Advisor Size  -0.0039 -0.0020 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0049 
 (-0.62) (-0.37) (-0.28) (-0.35) (0.82) 
Advisor Funds  0.0856** 0.0958*** 0.1104*** 0.0839*** 0.0445 
 (2.50) (3.46) (4.13) (2.94) (1.49) 
Subadvisor Size  0.0191** 0.0190*** 0.0167*** 0.0170** 0.0217*** 
 (2.39) (2.88) (2.59) (2.48) (2.83) 
Subadvisor Funds -0.1090*** -0.1133*** -0.1247*** -0.1019*** -0.0878*** 
 (-3.25) (-4.12) (-4.69) (-3.55) (-2.98) 
Fund Age  0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.87) (1.01) (1.13) (0.46) (0.32) 
Fund Expenses  -0.0440* -0.0648*** -0.0663*** -0.0337* 0.0233 
 (-1.77) (-3.13) (-3.19) (-1.96) (1.24) 
Fund Turnover 0.0087*** 0.0107*** 0.0118*** -0.0017 -0.0031 
 (3.04) (3.52) (3.46) (-0.45) (-0.95) 
Fund Flows  0.0056*** 0.0044*** 0.0045*** 0.0042*** 0.0066*** 
 (3.81) (3.41) (3.30) (2.69) (4.09) 
Past Return 1.2900*** 1.0852*** 1.0168*** 0.9213*** 0.7903*** 
 (23.61) (23.85) (23.41) (20.22) (14.60) 
Observations 79554 79554 79554 79554 79554 
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.175 0.164 0.158 0.102 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment Objective dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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6. Core competencies and Advisor-Subadvisor business relationships 
6.1 Commercial Relationships and Outsourcing decisions 
In this final section, we examine the role of core competencies in outsourcing decisions 
accounting for the existence of business connections among fund families and sub-advisors. 
To that end, we re-estimate model [4], which examined the relationship between outsourced 
fund style and sub-advisor expertise, but we now include a new variable, High Relation, which 
captures the special case where a fund family that has outsourced a high proportion of funds to 
the same sub-advisor. 
High Relation is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of funds the sub-advisor 
manages for the family out of the total number of funds the family has currently outsourced is 
greater than the median and 0 otherwise. For example, suppose a fund family has outsourced 
100 funds to three different sub-advisors. The first sub-advisor manages 10 funds, the second 
manages 30 the third manages 50. Because the median is 30, High Relation is coded 1 for the 
funds outsourced to the third sub-advisor and 0 for the funds outsourced to the other firms.52 
We also include an interaction term between the variables High Relation and Subadvisor 
expertise to test whether the expertise of the sub-advisor still significantly determines sub-
advisor selection under a high commercial relationship. 
Table 14 provides the estimates of the logistic specification by asset class. We must allow 
the marginal effect of sub-advisor expertise to be conditioned by the type of commercial 
relationship. In particular, the marginal effect of sub-advisor expertise is described as follows: 
 
                 
                    
      
             
     
                           
                           
 
Thus, for equity sub-advised funds,                        and                                
      . Therefore, an increase of one standard deviation in Class (equity) sub expertise 
                                                          
52
 In our proxy variable for the commercial relationship, we assume that the management company only performs 
management tasks, so the only way of having some business relations with other management companies is that 
they have somehow been sharing the management of some of their portfolios. 
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(0.418) implies a sub-advisor with a high relation (1.427-0.398*0.418) who is 43% more 
likely to be optimally assigned to an equity fund (in terms of expertise). However, without 
such a strong relationship between companies, the same increase in expertise leads to an 
increase of 59.6% in the likelihood of optimal fund allocation. Thus, business relationships 
between management companies might create friction between the core competency and 
outsourcing decisions. This result is similar across the other three asset classes.  
Table 15 presents the results when sub-advisor expertise is based on investment objectives. 
Overall, the main results remain unchanged. For instance, increasing the capital appreciation 
expertise of a sub-advisor without a strong relationship to the fund family by one standard 
deviation makes such a sub-advisor 5.7% more likely to be correctly assigned to a capital 
appreciation fund than if it had such relationship with the family. Commercial relationships 
also significantly diminish the effect of sub-advisor expertise for government long-term funds 
and corporate debts. However, this effect was weak for government short-term funds, which 
had a negative but non-significant interaction term coefficient. For the other models, an 
increase of one standard deviation in expertise increases the likelihood of a sub-advisor 
without a commercial relationship being properly assigned compared to a sub-advisor with a 
strong relationship with the fund family. 
Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that when there is a strong 
relationship between the sub-advisor and fund family, in the sense that the sub-advisor 
manages a substantial number of funds for that family, the core competency and sub-advisor 
expertise had weaker effects on sub-advisor appointment. Therefore, a sub-advisor might not 
manage the funds in which they are more experienced but rather those from families that are 
highly dependent on the sub-advisor.  
Note that the effect of these business connections differs across fund objectives. In 
particular, the effect is stronger for capital appreciation and growth equity funds as well as 
government long-term and corporate debt funds.  
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TABLE 14: ASSET CLASS EXPERTISE, SUBADVISOR CHOICE AND COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONS 
 
Table 14 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund 
belonging to one of four asset classes. The sample contains all U.S. outsourced mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the subadvised fund belongs to the equity, debt, 
balance or international class in each three-column panel. The explanatory variable is High Relation, which 
equals 1 if the ratio between the number of funds managed by the same fund subadvisor and total advisor funds is 
above the median. The remaining variables have been previously defined. Interaction terms between High 
Relation and the Subadvisor Expertise of the fund class are also included. The constant term has been omitted. 
Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (Equity) 
(2) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Debt) 
(3) 
Subadvised Funds  
(Balance) 
(4) 
Subadvised Funds 
 (International) 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
High Relation 0.635*** 0.157*** 0.706*** 0.048*** 0.301 0.007 0.249 0.018 
 (3.056) 0.500 (2.898) 0.500 (0.958) 0.500 (0.993) 0.500 
Class Sub Expertise 5.764*** 1.427*** 6.645*** 0.456*** 8.453*** 0.204*** 7.347*** 0.522*** 
 (25.407) 0.418 (17.120) 0.359 (7.903) 0.146 (21.909) 0.319 
High Relation*Class Sub Expertise -1.609*** -0.398*** -1.983*** -0.136*** -2.419** -0.058** -1.228*** -0.087*** 
 (-5.653) 0.356 (-4.465) 0.280 (-2.013) 0.113 (-2.860) 0.209 
Fund Size 0.083** 0.021** -0.226*** -0.016*** -0.130 -0.003 0.118** 0.008** 
 (1.979) 1.989 (-4.026) 1.989 (-1.630) 1.990 (2.212) 1.989 
Subadvisor Size -0.096 -0.024 0.127 0.009 0.157 0.004 0.158** 0.011** 
 (-1.622) 3.771 (1.538) 3.771 (1.360) 3.768 (2.422) 3.771 
Subadvisor Funds 0.361** 0.089** -0.130 -0.009 -0.105 -0.003 0.126 0.009 
 (2.332) 1.360 (-0.614) 1.360 (-0.371) 1.360 (0.728) 1.360 
Fund Age -0.018 -0.004 0.028* 0.002* 0.043*** 0.001*** -0.010 -0.001 
 (-1.285) 7.882 (1.729) 7.882 (3.418) 7.878 (-0.767) 7.882 
Fund Turnover -0.110*** -0.027*** -0.029 -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 0.043** 0.003** 
 (-3.255) 2.227 (-1.565) 2.27 (-0.178) 2.228 (2.435) 2.227 
Fund Expenses 0.664*** 0.164*** -2.399*** -0.165*** -0.171 -0.004 1.172*** 0.083*** 
 (4.292) 0.539 (-9.397) 0.539 (-0.523) 0.539 (4.932) 0.539 
Fund Flows -0.019 -0.005 0.041*** 0.003*** -0.076 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (-1.551) 2.810 (2.956) 2.810 (-1.149) 2.812 (0.038) 2.810 
Past Return -1.099*** -0.272*** 0.605 0.042 -0.601 -0.015 1.637*** 0.116*** 
 (-3.232) 0.173 (1.442) 0.173 (-1.168) 0.173 (3.714) 0.173 
Observations 4716  4716  4716  4716  
Pseudo R2 0.466  0.591  0.339  0.561  
Baseline predicted probability 0.522  0.233  0.051  0.178  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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TABLE 15: INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE EXPERTISE, SUBADVISOR CHOICE AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
 
Table 15 presents the results of cross-sectional time series logistic regression models of the probability of a fund belonging to one of seven equity and debt 
investment objective categories. The sample contains equity and debt U.S. mutual funds outsourced from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable for whether the subadvised fund belongs to capital, growth, income, return investment, government short-term (ST), government long-term (LT) or 
corporate fund objectives in each two-column panel. The explanatory variable is High Relation, which equals 1 if the ratio between the number of funds 
managed by the same fund subadvisor and total advisor funds is above the median. The remaining variables have been previously defined. Interation terms 
between High Relation and the Subadvisor Expertise of the fund invesment objective are also included. The constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (1) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Capital) 
(2) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Growth) 
(3) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Income) 
(4) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Return) 
(5) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Gov ST) 
(6) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Gov LT) 
(7) 
Subadvised Funds 
(Corporate) 
 Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std Coef/t Mfx/Std 
High Relation -0.036 -0.006 0.613*** 0.041*** 0.156 0.002 -0.144 -0.002 0.269 0.000 0.759*** 0.031*** 0.709** 0.013** 
 (-0.178) 0.500 (2.691) 0.500 (0.417) 0.500 (-0.409) 0.500 (0.481) 0.500 (3.200) 0.500 (2.425) 0.500 
Objective Sub Expertise 5.655*** 0.926*** 5.777*** 0.384*** 7.772*** 0.113*** 8.643*** 0.098*** 8.487*** 0.009*** 7.233*** 0.292*** 8.444*** 0.155*** 
 (21.041) 0.349 (18.844) 0.285 (10.521) 0.163 (13.245) 0.186 (7.225) 0.136 (13.989) 0.277 (7.383) 0.177 
High Relation*Objective Sub 
Expertise 
-0.993*** -0.163*** -0.557 -0.037 -1.818** -0.026** -1.555** -0.018** -2.793 -0.003 -2.589*** -0.105*** -3.141*** -0.058*** 
 (-2.734) 0.226 (-1.281) 0.199 (-2.102) 0.095 (-2.066) 0.126 (-1.541) 0.119 (-4.323) 0.193 (-2.628) 0.127 
Fund Size -0.005 -0.001 0.070 0.005 0.072 0.001 -0.049 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.261*** -0.011*** -0.092 -0.002 
 (-0.122) 1.989 (1.430) 1.989 (0.745) 1.990 (-0.567) 1.990 (0.016) 2.013 (-4.907) 1.989 (-1.066) 1.990 
Subadvisor Size 0.200*** 0.033*** -0.128** -0.009** -0.091 -0.001 -0.113 -0.001 -0.069 -0.000 0.044 0.002 0.157 0.003 
 (3.711) 3.771 (-2.078) 3.771 (-0.820) 3.768 (-1.008) 3.768 (-0.393) 3.784 (0.594) 3.771 (1.366) 3.768 
Subadvisor Funds -0.134 -0.022 0.486*** 0.032*** 0.710** 0.010** 0.597* 0.007* 0.520 0.001 0.384** 0.016** -0.206 -0.004 
 (-0.934) 1.360 (2.855) 1.360 (2.532) 1.360 (1.772) 1.360 (1.052) 1.363 (2.013) 1.360 (-0.720) 1.360 
Fund Age -0.019 -0.003 -0.031* -0.002* 0.028** 0.000** 0.015 0.000 0.038** 0.000** 0.042*** 0.002*** -0.028 -0.001 
 (-1.221) 7.882 (-1.926) 7.882 (2.041) 7.878 (0.727) 7.878 (2.197) 7.836 (3.354) 7.882 (-1.345) 7.878 
Fund Turnover -0.037 -0.006 -0.077 -0.005 -0.613*** -0.009*** -0.490** -0.006** 0.041 0.000 -0.029 -0.001 -0.096 -0.002 
 (-1.412) 2.227 (-1.420) 2.227 (-3.103) 2.228 (-2.307) 2.228 (0.918) 2.376 (-1.300) 2.227 (-1.616) 2.228 
Fund Expenses 0.363** 0.059** 0.448** 0.030** -0.024 -0.000 0.302 0.003 -2.049*** -0.002*** -2.340*** -0.095*** -1.665*** -0.030*** 
 (2.133) 0.539 (2.315) 0.539 (-0.084) 0.539 (0.698) 0.539 (-2.822) 0.532 (-8.163) 0.539 (-5.634) 0.539 
Fund Flows -0.035** -0.006** -0.010 -0.001 -0.072 -0.001 0.036** 0.000** 0.062 0.000 -0.028 -0.001 0.043*** 0.001*** 
 (-2.233) 2.810 (-0.485) 2.810 (-1.248) 2.812 (2.405) 2.812 (1.482) 2.825 (-1.028) 2.810 (3.122) 2.812 
Past Return -0.478 -0.078 -1.146** -0.076** 0.070 0.001 0.443 0.005 -6.443*** -0.007*** 0.423 0.017 0.990** 0.018** 
 (-1.193) 0.173 (-2.391) 0.173 (0.098) 0.173 (0.669) 0.173 (-3.739) 0.170 (1.050) 0.173 (2.120) 0.173 
Observations 4716  4716  4716  4716  4716  4716  4716  
Pseudo R2 0.405  0.436  0.422  0.579  0.475  0.547  0.423  
Baseline predicted probability 0.284  0.147  0.049  0.046  0.030  0.151  0.058  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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6.2 Commercial Relationships, expertise and outsourcing decision effects on fund performance 
We have demonstrated the joint significance of sub-advisor expertise and family-sub-advisor 
business connections on sub-advisor selection. In this section, we analyze the impact on fund 
performance of both aspects of outsourcing decisions. In particular, we compare the time series 
average of risk-adjusted fund performance using the 9-factor model previously described across four 
groups of outsourced funds. First, we classify funds by High or Low Style Expertise (Sub-advisor 
Expertise is in the fifth (high) or first (low) quintile in terms of investment objective). Second, for each 
of these groups, we classify the funds based on their level of commercial relationship for volume 
(number of funds) (Panel A) and length of contracts (Panel B). High (low) levels of volume of 
contracts are in funds with above (below) median ratios of the number of advisor funds managed by 
the same fund sub-advisor compared to the total advisor funds. Long (short) contracts are relationships 
between the family and sub-advisor greater (shorter) than 3 years. Third, we compare four portfolios of 
funds. 
To determine the significance of the differences, we perform a Portfolio Analysis (Two-group 
mean-comparison Test). Table 16 Panel A indicates that for both low and high commercial 
relationships, high style expertise funds make the greatest difference. Whereas funds with high sub-
advisor expertise are characterized by an alpha 48 bps higher per year for either high or low levels of 
commercial relationships, funds with strong commercial relationships barely gain 2.4 bps for low 
levels of expertise and 28 bps for high levels of expertise. In Panel B, we observe the same general 
pattern in terms of the length of the contract. Overall, these results suggest that choosing a sub-advisor 
based on expertise has a greater impact on fund performance than a selection based on commercial 
relations (in terms of both volume and length of the agreement). Therefore, we once again demonstrate 
the importance of core competency in management decisions. 53 
 
 
                                                          
53
 The variable used to measure commercial relationships might capture the current family-sub-advisor relationship and not 
past connections. Thus, in the last part of the empirical analysis, we construct a proxy for a past commercial relationship. 
This measure contains the average number of funds managed by the same sub-advisor among the total number of funds the 
family has outsourced over the last two years. The main results are consistent. The results of this last section are not 
reported to save space but are available upon request. 
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TABLE 16: SUBADVISOR EXPERTISE, COMMERCIAL REALTIONS AND FUND 
PERFORMANCE  
 
Table 16 presents the monthly average of risk-adjusted fund performance using the 4-factors Carhart model augmented by 
5 factors (Short-Term, Intermediate and Long-Term Government Bonds Indexes, and High Yield and Investment Grade 
Corporate Bonds) for all U.S mutual funds that were outsourced from 1996 to 2011. High or Low Objective Expertise 
equals 1 if Subadvisor Expertise is in the fifth (high) or first (low) quintile in terms of Investment Objective (ratio of 
Subadvisor TNA on fund’s investment objective over all Subadvisor TNA). Panel A summarizes average fund performance 
noting the Objective Expertise of the subadvisor and the volume of the Commercial Relation between the principal advisor 
and fund subadvisor (High and Low Commercial Relation equals 1 if the ratio of the number of advisor funds managed by 
the same fund subadvisor and total advisor funds is above or below the median, respectively). Panel B summarizes the 
average fund performance, noting the Objective Expertise of the subadvisor and the length of the Commercial Relation 
between the principal advisor and fund subadvisor (Long and Short Commercial Relation is equal is 1 if there is a relation 
between advisor and subadvisor greater or shorter than 3 years, respectively). To determine the significance of the 
differences, we perform a t-test across groups. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
level. 
 
Panel A: Commercial Relations in terms of volume of agreements 
Average Alpha 9-F 
Low Objective Expertise 
(obs) 
High Objective Expertise 
(obs) 
Difference 
T-test 
Low Commercial Relation 
(obs) 
-.01574 
(26238) 
.02537 
(20472) .04111 *** 
High Commercial Relation 
(obs) 
.00753 
(38484) 
.04789 
(11619) .04035 *** 
Difference  t-test .00189 *** .02251 ***  
 
 
Panel B: Commercial Relations in terms of the length of the agreements 
 
Average Alpha 9-F 
Low Objective Expertise 
(obs) 
High Objective Expertise 
(obs) 
Difference 
T-test 
Short Commercial Relation 
(obs) 
-.00442 
(18227) 
.02200 
(7207) 
.02642 *** 
Long Commercial Relation 
(obs) 
-.00075 
(47317) 
.03680 
(24912) 
.03756 *** 
Difference t-test .00366 .01480**  
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7. Conclusions 
Despite the rapid growth of outsourcing in the mutual fund industry, there has been 
relatively little research on how outsourcing portfolio management decisions are made in 
this industry. Studies of this new business model for mutual funds have focused on the 
performance of outsourced funds compared to the performance of funds managed in-house, 
demonstrating that externally managed funds significantly underperform internally 
managed funds. This negative effect of outsourcing in the mutual fund industry has not 
explained why mutual fund families have used outsourcing so widely over the past decade. 
In this paper, we analyze the role of core competencies in explaining both outsourcing 
decisions and the growth of outsourcing in the mutual fund industry over the last decade. 
 First, we examine whether the advisor’s core competency affects which funds are 
managed externally and whether the sub-advisor is chosen based on their core competency. 
We observe that fund families mainly outsource funds that fall outside their core 
competency. This result is consistent with previous research on mutual funds that noted that 
families wish to provide a wider menu of funds to investors to maximize net inflows. 
Furthermore, sub-advisors are more likely to be assigned to manage the funds styles in 
which they are more experienced. This result is also consistent with prior industrial 
organization research, which claims that to improve results, companies should focus on 
activities that represent their core competency and outsource other activities or tasks to 
companies that specialize in those activities.  
Second, we examine whether mutual fund performance has improved due to the 
outsourcing of portfolio management activities and whether this explains the rapid growth 
of this practice over the last decade. Our hypothesis, based on the industrial organization 
literature, is that outsourcing the portfolio management of funds that fall outside a family’s 
core competency allows the company to focus on its core competency and improve the 
performance of funds managed in-house. In addition, outsourcing the funds outside of its 
core competencies allows the family to achieve a wider (more diversified) portfolio of 
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mutual funds to offer its customers (which, according to recent research on family 
organization, also attracts greater net inflows). 
Advisors who outsource the management of funds that are beyond their core 
competency improve the performance of the funds managed internally compared with 
investment companies that maintain in-house management of such funds. The improved 
performance of funds managed in-house is consistent with the literature on industrial 
organization and helps explain the growth of outsourcing. Another result that helps explain 
the use of outsourcing over the last decade is a special case in which the advisor has no 
experience in a fund style. In this situation, there is no significant difference in fund 
performance between funds managed in-house by a non-specialist advisor and funds 
managed externally. However, if the sub-advisor is highly experienced in managing those 
funds (i.e., the fund is within its core competency), the performance of the outsourced fund 
will exceed that of a fund managed in-house by a non-specialist. This result is consistent 
with prior industrial organization research that claims that by allowing outside specialist 
organizations to concentrate on certain tasks, firms can improve their performance by 
focusing on the things they do best. 
Examining whether commercial relationships among fund families and sub-advisors 
affect outsourcing decisions and fund performance is another important contribution of this 
study. We examine how sub-advisor expertise affects sub-advisor selection conditional on 
how many family funds have been managed by the same sub-advisor and the length of the 
contracts. Our results suggest that either higher volume or longer sub-advisory contracts 
reduce the effect of firm expertise when selecting a sub-advisor. Thus, we argue that when 
fund families select a sub-advisor to manage their funds, they can rely not only on core 
competencies but also on past and current commercial relationships to avoid the risks 
associated with a new business relationship. Contracting with a sub-advisor based on its 
core competency has a greater impact on performance than decisions based on the volume 
or length of the sub-advisory agreement between a fund family and sub-advisor. In 
addition, our findings suggest that the optimal way of making such decisions is to consider 
both expertise and business relationships. 
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APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF ASSET CLASSES AND INVESTMENT OJECTIVES 
Under the Investment Act of 1940, an investment company must register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). All U.S. mutual fund and other regulated investment management companies are 
required to file Form NSAR (along with other documents) on a semi-annual basis. According to this form, 
funds must be classified into different asset classes and the investment objective. A summary of definitions 
for these categories is provided by the SEC to registrants, which we used to classify the funds (for a detailed 
description, see https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-sar.pdf ) 
 
ASSET CLASS 
 
- Equity: invests in equity securities, options and futures on equity securities, indices of equity 
securities or securities convertible into equity securities. 
- Debt: invests primarily in debt securities, including convertible debt securities, options and futures 
on debt securities or indices of debt securities. 
- Balance: at least 25% of the value of the fund should be invested in debt securities, preferred stock, 
or a combination of both. If convertible senior securities are included in the required 25%, only the 
portion of their value attributable to their fixed income characteristics may be used to calculate the 
25% figure. 
- International: more than 50% of its net assets at the end of the current period must be invested in 
securities located primarily in countries other than the United States. 
 
INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE 
 
Equity Funds 
- Aggressive Capital Appreciation: primarily and regularly seeks short-term appreciation through 
high-risk investment with little or no concern for receipt of income.  
- Capital Appreciation: primarily and regularly invests in an intermediate-term return by investing in 
moderate to high-risk securities with little or no concern for receipt of income.  
- Growth: seeks long-term growth with a moderate degree of risk. Receipt of income may be 
considered to some degree in selecting investments.  
- Growth and Income: primarily and regularly makes low risk investments with the objective of 
capital growth and income production.  
- Income: the receipt of income is the primary reason for selecting portfolio securities.  
- Total Return: portfolio includes a varying mix of equity and debt securities. 
 
Debt Funds 
- Government Short-Term: Short-Term Maturities of U.S. Treasury, U.S. Government Agency and 
State and municipal tax-free funds. 
- Government Long-Term: Intermediate and Long-Term Maturities of U.S. Treasury, U.S. 
Government Agency, State and Municipal tax-free funds. 
- Corporate: Intermediate and Long-Term Maturities of Corporate assets. 
 
For purposes of the NSAR Form, short-term maturities are defined as securities with maturities of 12 months 
or less. Securities with variable or floating interest rates or that are subject to a demand feature should be 
considered short-term if the interest rate adjustment period or demand period is 12 months or less. 
Intermediate and long-term maturities include all other debt securities. 
  
  
 
Chapter 4: Team Players vs All-Stars in Socially 
Responsible Investment Funds 
 
1. Introduction 
US registered investment companies play a major role in the US economy and around 
the world financial markets. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI Fact 
Book, 2014), there are 30 trillions of dollars in mutual funds asset worldwide, with half of 
them ($15 trillions) in the US mutual fund market. In an industry that is becoming more 
and more competitive, with a growing universe of investments and greater complexity of 
assets, a team management structure seems to be more optimal for handling and proceeding 
larger volume of information related to the investment management decisions. Consistent 
with this phenomenon, there has been an outstanding growth of team management in the 
mutual fund industry over the past two decades. For example, by mid 90s, the proportion of 
team managed funds was barely 30% while today this figure went up to nearly 70%. 
Despite the notable switch toward team-based portfolio management, the extant academic 
literature has not found clear performance benefits of teamwork in the fund industry.  
Team management can gain and profit from larger intrinsic knowledge and this should 
be accompanied with portfolios under team structures being outperforming those managed 
by an individual manager. Prior literature has also posits that team management achieves 
diversification of decisions and styles that reduces fund risk enhancing the portfolio 
performance (Barry and Starks (1984); Sah and Stiglitz (1991)). However, most of the 
current research on fund management structure is unable to evidence it. For example, 
Prather and Middleton (2002); Chen et al. (2004); Bliss et al. (2008); Massa et al. (2010); 
Bar et al. (2011) and Adams et al. (2013) find that the performance of individual managed 
funds are as good as (or even better) than the performance of team managed funds. This 
results together with the fact that there are about one third of portfolios that are still 
managed by individual managers, arise the interest of studying what are the advantage of
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 individual portfolio management as well as under which circumstances such organization 
structure is more suited than team management.  
Stein (2002) investigates how well different organizational structures perform and finds 
that while a decentralized approach (individual) perform better when there are task that 
involve processing soft information (information that cannot be contrasted by any other 
agents but the one that obtained it), a centralized approach (team) will be more optimal if 
they are working with hard information (it can be passed along within agents at no cost). In 
the context of portfolio management, soft and hard information can be associated with the 
volume of asset a manager is involved. For example, when a manager has to follow specific 
guidelines and must focus on a concrete sector or set of firms, soft information can be 
feasible and an effective way of collection reliable information.  
In this chapter, I examine whether individual management leads to better performance, 
relative to team management approach, when portfolio managers face a restricted 
investment opportunity set. Socially responsible investment (SRI) funds industry provides 
an ideal empirical setting in this context as these funds implements strict social criteria that 
exclude firms, economic sectors or even entire industries from their portfolios. Unlike 
conventional class of investments, SRI funds apply a set of investment screens to select 
stocks from an investment pool based on social, environmental or ethical (SEE) criteria. 
This implies a shorter universe from which a fund manager allocates their assets and greater 
coordination requirements. One of the advantages of using this specific investment industry 
is that, unlike sector funds, SRI selects the number of screens to apply to its investment 
portfolio. Thus, this allows us to compare not only restricted vs non-restricted portfolios but 
also within different levels of restrictions. Another important benefit is that despite the 
increasing trend of team management approach, there are many portfolios that are still 
managed by individual employees, hence we can evaluate differences between team and 
individual structures in general and also interact them between conventional and SRI funds. 
Coordination costs in reaching an optimal decision under time constraints present in the 
portfolio management industry is one of the disadvantages of using a team approach, which 
can be solved by an individual management structure. This study is more focused on 
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finding the benefit of individual over team management rather than studying the 
disadvantages of team-work previously shown of problems of free-riding and decreasing 
cooperation effectiveness (Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Holmstrom (1982); Laughlin, 
Hatch, Silver, and Boh (2006); Mueller (2012)). Thus, we do not claim that one 
organizational design is generally better than the other but simply that one can be preferred 
over the other depending on the situation.  
Consistent with the Steiner’s theory of process loss (1972), in which individuals in 
larger teams are predicted to perform worse because they experience lower levels of 
coordination, we claim that allocate individuals to work by themselves serves to avoid 
coordination cost in situations where a clear mandates is set. We find that even though there 
is no significant differences between neither SRI and Conventional funds nor Individual 
and Team management structures, the combination of SRI funds managed by a solo-
manager outperform on more than 1% per year. This result is robust to different 
econometrical approaches and performance measures. The intuition here is that team 
managed portfolios are better the more heterogeneous is the investment opportunity set. 
Therefore, it is not a simply coincidence that the increase in team managed funds occurs 
simultaneously with globalization and bullishness of the stock market, as Ramy 
Shaalanstated.54 
We also test several alternative explanations and we reject all of them. For example, we 
show that SRI funds managed by individuals hold riskier portfolios than other funds 
consistent with the diversification of opinion hypothesis of Sharpe (1981) and Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1988). This was empirically tested by Bar et al. (2011) for team vs 
individual in the mutual fund industry. Thus, the higher performance of SRI funds managed 
by individuals might be driven by holding more concentrated portfolios. However, after 
controlling for idiosyncratic risk the results remain unchanged. Another alternative 
explanation in this regard is that SRI funds were created for different interest than the mere 
fact of obtaining returns and hence not being fairly compared to conventional funds. We 
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 Ramy Shaalan is a portfolio analyst at Wiesenberger. 
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take this in to account and examine how different level of investment social screenings 
affect the performance of funds managed individually. We show that funds with higher 
levels of portfolio investment constrains are better run under a solo-management structure.  
We provide evidence that those individual managers in charge of SRI funds seem to 
have a more adequate profile for portfolio management in terms of being graduated for Ivy 
League universities, having a more quantitative background and holding a PhD degree. 
Thus, one might be concerned about a self-selection of top managers deciding about the 
organizational structure and investment social criterion. In order to rule out this hypothesis, 
we control for endogeneity issues and we find again that SRI funds have better performance 
when they are managed by a solo individual.  
Social concerned investors might be aware of this phenomenon; we find that SRI funds 
managed by individual investors receive more flows than other funds. Professionals from 
this industry also have similar view about differences between individual and team 
management. For instance, Stephen Oristaglio, senior managing director at Putman, said 
that team-management make more sense when investing become more complicated with so 
many opportunities, industries, markets and companies. Additionally, Richard Spillane, 
senior vice president at Fidelity, claimed that they are not religious about using team or 
individual management approach. They use one way or the other depending on the 
situation. For example, Fidelity typically use individual approach where there is a single 
mandate since this leads to “crisper information processing and decision-making”.  
Other studies also relate the type of information the portfolio manager is processing 
with the organizational structure of the fund. For instance, Chen et al. (2004) suggest that 
team managed approach, unlike individuals, need to rely more on hard information 
(quantitative measures of firms) so as to convince team-workers to implements their ideas. 
Thus, they examine whether individual managed funds are or not more likely to invest in 
local stocks. They find that managers are significantly more likely to do that they are better 
at selecting this local stocks as they can based their investment decisions more on soft 
information. 
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Our study contributes to different strand of the literature. First, it contributes to the large 
literature on the relation between organizational structure of mutual fund management and 
performance. Second, to the general and broader organizational management literature 
when manager of corporations face different restrictions and firms suffer from coordination 
problems. And finally, we also contribute to the growing literature of social concerned 
investments, in which prior literature are still unsettled about its effectiveness in general 
performance terms. We provide evidence that this type of investment might be efficient 
under certain circumstances.  
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development  
In this research, our motivation is drawn from two strands of the literature: 1) 
Organizational management and 2) Social concern investments.  
2.1 Organizational Management 
Even though we focus on the mutual fund industry for empirical convenience, our 
results are not only important for this industry, but it can also help provide insights into the 
many unanswered questions in the broader team vs individual management literature. For 
example, are individual better than team work? A part of this literature argue that teamwork 
benefits from a larger intrinsic knowledge base of the group and give better result than 
solo-work when their members have specialized and hold complementary skills (e.g., 
Lazear (1988)) and they are becoming crucial work units to the success of the organizations 
(Appelbaum et al. (1999)). However, other part of the literature strongly suggests a 
preference for individual rather than multiple decision-makers because of the difficulty of 
coordinating group effort (e.g., social loafing)55, coordination cost in arriving at optimal 
decisions (e.g., Becker and Murphy (1992)), problems of potential free-riding and decrease 
of cooperation effectiveness (Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Holmstrom (1982); Laughlin, 
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 See Bibb Latané et al., (1979) and Kravitz and Martin (1986). 
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Hatch, Silver, and Boh (2006); Mueller (2012)). Therefore, prior literature on this regard 
seems unsettled with an unclear final statement.  
A more comprehensive research of team versus individual work can be found in Stein 
(2002). This chapter presents when an organizational structure is preferred over the other in 
terms of generating information about investment projects and allocating capital to these 
projects. The author rather than posit just one of the structure as the optimal one, suggests 
that small firms with single-managers perform better when information about projects is 
soft (information that cannot be verified by anyone other than the agents who obtained it) 
while large corporation structures are more attractive when having hard information (it can 
be easily verified by anyone and it is costless to pass it along inside the firm). This opens a 
key issue for studying the organization structure in portfolio management from the 
perspective that not necessary team or individual work is more attractive in general terms 
but it changes depending the circumstances.  
In the portfolio manager industry, Sharpe (1981), Barry and Starks (1984) and Sah and 
Stiglitz (1991) suggest that teamwork should be able to obtain higher performance because 
of better diversification of style that reduces portfolio risk. However, some other research 
observes competition between co-leaders resulting in coordination problems and 
interpersonal conflicts (Hackman (2002)) and delays in decision making (Sah and Stiglitz 
(1988)). Consistent with this, empirical studies find very little evidence of performance 
improvement of team management structures in the mutual fund industry. Some examples 
are Prather and Middleton (2002), Bliss et al. (2008) and Bar et al. (2011) that find that 
individual managed funds do not do worse than team managed funds. Chen et al. (2004) 
observe that teamwork leads to lower performance than individual management because 
teams form a power structure discouraging communication and acquisition of information. 
Massa et al. (2010) also provide evidence of team managed fund underperform relatively to 
individual managed portfolios.  
More recent papers examine which are the main factors that determine the effectives of 
individual and team management. For example, Patel and Sarkissian (2012) shows that 
team managed funds exhibit better performance that individual managed portfolios 
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depending on team size and diversity as well as its geographic location. Dass et al. (2013) 
claims that coordination issue is the main driver of difference in performance between 
individual and team managed funds. Authors find that teamwork leads to lower market 
timing performance than individual management in balance funds because of the 
coordination challenge of this task while teams are better at performing tasks that required 
less coordination such as selecting stocks.  Adams et al. (2013) argue that under certain 
governance structures, collective decision making can be beneficial. They show that team 
managed funds with highly independent boards significantly improve fund performance 
relatively to individually managed funds. And regarding the investment behavior of 
portfolio managers, Patel and Sarkissian (2014) find that team-based funds invest in a 
larger number of securities than individual managed funds. 
 
2.2 Socially Responsible Investment 
Many studies have examined the effectiveness of portfolios that screen their holdings 
on social criteria and those that do not. This literature presents mixed results. For example, 
Hamilton and Statman (1993); Diltz (1995); Guerard (1997); Bauer et al. 2005; Jones et al. 
(2008) or Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) find that SRI funds do not different from conventional 
funds in terms of performance. Luck and Pilotte (1993); DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999); 
Statman (2000); Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Galema et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
funds that screen their holdings perform better than unscreened funds. But other studies, 
such as Teper (1992) or Geczy et al. (2003) have shown that SRI funds perform worse than 
conventional funds.  
SRI funds have been criticized for being unable to adequately diversify. According to 
modern portfolio theory (Markowitz (1952)) investors should build portfolios in such a way 
that the specific risk involved in any individual security is offset by other securities’ 
specific risk. Therefore, portfolios that implements strict social criteria excluding firms, 
industries or sectors will face a diversification challenge and will be expected to experience 
lower risk-adjusted returns. A few studies have been suggesting that SRI funds are likely to 
suffer a financial loss because of this diversification issue (Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (1996); 
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DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999)). On the other hand, some research has argued that the 
better a firm’s social performance, the better it can attract resources (Cochran and Wood, 
1984 and Waddock and Graves (1997)) and that SRI funds dampen downside risk for 
investors during crisis periods (Nofsinger and Varma (2002)). Thus, we will not claim that 
screened portfolios will systematically lead to better performance but only in cases in 
which adequately assigned to an individual manager.  
We draw our first hypothesis from the Steiner’s theory of process loss (1972) in which 
teamwork is predicted to perform worse since groups are more likely to suffer from higher 
cost of coordination and motivation losses. Therefore, SRI funds which follows a more 
restricted mandates and hence it is more difficult to decentralized tasks relatively to 
conventional portfolios, coordination issues is a challenge that can be solved by employing 
individual management structures.  
HYPOTHESIS 1. SRI funds being managed by individuals do indeed improve 
performance relatively to other funds. 
 
SRI portfolios vary greatly in the intensity and type of social investment screens so as 
to allow us to compare not only socially screened with unscreened funds but also within 
different levels of screened funds. The Social Investment Forum lists 12 types of screens 
that SRI funds might be subjected to. While having a high screening intensity implies 
shorter universe of securities from which a portfolio manager can select, low levels of 
intensity leave the funds close to those conventional portfolios. Prior literature considers 
SRI portfolios with moderate levels of screening as “stuck in the middle” funds. Barnett 
and Salomon (2006) argue that these funds cannot either diversify away the specific risk as 
they are still facing some restrictions or exclude enough poor companies since their 
investment opportunity set is not constrained enough. Thus, we consider only high and low 
screening intensity levels since funds with moderate levels of social screenings may be 
neither enough restricted to employ single mandates nor enough close to conventional 
funds in terms of their investment universe of assets. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2. SRI funds managed by individuals facing high levels of social 
screening investments are better managed than those managed by individuals with fewer 
screens.  
According to Bar et al. (2011) team managed funds take less extreme decisions than 
individuals do consistent with the diversification of opinion theory and thus, individual 
managed funds might hold portfolios with higher levels of unsystematic risk. Similary, SRI 
funds that have a smaller investment universe might also face difficulties to adequately 
diversify. Since prior literature has noted a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and 
expected return when investors do not diversify their portfolio (Merton (1987); Fangjian Fu 
(2009)), we want to rule out the possibility that higher risk taking behavior is driving the 
better performance of SRI funds managed by individuals.  
HYPOTHESIS 3. Even though SRI funds managed by individuals are under higher levels 
of specific risk, this behavior is not driving their superior performance. 
 
Massa et al. (2010) find that funds with anonymous portfolio manager receive less 
media mentions and lower inflows than named managers’ funds. On the other hand, SRI 
funds are targeted to investors than care not only about returns but also about non-financial 
features. Benson and Humphrey (2007) compare the determinants of fund flows for SRI 
and conventional funds and suggest that SRI investors might face difficulties in finding 
alternative investments that meet their non-financial goals. Thus, we claim that these 
investors might prefer to allocate their capital into portfolios in which the principal 
managers can be easily identified. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. Investors with social concerns will bet for individual managers in 
which they can trust more rather than in anonymous teams. So these funds will receive 
more flows.  
Many are the research that have considered the possibility that the management 
company decides that a fund has to follow a given investment style and thus allocate a team 
or an individual to run that fund for some other reasons that are taking into account (e.g., 
129                                                                                                   Chapter 4: Team Players vs All-Stars in 
Socially Responsible Investment Funds 
 
  
Bliss et al. (2008) or Bar et al. (2010)) or even that top managers might prefer individual 
management structures (Massa et al. (2010); Han et al. (2012)). 
HYPOTHESIS 5. SRI funds are managed by managers with better investment profile, but 
after controlling for superior managers self-selection, those managing SRI funds in 
individual structures are still better. 
3. Data and preliminary results 
 
3.1.Data Sources  
We examine actively managed U.S. mutual funds during the period 1996-2011. The 
data were obtained from different sources: the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund 
Database, Morningstar, the Socialfunds.com and the USSIF.org (formerly known as the 
Social Investment Forum) websites. Fund returns, total net assets, turnover, expenses and 
other available fund characteristics such as organizational structure were obtained from 
CRSP. SRI funds are identified using the Social Funds and The Forum for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment websites, as well as cross-checked with Morningstar Direct 
database. 
The CRSP database contains information about multiple fund classes issued by a 
particular fund. These classes, typically denoted A, B and C, have the same underlying 
portfolio. The main difference among them is the fee structure. Our observations are made 
at the class level. We group data by observations at the fund level, consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Gaspar et al. (2006) or Nanda et al. (2004)). We aggregate returns, 
weighting each class by total net assets (TNA). We compute the TNA of the fund as the 
sum of all TNA over all classes. Turnover and expenses are aggregated at the fund level by 
weighting each class by its total net assets; to determine fund age, we select the oldest class.  
We classified socially responsible investment funds according to Morningstar for the 
year 2011. This might create a situation with a look-back bias because we are assuming that 
these funds are the only SRI funds of our sample. Thus, using the way-back machine as 
provided at http://archive.org/web/, we are able to obtain different lists of SRI funds 
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reported in different years across the period of 1996-2011. A fund will be considered as 
SRI if it utilizes one or more social or environmental criteria as part of a formal investment 
policy. Furthermore, we exclude any institution that says it takes into account social or 
corporate governance criteria in its investment decisions but lacks a formal policy for doing 
so. We obtain information from the above websites on the social screening activity of SRI 
funds. We are provided with information about the use of screens in sixteen screening 
categories sorted by: Environmental issues: Climate/Clean Technology, Pollution/Toxics 
and Environment/Others. Social issues: Community Development, Diversity and EEO, 
Human Rights, Labor relations and Sudan. Governance related: Board Issues and Executive 
Pay. Shareholders engagements and Product: Alcohol, Animal welfare, Defense/Weapons, 
Gambling and Tobacco. In total, we are able to identify an average of 141 SRI funds per 
year that ranges from 61 in 1996 to 214 in 2009 and 135 in 2011 along those different 
categories. 
 
3.2.Summary statistics and preliminary results 
Table 1 reports the average of fund (Panel A) and portfolio manager (Panel B) 
characteristics across all U.S equity open-end funds for the period January 1996 to 
December 2011. Fund characteristics are: Size (the natural logarithm of total net assets 
(TNA) under management in millions of dollars); Age (the number of years since 
inception); Expenses (the total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA); Fee 
12b-1 (the annual marketing and distribution fee of the fund); Back and Front loads 
expressed as percentages of new investments; Turnover (the minimum of aggregate 
purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year) and Flow 
(a percentage that represents new inflows into the fund over the previous year). 
Management Company variable are the logarithm of the number of funds in the family, 
excluding the fund itself and Company Size (the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the 
family, excluding the fund itself). Variables at the portfolio manager level are: Ivy League, 
MBA, PHD and CFA that represent the percentage of managers on conventional and SRI 
Funds with that degree. Company background is the number of prior job positions of the 
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manager. Business and Quantitative studies account for the major background of the 
manager, and experience is the number of years since the manager graduated. This table 
also reports the difference between Conventional and SRI funds and the P-value associated 
to that difference. 
The results presented in Table 1 are consistent with SRI funds being younger, having 
less assets, lower expenses, marketing fee and loads. They have also higher levels of 
turnover and flows and belong to larger families with more number of funds than 
conventional funds. On average, portfolio managers in charge of SRI funds managed by a 
solo manager are graduated by an Ivy League, hold a Phd, MBA and Quantitative 
background and have more experience and have been in more companies that those at 
similar conventional funds. On the other hand, managers at conventional funds are more 
likely to hold Business Studies and the CFA degree. 
Table 2 reports the average values of fund performance and the idiosyncratic risk sorted 
by management structures. First column groups funds managed by an individual manager 
and second column that of team managed ones. In order to rule out that results are driven 
by specific characteristics of a given period, we report the difference and statistical 
significance between conventional and SRI funds both for full-sample period and for the 
sub-periods (1996–2004 and 2005–2011).  
Following prior research, we use the four-factor model developed by Carhart (1997) to 
estimate the abnormal returns, where the intercept of this model captures the fund's before-
fee risk-adjusted performance.56 Because we also consider international, balance and fixed 
income funds and to be more conservative, we use an additional performance model: a 9-
Factor model, which includes the four-factor model (Carhart 1997) and the following five 
additional risk factors: Barclays US Treasury Bill 1-3 Months, Barclays US Treasury 1-3 
Years, Barclays US Government Long, U.S. Corporate High-Yield and U.S. Corporate 
AAA. For every month from 1996 to 2011, we regress fund gross excess returns (before 
expenses and subtracting the risk-free rate) on the risk factors over the previous 24 months 
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 The data for the Fama-French and momentum factors were obtained from the Kenneth French website. 
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(which requires a minimum of 20 observations).57 The idiosyncratic risk is the standard 
deviation of a fund’s residuals, when estimating the CAPM model. 
We observe an unclear pattern on the effect a given organizational structure to the fund 
performance and idiosyncratic risk for conventional funds whereas individual management 
structures affect positively to SRI funds. For example for conventional funds, we find weak 
evidence (only Carhart’s alpha) of superior performance for team-management in the entire 
sample and weak superior performance (only alpha from 9 factor) for individual-
management in the first sample and only strong evidence in the second sample. Differences 
in idiosyncratic risk also changes depending on the sample period. On the other hand, we 
observe a clear pattern in SRI funds, where independently of the sample period and the 
measure used, individual management structures lead to higher performance. These 
portfolios managed by individuals are also more concentrated in terms of specific risk. 
These results might be driven by the fact that we do not observe the level of portfolio 
constrained of conventional funds. It might be cases in which a fund prospectus restricts the 
investments to a single sector or to a given investment objective. Thus, under some 
circumstances individual management can be preferred over team-managed structures. 
However, SRI funds are clearly more restricted portfolios in which individual management 
is more beneficial in terms of fund performance as this structures benefit from avoiding 
coordination costs.  
                                                          
57
 The main results remain unchanged when using a wider window of 36 months instead of 24 to estimate 
fund performance. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Fund and Manager Characteristics 
 
This table presents the average of fund (Panel A) and portfolio manager (Panel B) characteristics across all 
U.S equity open-end funds for the period January 1996 to December 2011. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Age is the number of years since inception.  
Expenses are total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Fee 12b-1 is the annual marketing and 
distribution fee of the fund. Back and Front loads are expressed as percentages of new investments. Turnover 
is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar 
year. Flow is a percentage that represents new inflows into the fund over the previous year. The Company 
Fund variable indicates the logarithm of the number of funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. 
Company Size is the logarithm of TNA for all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself. Ivy League, 
MBA, PHD and CFA represent the percentage of managers on conventional and Sri Funds with that degree. 
Company background is the number of prior job positions of the manager. Business and Quantitative studies 
account for the major background of the manager, and experience is the number of years since the manager 
graduated. The last two columns display the difference between Conventional and SRI funds and the P-value 
associated to that difference. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conventional SRI Difference P-value 
 
Panel A  
General Variables 
Size (log TNA) 4.2739 4.3419 -0.0679 0.00 
Age 9.7352 9.9642 -0.229 0.00 
Expenses 1.1369 1.2899 -0.153 0.00 
Fee 12b-1 0.2092 0.2394 -0.0302 0.00 
Back load 0.317 0.4751 -0.1581 0.00 
Front load 1.2389 1.2649 -0.026 0.02 
Turnover 1.014 0.8889 0.1251 0.00 
Flows 0.4296 0.3114 0.1182 0.00 
Monthly Returns 0.5064 0.5909 -0.0845 0.00 
Company Funds 45.7824 26.3016 19.4808 0.00 
Company Size 8.9514 8.0284 0.9229 0.00 
 
Panel B 
 Portfolio Manager level 
Ivy league 0.208 0.2639 -0.056 0.00 
MBA 0.4534 0.4736 -0.0203 0.00 
PHD 0.0287 0.0571 -0.0285 0.00 
CFA 0.0835 0.0493 0.0342 0.00 
Company Background 2.4098 2.4788 -0.069 0.00 
Business Studies 0.8206 0.7521 0.0685 0.00 
Quantitative Studies 0.0404 0.0995 -0.0591 0.00 
Experience 19.4078 23.3621 -3.9543 0.00 
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Table 2  
Individual vs Team managed funds 
 
This table presents the average values of fund performance (alpha from using the Carhart and 9F models) and 
the idiosyncratic risk (standard deviation of the residual from CAPM model) sorted by management 
structures. First column represents those funds managed by an individual manager and second column that of 
team managed ones. We also report the difference and statistical significance by groups of Conventional and 
Socially Responsible Investment funds based on the full-sample period as well as sub-periods (1996–2004 
and 2005–2011).  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Individual-Managed Team-Managed Difference 
Panel A: Entire sample 1996-2011 Conventional Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.0491 0.0647 -0.0155***  
Alpha 9F 0.0227 0.0219 0.0009  
Idiosyncratic Risk  0.0170 0.0169 0.0001*  
Average of funds per year 1846 2427   
 SRI Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.1056 0.0794 0.0262***  
Alpha 9F 0.1095 0.0425 0.0670***  
Idiosyncratic Risk  0.0237 0.0183 0.0054***  
Average of funds per year 62 79   
Panel B: 1st Period 1996-2004 Conventional Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.0208 0.0183 0.0025  
Alpha 9F -0.0137 -0.0319 0.0183***  
Idiosyncratic Risk  18.338 20.848 -0.2510***  
 SRI Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.1057 0.0853 0.0204**  
Alpha 9F 0.1143 0.0578 0.0565***  
Idiosyncratic Risk  28.845 21.482 0.7363***  
Panel C: 2ND Period 2005-2011 Conventional Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.1233 0.1038 0.0196***  
Alpha 9F 0.1012 0.0645 0.0367***  
Idiosyncratic Risk  15.557 14.322 0.1234***  
 SRI Funds 
Alpha Carhart 0.1357 0.0779 0.0578***  
Alpha 9F 0.1366 0.0354 0.1013***  
Idiosyncratic Risk  18.211 16.763 0.1449***  
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In Table 3, we present some preliminary results about difference on fund performance 
based on management structures (Team vs Individual) and investment policy (SRI vs 
Conventional), considering different levels of idiosyncratic risk (RSD is the standard 
deviation of a fund’s residuals, when estimating the CAPM model) and investment 
screenings. Panel A shows that SRI funds generally outperform Conventional funds. The 
greatest difference comes from funds managed individually and with high levels of 
idiosyncratic risks. In Panel B, we observe that individual managed funds outperform the 
team managed peer, especially in SRI funds with high levels of idiosyncratic risk. In Panel 
C and D, we also show the importance of the screening investment criterion of SRI funds. 
Under high levels of screening investment restrictions, funds managed by an individual 
manager outperform their team-managed peers.  Overall, this table suggests that SRI funds 
are better managed when they are under a single mandates, especially on funds with high 
levels idiosyncratic risks and a more restricted opportunity set of investment. 
 
 
Table 3 
 SRI Screens and Individual managed funds  
 
This table presents the fund performance differences between group of funds sorted as follows on each panel: 
Panel A compares SRI versus Conventional funds for Individual and Team managed structures by high and 
low levels of (RSD) idiosyncratic risk (forth and first quartiles of the standard deviation of the residuals from 
estimating the CAPM model, respectively). Panel B compares the performance of individual and team-
managed of SRI and Conventional funds for High and Low levels of idiosyncratic risk. Panel C displays the 
performance difference between difference levels of screening investments for individual and team managed 
structures. Screening levels are grouped according to the proportion of screening criterions into the forth 
quartile (high) or first quartile (low). Screening proportion is the ratio between the number of social 
investment screening of the fund and the total of screening available. Panel D difference in performance 
between Individual and Team structures of High and Low levels of screening social investments.  
 
 
 
 High RSD Low RSD 
 Panel A 
Difference Fund Performance Individual Team Individual Team 
SRI vs Conventional 0.1628*** 0.0603*** 0.0375*** 0.0021 
 Panel B 
Difference Fund Performance SRI Conventional SRI Conventional 
Individual Vs Team 0.1184*** 0.0159*** 0.0378*** 0.0024* 
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4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
Our empirical strategy utilizes cross-sectional variation to see how fund performance 
varies with management structure and investment constrains. There are few major worries 
that arise, however, when using cross-sectional variation. The first is that funds of different 
organizational structure may be in different styles. For instance, individual managed funds 
might be more likely than team-managed funds to pursue small stock, value stock, and 
price momentum strategies, which have been documented to generate abnormal returns. 
While it is not clear that one necessarily wants to adjust for such heterogeneity, it would be 
more interesting if we found that organizational structure in SRI funds influences 
performance even after accounting for variations in fund styles. The second worry is that 
organization structure might be correlated with other fund characteristics such as fund age 
or turnover, and it may be these characteristics that are driving performance. 
For instance, individual-managed funds may be measuring whether a fund is relatively 
small and thus does not need from a team to be managed and if it turns out that small funds 
happen to perform better, this might be leading to spurious results. Therefore, fund 
performance on whether the funds are classified as SRI or Conventional, organizational 
structures and fund and family characteristics as well as including time and fund style 
dummies.  
In this section, we first test how fund type and organizational structure affect fund 
performance separately and then we examine what is the effect of their combination. 
4.1.Separated tests for Socially Responsible Investment and Organizational Structures.  
Panel C 
Difference Fund Performance Individual Team 
High vs  No-High Screening 0.1352***     -0.0312 
Low  vs  No-Low  Screening     -0.0044 -0.0450** 
High vs  Low  Screening 0.1108***       0.0060 
Panel D 
Difference Fund Performance High  Screening Low  Screening 
Individual  Vs Team 0.1603*** 0.0555** 
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First, to test for SRI fund efficiency, we estimate differences in performance due to 
fund type (SRI vs Conventional) from the following pooled OLS regression at monthly 
frequency:  
                                               [1] 
where             is the risk-adjusted return of fund j in month t,    is the intercept, 
     is a dummy variable indicating whether fund j is a socially responsible investment 
fund, and        is a set of control variables previously described referring to the prior year. 
The subscript j corresponds to all U.S. open-end funds in our sample.  
Table 4 - Panel B presents the results of equation [1] in each the dependent variable 
fund performance is either the alpha from Carhart’s 4 factor model and a 9-Factor model 
previously defined. Time and Investment Style dummies are also included in the last two 
columns. Standard errors are clustered at fund level. We find weak evidence of SRI funds 
outperforming Conventional portfolios. This result seems to be driven by specific 
investment objectives or time periods. When controlling for both factors, the performance 
of SRI funds turn to be indifferent from that of Conventional funds.  
Secondly, we estimate differences in performance between funds managed under 
individual portfolio manager structures and team management ones. To do that, we estimate 
the following pooled OLS regression at monthly frequency:  
                                                      [2] 
Where the only difference with the equation [1] is the main variable of interest 
           , that is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by a single 
individual portfolio manager and 0 if the fund is under a team-management structure.  
Table 4 - Panel B presents the estimated results of equation [2]. While including only 
fund style dummies team-management appears to be more effective than individual 
management in terms of performance as measured with the Carhart’s model, when 
considering time dummies as well, individual managed portfolios outperform those 
managed by a team. 
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Table 4: Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Performance (I) 
This table presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. In Panel A, we compare the performance 
between SRI and Conventional funds and in Panel B we examine performance differences between individual and team management structures. The sample 
contains the U.S. open-end mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent 
variable is fund performance, which is measured by alpha, as given by Carhart’s four-factor (Alpha Carhart) model and including five additional factors (Alpha 
9F). SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social Responsible Investment and 0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
fund is managed by an individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of 
dollars. Age is the number of years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum 
of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Flows is a percentage that represents new inflows into a fund over 
the previous year. Company Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in a fund family. Company Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund 
family, excluding the fund itself. Control variables are lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported; and the constant 
term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Panel A: SRI vs Conventional Funds Panel B: Individual vs Team Managed Funds 
 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
Alpha 
Carhart 
Alpha 
9F 
SRI 0.0313* 0.0429* 0.0423** 0.0322 0.0267 0.0228       
 (1.80) (1.72) (2.49) (1.29) (1.57) (0.90)       
Individual       -0.0028 0.0047 -0.0133** 0.0101 0.0296*** 0.0344*** 
       (-0.45) (0.63) (-2.05) (1.28) (4.59) (4.43) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0082*** 0.0138*** 0.0121*** 0.0120*** 0.0173*** 0.0142*** 0.0085*** 0.0142*** 0.0126*** 0.0123*** 0.0176*** 0.0145*** 
 (4.60) (6.45) (6.74) (5.56) (9.87) (6.67) (4.76) (6.63) (7.01) (5.68) (10.05) (6.81) 
Age 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0016*** -0.0012** 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0017*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.30) (-0.84) (-0.58) (-0.63) (-3.73) (-2.34) (0.36) (-0.80) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-3.92) (-2.60) 
Expenses -0.0050 0.0550*** 0.0246*** 0.0396*** 0.0327*** 0.0436*** -0.0048 0.0555*** 0.0256*** 0.0400*** 0.0329*** 0.0433*** 
 (-0.60) (6.10) (2.83) (4.31) (3.91) (4.85) (-0.57) (6.14) (2.94) (4.34) (3.93) (4.81) 
Turnover 0.0039** 0.0017 0.0037** 0.0007 0.0012 0.0006 0.0039** 0.0018 0.0036* 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 
 (2.02) (0.78) (1.96) (0.33) (0.66) (0.26) (2.01) (0.81) (1.92) (0.36) (0.75) (0.33) 
Flows 0.0034* 0.0074*** 0.0033 0.0077*** 0.0063*** 0.0073*** 0.0040* 0.0076*** 0.0038* 0.0079*** 0.0074*** 0.0078*** 
 (1.67) (3.61) (1.62) (3.73) (3.17) (3.75) (1.77) (3.32) (1.73) (3.44) (3.37) (3.61) 
Company Funds 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
 (4.82) (5.70) (5.74) (5.31) (4.29) (5.33) (4.91) (5.68) (6.05) (5.18) (3.55) (4.69) 
Company Size -0.0031 -0.0049* -0.0048** -0.0033 -0.0069*** -0.0069** -0.0037* -0.0053** -0.0059*** -0.0033 -0.0063*** -0.0060** 
 (-1.42) (-1.83) (-2.17) (-1.21) (-3.14) (-2.56) (-1.67) (-1.97) (-2.64) (-1.23) (-2.88) (-2.23) 
Style dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 476439 476439 476439 476439 476439 476439 472207 472207 472207 472207 472207 472207 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.041 0.029 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.041 0.030 
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4.2.Join test for Socially Responsible Investment and Organizational Structures.  
Prior results, give us a first flavor of how different fund type and organizational 
structures can affect the performance of these portfolios. Since we claim that a type or a 
structure might not be generally preferred over the other but only under certain 
circumstances, we are not interest on how this features work separately but jointly. That is 
to say, how the interaction of these variables affect the fund efficiency. In other word, we 
want to test whether SRI portfolios will be more efficiently managed from the performance 
point of view, when they are under an individual management structure instead of under a 
team one. Then, to test our second hypothesis we have to estimate the following pooled 
OLS regression at monthly frequency:  
                                                         
                                [3] 
In Table 5, we show the estimates of equation [3] for all the U.S. open-end mutual 
funds from 1996 to 2011. Socially Responsible Investment Funds do not seems to differ 
from conventional funds in performance and similarly with individual managed portfolios 
that only better than team-managed when considering style and time dummies.    is 
positive and statistically significant across all the different specifications, showing that SRI 
funds are better managed when they have an individual structure of management. 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, individually managed funds outperform the SRI funds 
managed by team between 78.48 and 105.96 bps per year.   
To be more conservative, in Table 6 we replicate the estimation of equation [3] but 
applying Fama-MacBeth (1973) and family fixed effect approach. Family fixed effects, 
allow us to compare specifically differences in performance of SRI funds between 
individual and team-managed one that belongs to the same family. We observe that SRI 
fund do not differ in terms of performance from the Conventional funds in general, but 
those SRI funds that are managed individually have between 47.4 and 116.76 bps per year 
more than other SRI funds. These results confirm our first hypothesis that SRI funds being 
managed by individuals do indeed improve performance relatively to other funds 
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Table 5  
Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Performance (II) 
 
This table presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are 
calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance, 
which is measured by alpha, as given by Carhart’s four-factor (Alpha Carhart) model and including five 
additional factors (Alpha 9F). SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social Responsible 
Investment and 0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by an 
individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also included to capture the 
combination effect on performance. Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) under management 
in millions of dollars. Age is the number of years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are total annual 
expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of 
securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Flows is a percentage that represents new inflows 
into a fund over the previous year. Company Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund family, 
excluding the fund itself. Control variables are lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are 
included but not reported; and the constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F 
Individual * SRI 0.0654** 0.0753* 0.0669** 0.0742* 0.0784*** 0.0883** 
 (2.26) (1.81) (2.34) (1.80) (2.70) (2.14) 
Individual -0.0064 0.0051 -0.0172*** 0.0107 0.0250*** 0.0328*** 
 (-1.02) (0.66) (-2.68) (1.34) (3.91) (4.21) 
SRI 0.0019 0.0102 0.0130 -0.0006 -0.0098 -0.0187 
 (0.10) (0.47) (0.68) (-0.03) (-0.51) (-0.85) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0084*** 0.0140*** 0.0124*** 0.0121*** 0.0176*** 0.0145*** 
 (4.66) (6.48) (6.90) (5.58) (9.99) (6.75) 
Age 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0016*** -0.0013*** 
 (0.36) (-0.82) (-0.49) (-0.64) (-3.89) (-2.60) 
Expenses -0.0055 0.0550*** 0.0251*** 0.0396*** 0.0325*** 0.0432*** 
 (-0.65) (6.08) (2.88) (4.31) (3.88) (4.79) 
Turnover 0.0039** 0.0018 0.0036* 0.0009 0.0014 0.0008 
 (2.02) (0.84) (1.93) (0.40) (0.78) (0.37) 
Flows 0.0040* 0.0076*** 0.0038* 0.0078*** 0.0074*** 0.0078*** 
 (1.77) (3.31) (1.74) (3.43) (3.36) (3.60) 
Company Funds 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
 (5.02) (5.71) (6.18) (5.18) (3.68) (4.72) 
Company Size -0.0037* -0.0051* -0.0059*** -0.0032 -0.0063*** -0.0060** 
 (-1.67) (-1.88) (-2.64) (-1.16) (-2.90) (-2.20) 
Style dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 471886 471886 471886 471886 471886 471886 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.041 0.030 
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Table 6  
Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Performance 
(Robustness Checks) 
 
This table presents results for monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) and family fixed effect regressions estimates of 
risk-adjusted returns on fund characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end mutual funds from 1996 
to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent 
variable is fund performance, which is measured by alpha, as given by Carhart’s four-factor (Alpha Carhart) 
model and including five additional factors (Alpha 9F). SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a 
Social Responsible Investment and 0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is 
managed by an individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also included 
to caputure the combination effect on performance. Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) 
under management in millions of dollars. Age is the number of years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are 
total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases 
and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Flows is a percentage that represents 
new inflows into a fund over the previous year. Company Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of 
funds in a fund family. Company Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund family, excluding the 
fund itself. Control variables are lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not 
reported; and the constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three). * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 Fama McBeth Family Fixed Effect 
 Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F 
Individual * SRI 0.0395** 0.0575* 0.0772** 0.0973* 
 (2.20) (1.95) (2.24) (1.74) 
Individual 0.0234*** 0.0223*** 0.0288*** 0.0347*** 
 (5.08) (4.24) (3.24) (3.43) 
SRI 0.0272** 0.0219 0.0144 0.0461 
 (2.26) (1.53) (0.53) (1.19) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0114*** 0.0094*** 0.0140*** 0.0100*** 
 (6.68) (3.61) (5.87) (3.72) 
Age -0.0010* -0.0015*** -0.0011*** -0.0005 
 (-1.83) (-3.78) (-2.62) (-0.91) 
Expenses 0.0131 0.0392*** 0.0507*** 0.0566*** 
 (0.85) (3.48) (3.86) (3.82) 
Turnover 0.0083** 0.0131** 0.0027 0.0005 
 (1.99) (2.40) (0.72) (0.18) 
Flows 0.0982*** 0.0960*** 0.0059 0.0060* 
 (7.96) (5.10) (1.59) (1.96) 
Company Funds 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0006 0.0004 
 (4.52) (5.07) (1.26) (1.07) 
Company Size -0.0051 -0.0051* -0.0077 -0.0107 
 (-1.45) (-1.92) (-0.98) (-1.32) 
Style dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes Yes 
Observations 471886 471886 471886 471886 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.071 0.101 0.088 
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4.3.SRI Screens and the performance of Individual managed funds.  
Since no all the Socially Responsible Investment funds are managed under the same 
investment restrictions, in this section we estimate the following equation for all the U.S 
SRI funds that are managed by an individual portfolio manager: 
                                                                                 [4] 
Where                  measures the high and low levels of the ratio between the 
number of social investment screening of the fund j and the total of screening available. 
High Screening will be a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund screening proportion is 
within the fourth quartile of fund style and date and Low Screening is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the fund screening proportion is within the first quartile of fund style and 
date. Table 7 presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of the equation 
[4]. While SRI funds managed by an individual manager under a low level of investment 
restriction do not differ in performance from other similar funds, those managed with high 
levels of investment screenings outperform between 216.7 and 229.2 bps per year. This 
result is consistent with our second hypothesis that SRI funds managed by individuals 
facing high levels of social screening investments are better managed than those SRI funds 
managed by individuals with more relaxed screening criterion. 
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Table 7  
SRI Screens and the performance of Individual managed funds  
 
This table presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end SRI mutual funds managed by individual portfolio 
managers from 1996 to 2011. Fund returns are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). 
The dependent variable is fund performance, which is measured by alpha, as given by Carhart’s four-factor 
plus five additional factors. High Screening is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund screening proportion 
is within the fourth quartile of fund style and date. Low Screening is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
fund screening proportion is within the first quartile of fund style and date. Screening proportion is the ratio 
between the number of social investment screening of the fund and the total of screening available. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Age is the number of 
years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. 
Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the 
calendar year. Flows is a percentage that represents new inflows into a fund over the previous year. Company 
Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in a fund family. Company Size is the logarithm of 
TNA of all funds in a fund family, excluding the fund itself. Control variables are lagged 12 months. Time 
and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported; and the constant term has been omitted. 
Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Fund Performance of Individual SRI Funds 
High Screening 0.1806**  0.1825*  0.1910**  
 (2.20)  (1.94)  (2.19)  
Low Screening  0.1138  0.0767  0.0851 
  (1.18)  (0.72)  (0.82) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0056 0.0001 0.0097 0.0080 0.0038 0.0027 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.43) (0.36) (0.18) (0.13) 
Age -0.0028 0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0027 0.0011 
 (-0.63) (0.19) (-0.87) (-0.03) (-0.69) (0.22) 
Expenses -0.0087 -0.0070 0.0586 0.0646 0.0821 0.0815 
 (-0.16) (-0.13) (0.87) (0.95) (0.98) (0.96) 
Turnover 0.0161* 0.0172** 0.0181* 0.0169* 0.0248*** 0.0226*** 
 (1.96) (2.34) (1.91) (1.77) (3.32) (2.92) 
Flows 0.0076 0.0050 0.0074 0.0057 0.0060 0.0047 
 (1.01) (0.63) (0.98) (0.71) (0.84) (0.61) 
Company Funds 0.0034 0.0007 0.0033 0.0014 0.0021 0.0001 
 (1.29) (0.30) (1.23) (0.55) (0.80) (0.04) 
Company Size -0.0162 -0.0035 -0.0107 -0.0028 -0.0026 0.0068 
 (-0.47) (-0.11) (-0.30) (-0.08) (-0.07) (0.19) 
Style dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2958 2958 2958 2958 2958 2958 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.007 0.029 0.022 0.086 0.079 
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4.4.Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Idiosyncratic Risk.  
Portfolios managed by an individual manager are more likely to be more concentrated 
as they do not benefit from the diversification of opinions of team decisions. Additionally, 
SRI funds are meant to follow an investment policy that implies building a more restricted 
portfolio. Taking altogether, one might argue that the greater performance of SRI funds 
managed under a single mandate comes from holding riskier portfolios (higher 
idiosyncratic risk) based on Merton’s Theory for undiversified portfolios (1987). To rule 
out this alternative interpretation, we replicate the estimation of equation [3] for two 
different subsamples: portfolios with high and low levels of idiosyncratic risk. 
In Table 8 we effectively confirm that while funds managed by an individual manager 
hold risky portfolios in general, if the portfolio is under SRI policy the fund is even riskier. 
However Table 9 shows that, independently of whether the funds is within the highest 
quartile of idiosyncratic risk (RSD is the standard deviation of a fund’s residuals, when 
estimating the CAPM model)  in Panel A and within the lowest one in Panel B, SRI funds 
managed by solo portfolio manager, outperform between 62.88 and 169.3 bps per year. 
This is consistent with what we claim in hypothesis 3 and thus, we confirm that even 
though SRI funds managed by individuals are under higher levels of specific risk, this 
behavior is not driving their superior performance. 
 
4.5.Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Fund Flows.  
In this section we try to examine how investors react to these different investment 
policies and managerial structures and whether they are sophisticated enough to learn about 
higher performance on SRI funds managed by individuals. To test for that we estimate the 
following equation: 
                                                           
                                                                                                                              [5] 
Where the dependent variable              represents new inflows into the fund j in time 
t. SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social Responsible Investment and 
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0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by an 
individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also 
included to capture the combination effect on performance.         is a set of control 
variables described in prior sections and are all lagged 12 months. Time and Investment 
Style dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-
statistics are reported in parentheses (adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West 
(1987) lags of order three).  
Table 10 reports the estimates of equation [5] for monthly Pooled OLS, Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) and family fixed effect regressions. Consistent with our forth hypothesis, this Table 
shows that flows on SRI funds managed by individuals are greater than other funds across 
the three different approaches. Thus, Social concern investors will bet for individual 
managers in which they can trust more rather than in anonymous teams. So these funds will 
receive more flows.   
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Table 8  
Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
This table presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of idiosyncratic risk on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end mutual funds from 1996 to 2011. The dependent 
variable is the specific or idiosyncratic risk, which is measured by the standard deviation of the residual 
obtained when estimating the CAPM model. SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social 
Responsible Investment and 0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed 
by an individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also included to 
capture the combination effect on the dependent variable. Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets 
(TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Age is the number of years since the fund’s inception. 
Expenses are total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate 
purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Flows is a percentage that 
represents new inflows into a fund over the previous year. Company Funds is the natural logarithm of the 
number of funds in a fund family. Company Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund family, 
excluding the fund itself. Control variables are lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are 
included but not reported; and the constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Fund Idiosyncratic Risk 
Individual * SRI 0.3817** 0.3556** 0.3154** 
 (2.30) (2.25) (2.11) 
Individual 0.0930*** 0.1941*** 0.1044*** 
 (3.56) (7.89) (4.29) 
SRI -0.0368 -0.1239 -0.0751 
 (-0.31) (-1.04) (-0.65) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0892*** 0.0459*** 0.0420*** 
 (11.46) (6.45) (6.03) 
Age -0.0136*** -0.0087*** -0.0036** 
 (-7.82) (-5.63) (-2.22) 
Expenses 1.0485*** 0.6614*** 0.6676*** 
 (32.14) (22.27) (23.01) 
Turnover 0.0661*** 0.0621*** 0.0571*** 
 (7.43) (7.57) (7.14) 
Flows 0.0066 0.0081 0.0067 
 (1.24) (1.64) (1.43) 
Company Funds 0.0021*** 0.0008 0.0013** 
 (3.91) (1.59) (2.55) 
Company Size -0.0242** 0.0007 0.0042 
 (-2.50) (0.07) (0.47) 
Style dummies No Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes 
Observations 471886 471886 471886 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.248 0.342 
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Table 9  
Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
This table presents results for monthly pooled OLS regressions estimates of risk-adjusted returns on fund 
characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end mutual funds from 1996 to 2011 and is distributed in 
two Panels, A for funds within the highest quartile of idiosyncratic risk and B for the lowest one. Fund returns 
are calculated before deducting fees and expenses (gross return). The dependent variable is fund performance, 
which is measured by alpha, as given by Carhart’s four-factor (Alpha Carhart) model and including five 
additional factors (Alpha 9F). SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social Responsible 
Investment and 0 otherwise. Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by an 
individual portfolio manager and 0 otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also included to capture the 
combination effect on performance. Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) under management 
in millions of dollars. Age is the number of years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are total annual 
expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of 
securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Flows is a percentage that represents new inflows 
into a fund over the previous year. Company Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in a fund 
family. Company Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund family, excluding the fund itself. Control 
variables are lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported; and the 
constant term has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Panel A: 
High RSD 
Panel B: 
Low RSD 
 Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F 
Individual * SRI 0.0524* 0.0719** 0.1146* 0.1411* 
 (1.95) (2.29) (1.74) (1.77) 
Individual 0.0096 0.0191** 0.0394** 0.0391* 
 (1.25) (2.05) (2.36) (1.94) 
SRI -0.0115 -0.0206 0.0073 -0.0040 
 (-0.61) (-1.02) (0.13) (-0.07) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0063*** 0.0081*** 0.0327*** 0.0228*** 
 (3.55) (3.60) (6.89) (4.02) 
Age 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0043*** -0.0035* 
 (0.10) (0.57) (-2.72) (-1.80) 
Expenses -0.0070 0.0083 0.0404* 0.0506** 
 (-0.87) (0.94) (1.95) (2.38) 
Turnover 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0026 
 (0.65) (-0.07) (-0.88) (-0.76) 
Flows 0.0005 0.0006 0.0067 0.0068 
 (0.60) (0.57) (1.54) (1.44) 
Company Funds 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0005** 0.0010*** 
 (0.16) (1.75) (2.32) (3.48) 
Company Size -0.0045* -0.0065** 0.0004 -0.0007 
 (-1.76) (-2.05) (0.07) (-0.10) 
Style dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88777 88777 131655 131655 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.075 0.060 0.058 
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Table 10: Socially Responsible Investment, Management Structure and Fund Flows 
 
This table presents results for monthly Pooled OLS, Fama-MacBeth (1973) and family fixed effect 
regressions estimates of fund flows on fund characteristics. The sample contains the U.S. open-end mutual 
funds from 1996 to 2011. The dependent variable is the Fund Flows that represents new inflows into the fund. 
SRI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is a Social Responsible Investment and 0 otherwise. 
Individual is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund is managed by an individual portfolio manager and 0 
otherwise. Iteration term of these variables is also included to capture the combination effect on performance. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) under management in millions of dollars. Age is the 
number of years since the fund’s inception. Expenses are total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end 
TNA. 12b-1 fee is the annual marketing and distribution fee rate, Front and Back loads are the subscription 
and redemption fee of the funds expressed as a percentage of TNA. Past Flows is a percentage that represents 
new inflows into a fund over the previous year. Turnover is the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of 
securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year. Past Performance is a fund’s past year’s risk-
adjusted return. Company Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in a fund family. Company 
Size is the logarithm of TNA of all funds in a fund family, excluding the fund itself. Control variables are 
lagged 12 months. Time and Investment Style dummies are included but not reported; and the constant term 
has been omitted. Standard errors are clustered at fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses (adjusted 
for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three). * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fund Flows 
 Pooled OLS Fama McBeth Family FE 
Individual * SRI 0.1947** 0.0495* 0.1236* 
 (2.18) (1.66) (1.80) 
Individual -0.0419* -0.0834*** -0.0281 
 (-1.69) (-2.65) (-0.73) 
SRI -0.1431** -0.0161 -0.0661 
 (-2.10) (-0.46) (-0.52) 
Size (log TNA) -0.2485*** -0.2092*** -0.2505*** 
 (-17.26) (-3.76) (-7.58) 
Age 0.0093*** 0.0056*** 0.0095*** 
 (6.73) (3.16) (4.19) 
Expenses -0.1762*** -0.1762*** -0.1272* 
 (-4.72) (-3.00) (-1.87) 
12b-1 fee 0.6559*** 0.6114*** 0.5078*** 
 (10.38) (3.10) (3.79) 
Front Load 0.0092 0.1169* -0.0109 
 (0.34) (1.74) (-0.26) 
Back Load -0.0506*** -0.0503*** -0.1115*** 
 (-6.14) (-3.02) (-4.79) 
Turnover 0.0058 0.0229 0.0097 
 (0.75) (1.26) (1.02) 
Past Flows 0.2747*** -0.3441 0.2760*** 
 (6.30) (-1.62) (5.74) 
Past Performance -0.0011*** -0.0006** -0.0028 
 (-3.01) (-1.98) (-1.33) 
Company Funds 0.0870*** 0.0763*** 0.0243 
 (8.33) (3.45) (0.52) 
Company Size 0.0066*** 0.0031* 0.0083*** 
 (4.16) (1.74) (3.80) 
Style dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes No  Yes 
Observations 217395 217395 217395 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.058 0.062 
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4.6.Determinants of individual managed SRI funds.  
In this section, we analyze the fund and manager characteristics of SRI funds managed 
by individual portfolio managers. In order to run this test, we estimate the following 
logistic model: 
             
         
           
 ,                                               [6] 
Where 
                                                                  
               . The dependent variable (      is a dummy variable equals 1 for SRI funds 
managed by individual portfolio managers.                             accounts for 
the following portfolio manager background: MBA, PHD, Business and Quantitative 
studies that are indicators for manager’s degree. Company background indicates the 
number of prior positions of the manager and Experience is the number of years since the 
manager first graduated.                         consists on MKT, SMB, HML and 
WML that are the risk factors from the Carhart’s model and ST Bond, INT Bond, LT Bond, 
HY Bond and IG Bond that are the additional factors of the 9F model presented earlier. The 
remaining variables are previously defined and are included on        . 
Table 11 report the coefficient, t-statistic and marginal effects from estimating the 
equation [6]. Portfolio managers in charge of SRI funds are more likely to be graduated 
from a top university, hold a PhD and have a quantitative background. These portfolios 
have a greater market loading and hold less long term bonds.  
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Table 11  
Determinants of individual managed SRI funds 
 
This table presents the monthly logistic regressions of SRI funds managed by individual portfolio managers 
on managers and fund characteristics. The sample contains all U.S. equity and fixed income mutual funds 
managed by a single portfolio manager from 1996 to 2011. MBA, PHD, Business and Quantitative studies are 
indicators for manager’s degree. Company background indicates the number of prior positions of the 
manager. Experience is the number of years since the manager first graduated. MKT, SMB, HML and WML 
are the risk factors from the Carhart’s model. ST Bond, INT Bond, LT Bond, HY Bond and IG Bond are the 
additional factors of the 9F model presented earlier. The remaining variables are previously defined. Time and 
investment-style dummies are included but not reported; t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the 
constant term has been omitted. The unconditional probability is reported and described as the baseline 
predicted probability. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Equity Loadings Debt Loadings 
 Coef/t Mfx Std Coef/t Mfx Std 
Ivy league 0.942** 0.016** 0.417 0.966** 0.016** 0.417 
 (1.980)   (2.033)   
MBA -0.094 -0.002 0.495 -0.090 -0.002 0.495 
 (-0.196)   (-0.188)   
PHD 1.752*** 0.030*** 0.164 1.840*** 0.031*** 0.164 
 (2.737)   (2.942)   
Company Background -0.102 -0.002 1.313 -0.105 -0.002 1.313 
 (-0.572)   (-0.580)   
Business Studies 0.682 0.012 0.399 0.689 0.012 0.399 
 (1.250)   (1.286)   
Quantitative Studies 1.329* 0.022* 0.169 1.379* 0.023* 0.169 
 (1.688)   (1.807)   
Experience -0.005 -0.000 8.660 -0.003 -0.000 8.660 
 (-0.255)   (-0.177)   
MKT 0.779* 0.013* 0.518    
 (1.944)      
SMB -0.346 -0.006 0.291    
 (-0.714)      
HML 0.057 0.001 0.371    
 (0.169)      
WML -0.424 -0.007 0.216    
 (-0.817)      
ST Bond    -0.001 -0.000 42.657 
    (-0.395)   
INT Bond    0.005 0.000 7.515 
    (0.249)   
LT Bond    -0.158** -0.003** 1.690 
    (-2.354)   
HY Bond    0.197 0.003 0.983 
    (1.407)   
IG Bond    0.011 0.000 5.414 
    (0.538)   
      (Continued) 
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TABLE 11 (cont’d) 
 
Size (log TNA) 0.205** 0.003** 2.025 0.232** 0.004** 2.025 
 (2.055)   (2.238)   
Age 0.016 0.000 8.572 0.014 0.000 8.572 
 (1.088)   (0.922)   
Expenses 0.468 0.008 0.597 0.581 0.010 0.597 
 (1.132)   (1.415)   
12b-1 fee 0.659 0.011 0.316 0.642 0.011 0.316 
 (1.042)   (1.024)   
Front Load -0.154 -0.003 0.505 -0.132 -0.002 0.505 
 (-0.471)   (-0.417)   
Back Load 0.184 0.003 1.432 0.175 0.003 1.432 
 (1.303)   (1.236)   
Turnover -0.477* -0.008* 2.232 -0.477* -0.008* 2.232 
 (-1.796)   (-1.907)   
Flows 0.061*** 0.001*** 0.688 0.062*** 0.001*** 0.688 
 (3.692)   (3.938)   
Company Funds -0.048*** -0.001*** 50.790 -0.047*** -0.001*** 50.790 
 (-3.164)   (-3.136)   
Company Size 0.333** 0.006** 2.329 0.329** 0.006** 2.329 
 (2.103)   (2.037)   
Observations 34542   34542   
Pseudo R2 0.209   0.206   
Baseline predicted  
probability 
0.051   0.051   
 
 
5. Endogeneity Issues 
As with any empirical study, an important concern in the interpretation of our results is 
the fact of being under some endogeneity issues. In the following sections, we take a 
number of steps to address this concern. 
5.1.Propensity Matching Scores.  
Our first endogeneity concern arises from the idea that SRI might perform better when 
they are managed by individual managers due to a selection criterion from the management 
companies, which allocate their best managers into a single structure of management of SRI 
funds, while set the worse managers to manage conventional funds within a team 
organization. Thus, SRI funds managed by individuals outperform not because of the effect 
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of the manager’s most resources optimization per se, but for the way the managers self-
select themselves to be allocated. Therefore, in this section we employ a propensity score 
matching procedure using Nearest Neighbor of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and the 
Stratified Sampling of Hunt and Tyrrell (2001) to identify a control sample of funds that 
that exhibit no observable differences in characteristics except for the main variable of 
interest.  
In Table 12, we compare the fund performance (the alpha from the 9-factors model 
previously defined) between different groups under a propensity score matching approach. 
To implement this methodology, we first calculate the probability (e.g., the propensity 
score) that a fund with given characteristics is managed by a single manager. The 
propensity score is calculated using the portfolio manager characteristics that we included 
in the specification model [3]. More specifically, this probability is estimated as a function 
of fund size, fund age, expenses turnover, fund flows, number of funds per family and 
family size. To ensure that the funds in the control sample are sufficiently similar to the 
funds on treatment group, we require that the maximum difference between the propensity 
score of these funds and that of its matching peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. 
We can observe that main results remain unchanged and we can certainly confirm that 
individual management structures are better when managing SRI funds.   
5.2.Heckmann two-Step Selection Bias.  
By construction, to examine the effect on individual vs team management organization 
on SRI funds, we need to assume that the fund family is free to offer SRI portfolios, 
however, in many cases the management company do not have a policy of offering these 
type of funds. Therefore, we will be under a selection bias problem in which, only a 
subsample of managers can be allocated to a SRI portfolio under a single mandates. To 
address this issue, we conduct the Heckman selection model, in which first we obtain the 
probability of being a SRI fund, and in the second stage, we estimate the effect of managing 
the portfolio individually on fund performance.  
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The Table 13 reports the regression results from the Heckman two-stage estimation. In 
the first-stage regression, we model the probability that a fund family is managing at least 
one SRI fund58: 
                                                              
 3                   ,  1+ 4  , −12+                                                                 [7] 
where      is the cdf (cumulative density function) of the standard normal distribution. 
The dependent variable             is a dummy variable equals 1 if the fund has a Socially 
Responsible Investment policy.                is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
fund j belongs to a fund family that has at least one SRI fund and 0 otherwise.    is a 
constant and                 is a dummy variable equals 1 if the funds is managed by a 
single manager.                         is measured by the standard deviation of the error 
from estimating the 9-F performance measure.        is a set of control variables previously 
used. We also include year and style dummies and the standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level. We show that the probability of being a manager that manages more than one 
fund depends positively on the ratio of funds per manager of their family.  
In the second stage, we find that conditioned on the probability of being a SRI fund, 
those funds that are managed by an individual portfolio manager outperform their team-
managed peer between 65.04 and 91.68 bps per year. Therefore, consistent with our last 
hypothesis, these results give more evidence that even though SRI funds are managed by 
managers with better investment profile, when controlling for superior managers self-
selection, those managing SRI funds in individual structures are still better managed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
 The selection equation (first-stage regression) needs to include at least one variable that is clearly 
determining in the process of discriminating whether it belongs to the sample and at the same time not affect 
much the dependent variable. We have to assume that “Ratio Funds per Manager” is not affecting the 
promotion decision, as cannot think of any obvious economic stories for why this assumption would be false.   
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Table 12  
Endogeneity Issues (I): Propensity Matching Scores 
 
In this table, we identify different control samples on each row by employing two different propensity score 
matching procedures: Nearest Neighbor of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Stratified Sampling of Hunt and 
Tyrrell (2001). The propensity score is estimated using fund size, fund age, expenses turnover, fund flows, 
number of funds per family and family size. We require that the difference between the propensity score of 
the treatment and control groups does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. We then compare the fund 
performance after fees (using net returns) between the two groups and report the value of the difference and 
the t-statistic using bootstrapped standard errors associated to that difference. Fund performance is defined as 
the alpha from Carhart and from the 9-factors model (Carhart’s model augmented by 5 more factors). The 
first row compares SRI funds managed by individual portfolios and team managed ones. The second row 
presents the differences between SRI and Conventional funds managed by an individual manager. The last 
row shows the excess performance of SRI funds managed by individual portfolio managers over the rest of 
funds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F 
 
 
Nearest  
Neighbor 
Stratified  
Sampling 
Nearest  
Neighbor 
Stratified  
Sampling 
Individual Vs Team 
(SRI funds) 
Difference 0.018 0.025 0.053 0.072 
t-stat 1.678 2.963 3.421 6.218 
SRI Vs Conventional 
(Individual managed funds) 
Difference 0.055 0.036   0.069 0.067 
t-stat 5.421 5.237 5.239 7.173 
SRI (Individual managed) 
 Vs any other funds 
Difference 0.031 0.030 0.057 0.063 
t-stat 3.12 4.56 4.545 6.78 
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Table 13  
Endogeneity Issues (II): Heckmann 2 Step Selection Bias 
 
In this table, we show the estimates from Heckman’s two-step procedure where the first stage regression 
model estimates the probability that a fund is under a social investment category and in the second stage, how 
being managed by individual portfolio manager affects the fund performance, conditioned on being a SRI 
fund. Firm policy is the proportion of Socially Responsible funds the family has over their total pool of funds 
offered. The remaining variables have been previously described. The sample contains all U.S. mutual funds 
from 1996 to 2011. Time dummies are included but not reported; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Step: Fund Performance 
 Alpha Carhart Alpha 9F 
Individual 0.0542*** 0.0764*** 
 (6.11) (6.11) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
 
First Step: Probability of SRI funds 
Individual 0.0182* 0.0182* 
 (1.86) (1.86) 
Size (log TNA) 0.0314*** 0.0314*** 
 (10.80) (10.80) 
Age 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 
 (13.15) (13.15) 
Expenses 0.0507*** 0.0507*** 
 (5.53) (5.53) 
Turnover -0.0337*** -0.0337*** 
 (-10.50) (-10.50) 
Flows 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 
 (2.68) (2.68) 
Company Funds 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 (5.62) (5.62) 
Company Size -0.0601*** -0.0601*** 
 (-19.13) (-19.13) 
Firm Policy 4.9222*** 4.9222*** 
 (178.42) (178.42) 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0953*** 0.0953*** 
 (35.47) (35.47) 
Observations 439350 439350 
Pseudo R2 0.3967 0.3877 
Style Dummies Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
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6. Conclusions 
The recent debate about the efficiency of team-management in the mutual fund industry 
has not considered the fact that some portfolios are under a restricted investment 
opportunity set from which a single manager approach could yield better managerial 
performance. This chapter is an empirical examination of whether SRI funds managed by 
individuals perform better than these funds managed by teams.  
We examine whether individual management leads to better performance, relative to 
team management approach, when portfolio managers face a restricted opportunity set of 
investment. Socially responsible investment funds industry provides an ideal empirical 
setting in this context as these funds implements strict social criteria that exclude firms, 
economic sectors or even entire industries from their portfolios. Unlike conventional class 
of investments, SRI funds apply a set of investment screens to select stocks from an 
investment pool based on social, environmental or ethical (SEE) criteria. This implies a 
shorter universe from which a fund manager allocates their assets and greater coordination 
requirements. One of the advantages of using this specific investment industry is that, 
unlike sector funds, SRI selects the number of screens to apply to its investment portfolio. 
Thus, this allows us to compare not only restricted vs non-restricted portfolios but also 
within different levels of restrictions. Another important benefit is that despite the 
increasing trend of team management approach, there are many portfolios that are still 
managed by individual employees, hence we can evaluate differences between team and 
individual structures in general and also interact them between conventional and SRI funds. 
We show that SRI funds are better managed under an individual management structure 
independently of the specific fund and family characteristics. This performance increases 
for SRI funds with highly levels of social screenings since individual management leads to 
sharpen information processing and decision-making. Our results are robust to different 
approaches, evidencing the organizational effectiveness when management structure is 
properly aligned to the operational scope. 
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